University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2005

PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICS OF REWILDING NATURE: THE
CASE OF GRIZZLY BEAR REINTRODUCTION IN IDAHO
John G. Hintz
University of Kentucky

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Hintz, John G., "PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICS OF REWILDING NATURE: THE CASE OF GRIZZLY BEAR
REINTRODUCTION IN IDAHO" (2005). University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations. 357.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/357

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

John G. Hintz

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
College of Arts and Sciences
2005

PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICS OF REWILDING NATURE:
THE CASE OF GRIZZLY BEAR REINTRODUCTION IN IDAHO

__________________________________
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
___________________________________
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

By
John G. Hintz
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Susan M. Roberts, Associate Professor of Geography
Lexington, Kentucky
2005
Copyright © John G. Hintz 2005

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICS OF REWILDING NATURE:
THE CASE OF GRIZZLY BEAR REINTRODUCTION IN IDAHO

In 1975, the US Fish and Wildlife Service listed the grizzly bear as a “threatened
species” under the Endangered Species Act. Following the listing, a recovery plan was
drafted in which the Bitterroot Ecosystem of central Idaho and extreme western Montana
was one of six proposed grizzly bear recovery areas. It was the only one of the six,
however, which did not contain a resident population of grizzlies. The Fish and Wildlife
Service eventually accepted a proposal submitted by a coalition of environmental and
timber industry groups. The coalition proposed to reestablish a population of grizzlies in
the Bitterroot by translocating 25 bears over five years from existing populations in the
US and Canada. The proposal, however, included significant concessions, including
reduced protection for the reintroduced grizzlies and management of the grizzly
population by a “Citizen Management Committee.” A large contingent of regional and
national environmental groups quickly rose up in vociferous objection to the proposal –
exposing a significant rift within the environmental movement. These environmentalists
objected to the very idea of Citizen Management and also claimed that the proposed
recovery area was too small to ensure recovery.
Drawing on interviews and document analyses, this dissertation employs an
environmental pragmatist approach to examine the intra-environmentalist disputes that
flared up throughout the Bitterroot grizzly recovery debates. The dissertation focuses on
the relationship between environmental ideologies, science, and conservation advocacy,
with an eye toward examining how environmentalists crafted and defended rival
proposals for grizzly recovery. Through this interpretive lens, the dissertation aims to
explain the existence and persistence of this intra-environmentalism rift as well as
explore its ramifications for environmentalism in the region.
While no wholly unified environmental movement can ever be possible – or is
even necessarily desirable – unwavering commitments to unreachable ideals on the part
of many environmentalists are hindering the growth, flexibility and efficacy of
conservation in the region. The main contribution of this dissertation will be to provide
an empirical case study that defends the environmental pragmatist assertion that hostile

and unnecessary divisiveness within the environmental movement ultimately obstructs
the development of a more successful environmentalism.
KEYWORDS: Environmental Pragmatism, Nature-Society Geography, Environmental
Politics and Policy, Grizzly Bear Conservation, Rocky Mountain Northwest
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Examining an Intra-Environmentalism Debate
1.1. Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot: Gone but not Forgotten
It was the largest forest fire in American history. Maybe even the largest
forest fire ever… For two terrifying days and nights - August 20 and 21,
1910 - the fire raged across three million acres of virgin timberland in
northern Idaho and western Montana. Many thought the world would end,
and for 86, it did (Petersen, 1994).
The devastating forest fires of 1910 hold a prominent place in the history of the
State of Idaho. When reading about the “great burn” (Peterson, 1976, p. 118), it is
invariably the loss of human life (Petersen, 1994) or the amazing physical destruction left
in its wake (e.g., five Idaho towns, including the good-sized mining town of Wallace,
were all but burned to the ground (Moore, 1996)) that dominate the storyline. Usually
relegated to footnote status is the fact that the great burn opened up the rugged, scrabbly,
mountainous and (thanks to the fires, formerly) densely forested areas north and south of
the Lochsa River to sheep grazing. The newly arrived sheep herders – even as their
presence in the region would be short-lived – would play a large part in determining the
course of environmental politics in the region three-quarters of a century later.
Fearing (and occasionally suffering (Moore, 1996)) livestock losses due to grizzly
bear depredation, Forest Service employees and sheep herders adopted a shoot-on-sight
policy toward grizzly bears (Parsell, 1986; Roy et al., 2001), and their efforts would
prove effective beyond even their goals. Unlike previous and concurrent campaigns to
exterminate wolves (McIntyre, 1995), the elimination of the grizzly bear was never
official Federal policy; but in the Bitterroot Ecosystem of central Idaho, their fates would
be the same. By the 1930s reports of grizzlies in the Bitterroot were so scarce that the
population had likely dwindled to only a few individuals, and the last confirmed track of
a grizzly bear in the Bitterroot was seen in 1946 (Moore, 1996).
The blame cannot be laid completely at the feet of sheep herders – their efforts
were just the final nail in the Bitterroot grizzly’s coffin. For a couple of decades before
the great burn, sport hunters and trappers killed dozens of grizzlies every year in the
Bitterroot country (Moore, 1996). Dams were another anthropogenic cause of the
Bitterroot grizzly’s demise. In 1927 a hydropower dam was built on the Clearwater River
at Lewiston, Idaho, cutting off salmon – an important Bitterroot grizzly food source –
1

from the Bitterroot country (Moore, 1996; Roy et al., 2001). No one knows how many
grizzlies historically inhabited the Bitterroot and Clearwater regions of Idaho before their
quick demise commenced around the turn of the twentieth century. What we do know is
that much of the Bitterroot Ecosystem is now protected as Federally-designated
wilderness, and that nearly all of the rest is national forests. Courtesy of these vast tracts
of Federally owned and managed lands, and despite depleted salmon runs,1 the region
still contains the necessary habitat to support a population of grizzly bears today (Bader
& Bechtold, 1996; Boyce & Waller, 2003; Merrill et al., 1999; Noss et al., 1996; Roy et
al., 2001; USFWS, 2000a).

1.2. The Evolution of an Environmental Debate
In the lower 48 states today, grizzly bears number around 1,000 individuals –
about two percent of the estimated 50,000 grizzly bears that roamed the West prior to
Euro-American settlement (USFWS, 2000a). In 1975 the grizzly bear was listed by the
US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) as a threatened species in the lower 48 States. The
1982 (revised 1993) FWS “Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan” listed six “grizzly bear
ecosystems” within which recovery efforts would be concentrated (Roy et al., 2001;
USFWS, 1982, 1993). Five of these ecosystems contain grizzlies: the Yellowstone (with
400-600 bears), Northern Continental Divide (300-400), Selkirk (45-50), Cabinet-Yaak
(30-40), and the North Cascades (5-30) (USFWS, 2000b). The sixth grizzly bear
ecosystem – the only one without a resident population of grizzly bears – is the Bitterroot
Ecosystem of central Idaho and extreme western Montana.

1

The dam at Lewiston is no longer there, even though four dams downstream (on the Snake River;
Lewiston lies at the confluence of the Clearwater and the Snake) have been constructed since. These newer
dams do not wholly block the Clearwater River anadromous fish runs, and steelhead and salmon do (once
again) make up into the Bitterroot country, but in nowhere near-historic numbers. Small enough numbers,
in fact, that their presence does not constitute a potential viable food source for grizzly bears. (USFWS,
2000a).
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Figure 1.1. The Six “Grizzly Bear Ecosystems” in the US Lower 48 States (map
from Roy et al., 2001, p. 208)
In 1992, the FWS began studying the idea of recovering grizzly bears in the
Bitterroot Ecosystem (BE) by reintroducing a small number of grizzlies into the SelwayBitterroot Wilderness area – a 1.6 million acre Wilderness area in the heart of the
Bitterroot Ecosystem. The FWS accepted a recovery proposal submitted by a coalition of
environmental and timber industry groups that would eventually become the FWS’
official “preferred alternative” for recovery in the 1997 Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) on Bitterroot grizzly recovery (Roy et al., 2001; USFWS, 1997a). Touted
as a “grassroots” (Barker, 2000, p. 1) “common-sense solution” (NWF, 1997b, p. 3) to an
historically polarizing issue – the conservation of endangered species on Federal lands –
the recovery proposal included two key features that many environmentalists in the
region found to be unacceptable compromises.
First, the reintroduced grizzly population was to be managed by a “Citizen
Management Committee” comprised of gubernatorial appointees from Idaho and
Montana, Federal and State management professionals, and one representative of the Nez
Perce Tribe. Many environmental groups in the region vociferously opposed the idea of
citizen management, fearing that the committee would be guided more by politics than
science. Secondly, unlike grizzlies inhabiting the other five grizzly bear ecosystems, the
reintroduced grizzly bears would not have the full protection offered under the
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“threatened” status by the ESA. The reintroduced BE population would be designated an
“experimental nonessential population,” granting the FWS and Federal land management
agencies a degree of “flexible and responsive management” not available to fully
protected “threatened” or “endangered” species (Roy et al., 2001, p. 215). For many
environmentalists in the region “greater flexibility can be translated as more dead bears”
(USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-124), and because the grizzly is a slowly reproducing species, dead
bears would spell the ultimate failure of the effort (Bader & Bechtold, 1996).
Environmentalists’ objections to the preferred alternative, however, went well
beyond questioning whether or not the recovery proposal, as written, would succeed.
Utilizing recent findings from the science of conservation biology, environmentalists
argued that adding a sixth, isolated population of grizzly bears – even if it were to
become established – would do little to ensure the future of the grizzly in the lower 48
States. What was needed, rather, was a plan to reconnect the separate ecosystems into one
grizzly bear “metapopulation,” providing the grizzly bears the habitat, dispersal
opportunities, and genetic diversity necessary to ensure long-term survival of the grizzly
bear (Bader & Bechtold, 1996). A coalition of regional environmental groups presented
the FWS with the more ambitious “Conservation Biology” proposal, which aimed to
recover grizzlies in the Bitterroot with the full protection of the ESA. The Conservation
Biology proposal also gave the reintroduced grizzlies a much larger protected recovery
zone and, through an ambitious ecological restoration effort, attempted to reconnect the
Bitterroot ecosystem to the Cabinet-Yaak ecosystem to the north. This recovery proposal
was included in the Draft and Final EISs, and was endorsed by the majority of
environmental advocates in the region (USFWS, 2001).
In 2000, with the publication of the Final EIS, citing favorable public opinion for
Bitterroot grizzly recovery (but obscuring the fact that much of this support was for the
Conservation Biology proposal), the FWS adopted its official preferred alternative, the
“Citizen Management Alternative” for grizzly recovery in the Bitterroot Ecosystem.
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt rubberstamped the proposal, and grizzly reintroduction
was to begin in the summer of 2002. The success of the project proved short-lived,
however. As her first major directive as Interior Secretary under the Bush administration,
Gale Norton shelved the reintroduction plan, effectively halting the reintroduction efforts
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altogether. The inability of this project to realize success supports the argument that the
growth – indeed the globalization – of environmental concern is not matched by
increased success in curtailing ecological problems (Fischer & Hajer, 1999; Luke, 1997).
The apparent intractability of grizzly bear conservation in the region makes the Bitterroot
reintroduction debates an ideal case study for examining the intra-environmental aspects
of the “crises” of grizzly bear conservation (Craighead et al., 1995; Mattson et al., 1996),
biodiversity decline (Soulé, 1987; Redford & Sanjayan, 2003), and environmentalism
more broadly (Athanasiou, 1998; Dowie, 1995; diZerega, 1996; Shabecoff, 2000).

1.3. The Object of Analysis: Conflict within Conservation
The divergence of opinion on what constitutes an acceptable grizzly bear recovery
proposal in the region marked, and exacerbated, a significant ideological rift within
conservation advocates in the region. This dissertation is devoted to examining the
ramifications of this intra-environmentalism divide. Through an analysis of the debates
over Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction during the latter half of the 1990s, my research
broadly addresses the following questions: What rhetorical and practical strategies do
environmentalists employ to advocate their proposals? How does ecological science
inform and shape conservation programs? What is the relationship between
environmental

ideologies,

environmental

science,

and

conservation

advocacy?

Addressing these questions in the context of the Bitterroot grizzly debates allows me to
accomplish a number of tasks in the dissertation. First, it enables an historical explanation
of the development of this intra-environmental divide – an understanding of how each
position developed individually as well as how the divide itself developed and is
perpetuated. Secondly, by deploying a critical methodology, I can highlight weaknesses,
inconsistencies, and contradictions within environmentalists’ ideological foundations as
well as within their products – the specific agendas for conservation. Thirdly, I can judge
the various ideologies and proposals on their own terms and comparatively in the context
of the Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction debates.
This general framework for analysis has enabled two significant contributions: In
the specific context of assessing the Bitterroot debates, I will make the case that the FWS
preferred alternative for grizzly recovery was preferable to the more ambitious alternative
proposed by its environmentalist-critics. More broadly, I hope that my critiques of the
5

conservation biology movement will assist in the positive development of endangered
species conservation and environmentalism writ large in the Rocky Mountain Northwest.
The findings and analysis of the dissertation come from two sources: documents
and interviews. The documents examined include government publications such as the
grizzly bear reintroduction EISs, transcripts of the public meetings held as part of the EIS
process, conservation proposals by grizzly bear ecologists, advocacy literature published
by environmental organizations, press releases by politicians, and newspaper editorials
and letters. Figure 1.2 represents the various actors in the debates and their “products” –
the documents, policies, and practices examined as part of the dissertation research
process.

Figure 1.2. Objects of Analysis: Bitterroot Grizzly Reintroduction Debate
Participants and their Outcomes/Products
I interviewed (in person, over the telephone, and over email) individuals
representing a variety of groups involved in the reintroduction debates, including Federal
Government employees, scientists, environmental activists advocating the Citizen
Management proposal, and environmental activists advocating the Conservation Biology
proposal. The majority of the document collection and the in-person interviewing took
place during the summer of 2003 during a three-month stay in Idaho and Montana.
Invaluable was the unlimited access I was granted to the extensive and well-organized
collection of documents pertaining to the Bitterroot reintroduction debates housed at the
FWS Grizzly Bear Recovery Office in Missoula, Montana.

1.4. Organization and Overview of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized into six chapters following this introduction. In
Chapter 2, I outline what I perceive to be the three dominant approaches to ‘critical’
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nature-society geography. Critical nature-society geography reflects the broader trend
within academic geography of scholars integrating the insights of various critical social
theories into their methodological and philosophical frameworks for analysis. One result
of this “critical turn” (Sayer, 1989, p. 206) in human geography has been new approaches
that, each in their own way, challenge the status quo in environmental geography, rework
existing and potential nature-society relationships, and open up previously uncharted
analytical, methodological, and political terrain. In this chapter, I outline the primary
philosophical and political underpinnings of these three frameworks – Marxist geography
and the production of nature, the social construction of nature, and nature as discourse.
In Chapter 3, I present my case for environmental pragmatism as a fourth critical
framework for nature-society analyses. This argument entails both a positive formulation
of pragmatism and a critique of the existing critical frameworks outlined in the previous
chapter. Positively, I develop and defend pragmatism as a philosophically and
methodologically robust framework for examining environmental politics. Further, I
argue that pragmatism offers a politically enabling framework for an environmentalist
analysis of the politics of nature. Woven throughout my articulation and defense of
environmental pragmatism is a thoroughgoing critique of the now-dominant critical
paradigms, which I find (in places) philosophically and politically wanting. I hope to
make clear in the chapter that I am not proposing environmental pragmatism as a
wholesale replacement for existing frameworks. Nor do I see pragmatism and the others
as mutually exclusive projects. Rather, I hope to establish the appropriateness of
pragmatism for the type of analysis I aim to put into practice, all the while noting the
methodological and political barriers that the other critical frameworks present for such a
project.
Chapter 4 begins my review and analysis of the Bitterroot grizzly bear
reintroduction debates. In this chapter, I map the development of the environmental
philosophy of deep ecology in the US. I examine the influence of deep ecology on the
science of conservation biology and specifically one of its more radical offshoots, the
“rewilding” movement (Barlow, 1999; Soulé & Noss, 1998). This is followed by a
review of recent academic critiques of deep ecology – critiques which are also, I find,
quite relevant to the rewilding movement. These sincerely sympathetic critics share the
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basic aspirations of deep ecologists, but none the less (in different ways and to different
degrees) find deep ecology unnecessarily divisive, philosophically suspect, and
politically problematic. As I find deep ecology, conservation biology, and the rewilding
movement to be primary determining influences on the environmentalist coalition that
crafted the Conservation Biology alternative for Bitterroot grizzly recovery, these
investigations frame my initial review, explanation, and critique of the Conservation
Biology alternative. After considerable review, I find that the deep ecology critics are
basically right – that the rewilding movement is divisive, “self-congratulatory” (Fox,
1990, p. 120), and imparts a problematic politics. The Conservation Biology alternative,
following this path, emerges riddled with unresolved inconsistencies and questionable
foundational claims.
In Chapter 5, I critically evaluate the Citizen Management alternative for
Bitterroot grizzly bear recovery. To situate the examination of this proposal, I offer a
‘geo-history’ of the Federal lands in the Bitterroot region, as well as an extended review
of the Endangered Species Act. The ESA review focuses on the aspects of the Act that
were the most controversial components of the Citizen Management proposal. Following
these reviews, I examine the rhetorical and representational devices through which
Citizen Management proponents attempted to gloss over the inherent inconsistencies in
the proposal and affix a sense of inevitability to the prospect of Federally-mandated
grizzly recovery proceeding in the region.
Chapter 6 revisits the Conservation Biology alternative. This chapter is divided
roughly into two sections. In the first, I examine some contested components of the
reintroduction debates through the lens of contemporary environmental ethics. Assessing
the recovery alternatives through two prominent litmus tests for environmental morality –
animal rights and holistic ecological ethics – I show how the Conservation Biology
alternative could easily appear as definitely favorable to the Citizen Management
proposal under both considerations. I contest the apparently self-evidentiary nature of this
conclusion using a Deweyan pragmatist methodology that both serves to critique the
foundational bases of the ethical claims of right action and offers an alternative method of
assessing the validity and justness of normative proposals. I begin the second section of
the chapter with a detailed examination of the adamant opposition to the Citizen
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Management proposal by Conservation Biology proposal advocates. Further developing
the analyses initiated in Chapter 4, I give more empirical weight to my preliminary
conclusions that the Conservation Biology proposal was both internally inconsistent and
politically problematic. I focus particularly on the persistence and upholding of the rigid
science/politics divide that was foundational to the Conservation Biology alternative
proponents’ opposition to the Citizen Management alternative. Following this admittedly
rather biting critique, I attempt an explanation of how and why the scientificfoundationalist model arose and has so resolutely persisted. This explanation – placing
this model of environmentalism within the broader movement – helps bring to light this
brand of activism’s positive role and necessary niche within environmental protection.
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, revisits the Citizen Management proposal.
Following the (self-imposed, but as I see it mandatory) environmental pragmatist
insistence on contributing to the development of more defensible policy, politics, and
activism, I judge whether the Citizen Management proposal might have been a preferable
and defensible course of action. Initially, I compare the economic components of each
proposal, and find the Citizen Management proposal more attuned and sensitive to the
sociopolitical and economic climate of central Idaho. This in itself, however, can not
justify an endorsement of the Citizen Management proposal. After all, this is a grizzly
bear conservation and not an economic development proposal, and it needs to be judged
as such. To further judge the defensibility of the Citizen Management proposal, then, I
begin with a review of the collaborative community-based conservation model upon
which the proposal is based. I come out in agreement with proponents of community
conservation, seeing this model as more democratic than traditional top-down Federal
lands management and more open-ended in nature than proposals assuming an idealized
and fixed socio-spatial-ecological end-result. Moreover, the history of the West –
particularly socioeconomic conditions in much of the rural West – seem to justify the
Bitterroot region as an appropriate and hopeful site in which to commence such an effort.
In response to the potential charge that I only reviewed literature sympathetic to, indeed
promoting, the community conservation model, I would respond that this review was
preceded by a careful analysis of some of citizen-based conservation’s fiercest critics –
the conservation biology advocates in the Rocky Mountain Northwest.
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Following the review and assessment of the community-based model, I outline the
FWS’s official response to the most strident critiques leveled by Conservation Biology
alternative proponents. This explanation is necessary for a couple of reasons. First, it was
not included in full in the discussion of the Citizen Management proposal in Chapter 5.
Secondly, it provides a very reasonable defense, albeit of the admittedly narrow aims of
the proposal. Realizing, however, that restating the official response to a proposal viewed
by its critics as unacceptable compromise would do little to alter the opinions of these
same critics, I then project several scenarios that might have come to pass if the Citizen
Management proposal had been implemented. In projecting these ‘what if’ scenarios, I
find that at worst, implementation of the Citizen Management proposal leaves us in no
worse shape than before. More significantly, projected with any degree of optimism
(optimism that I argue is warranted based upon my review of community conservation in
the previous section), I see the Citizen Management proposal emerging as a positive step
toward the broader goals of grizzly bear conservation and, more broadly, environmental
sustainability in the region.

1.5. Roads not Taken
To conclude this introduction, I would like to mention a couple of ‘roads not
taken’ in this research project. In the initial phases of the project, such as when I was
applying to external funding agencies for travel expenses, I proposed something along the
lines of a “comprehensive analysis of one long-standing ecologically and socially
significant debate.” As I attempted to outline what this project would ultimately end up
looking like, and moreover as I read dozens of institutional, academic, and journalistic
accounts of the debates, I soon realized that this project had already been completed by
many others. Indeed, it had already been completed by many others much more ‘inside’
the debates than myself (as I initiated this project just before it was tabled by Secretary
Norton, there was little opportunity to get inside the conflict). It seemed presumptuous,
then, to assume that I could offer much that was substantively and analytically fresh at
such a broad, overview scale. Even more problematic was trying to get any purchase on
what exactly would be my lines of analysis in attempting some or another
“comprehensive critical review” of the debates. So I decided to focus my efforts on
finding some aspect of the debates not yet fully explored, or perhaps at least not yet
10

‘critically’ explored; my sense being that a more limited but more focused analysis would
ultimately yield more original insight into this debate, and, just as significantly, be of
greater relevance to the study and practice of environmental politics Hopefully my review
of the debates that is still a large part of the dissertation is adequately “comprehensive” so
that a reader with little or no knowledge of this conflict can still understand its broader
import, as well as appreciate this work’s specific contribution.
But even with all that said, the limited focus did obviate the review and analysis
of at least one important component of the debate. Probably the most conspicuously
absent characters in the dissertation are the outright opponents of grizzly recovery, and,
as can be judged by the quick-and-easy termination of the reintroduction program, this
opposition was no marginal force. Studying the power-politics of anti-conservation forces
could certainly have resulted in an equally important contribution, but would have
necessitated a different (or at least an enormous additional) collection of documents,
research sites (e.g., Boise, Idaho and Washington, DC), and interview subjects. More
likely than adding one more dimension to this project, however, would have been the
development of a different project altogether.
It may indeed be true that the closure of the project was little more than a
backroom deal brokered between the newly elected duo of Idaho Governor Dirk
Kempthorne and President George W. Bush (both foes of environmentalism, it is fair to
say). Even so, it seems fair to state that a less internally divided environmental movement
– more specifically, one less hostile to creative if risky compromise – would have, to
some degree or another, made it more difficult for the Bush administration to rather
quietly terminate the entire Bitterroot grizzly bear recovery process. So there is a ‘small
picture’ and a ‘big picture’ relevance to the framework I chose – small picture: intraenvironmental

divisiveness

hindered

(albeit

to

an

unknowable

degree)

the

implementation of Bitterroot grizzly recovery; big picture: a more unified environmental
movement will be more successful, on the ground, in the future (Norton, 1991; Light,
2004).
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Chapter 2. Nature: Now, More than Ever, Critical to Human
Geography
2.1. Introduction
Despite two decades of a human geography increasingly infused with the insights
of social theory, in 1989 Margaret FitzSimmons would bemoan geography’s “peculiar
silence on the question of social Nature” (FitzSimmons, 1989, p. 106). Over the next
decade, however, the silence would be replaced by a roar. Indeed, in 1998 Noel Castree
and Bruce Braun would proclaim that “Nature … is on the agenda as never before”
(Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 3). But what exactly is the “nature” that Castree and Braun
(correctly) claim is so prominently on “the agenda”? To answer this question, I will trace
the development of three primary (and more or less chronological) streams of ‘critical’
nature-society geography: the production of nature, the social construction of nature, and
nature as discourse. These frameworks rose to prominence in the geographical literature
in a more or less chronological fashion, echoing broader social-theoretical trends within
the discipline. Each of these frameworks, for different reasons and in different ways,
places the idea that we can know, speak for, or save ‘nature’ under relentlessly skeptical
scrutiny. They all present very direct challenges to ‘status-quo’ environmental geography.
Addressing (and when necessary redressing) these challenges is a necessary component
of any contemporary ‘critical’ environmental geography. To take up this task, I will
review and critically assess each of these perspectives, outlining their foundational
philosophical and political commitments, all the while critically assessing the
consistency, veracity and tenor of their claims.

2.2. Critical Nature-Society Geography I: Marxist Geography and the
Production of Nature
I begin my review and discussion of the production of nature thesis with the
statement that, of the three theses reviewed in this section, the production of nature thesis
is the one that I find the most helpful and useful for this research project. As such, out of
these three theses, the production of nature is the one that will most directly inform the
empirical analyses in chapters four through seven. Echoing Raymond Rogers, my goal is
to formulate a theoretical framework for analysis that registers the “embeddedness”
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(Rogers, 1994, p. 20) of human beings and cultural institutions in nature. Suffice it to say
for now that it is my contention that the production of nature thesis does forge a theory of
human embeddedness in nature (although it does so in a problematic fashion, a point
which will be returned to in detail), while the social construction of nature and nature as
discourse theses too readily veer toward a disembedding of things human from nature
(again, a point which will be returned to later). With that said, I will review the arrival of
Marxism to academic geography, followed by an elaborated discussion of the production
of nature thesis.
Not surprisingly, the radical fervor of late 1960s – centered on issues of racism,
sexism, the despoliation of the environment, and a general left outrage toward the
Vietnam War – spurred a radicalism in segments of even the most conservative of
academic disciplines (Peet, 1969, 1997). Geography proved no exception. In 1969,
Antipode: A Journal of Radical Geography was founded for the express purpose of
publishing overtly radical-political academic research: “We believe that involvement in
the problems and inequities of an affluent but ailing nation is the critical issue and that
the era of the academic ostrich has at long last come to an end” (Peet, 2000, p. 67). The
bulk of the initial radical intervention was more form than substance, however, as early
radical geographers remained reliant upon conventional methodologies and assumptions.
What these methods lacked was any way of connecting “social issues to their origins in
societal structures” (Peet 2000, p. 75). Space was an isometric plane and society was
made of individual rational economic agents. What had become “scientific” geography
could only ask questions that at the end of the day always managed to “justify the
[existing] economic system” (p. 74). To truly break free of the limitations and ideological
bases of “bourgeois modes of thought and analysis” (Slater 1997, p. 48) many radical
geographers quickly turned to the social theory of Marxism.
Clearly, this is not the place to attempt to write the nth synopsis of Marxian
political economy or social theory, but it is important to flesh out in a bit of detail some
of the ways in which Marxist geography signaled a true departure from mainstream social
science. This discussion is necessary as it marks the initial infusion of any critical social
theory into academic geography. The two discussions that follow this one – on nature
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constructionism and nature as discourse – are continuations of social theory-informed
geography, and logically follow this thread.
In the two decades prior to the Marxist intervention, geography had moved from
rather non-theoretical descriptive regional geographies to a more self-described scientific,
theory-based quantitative geography.2 The latter, the “spatial science” that took off in the
1960s, was for the most part a new (to America, anyway) economic geography which
drew heavily on the earlier “commercial geographies” of European theorists such as
Christaller, von Thünen, and Lösch (Gregory, 1994, p. 59). The foundation for the new
spatial science was a rather uncritical appropriation and deployment of metaphors from
neoclassical economics (rational landscapes and rational human action) and physics
(spatial diffusion, spatial interaction). Early Marxist geographers cited (among other
problems) two glaring deficiencies in this foundation: first, the assumption that society is
comprised of disconnected, rational individuals unaffected by social structures and
processes; secondly, that the physics-based spatial modeling made no connections
between spatial form and social structures and processes. Established Marxist-materialist
theory immediately remedied the former of these deficiencies and potentially could, it
was thought, if properly applied, remedy the latter as well. Marxist geographers set out to
challenge “the previously hegemonic ‘spatial science’… [by turning the argument] on
how the relation between space and society should be conceptualized” (Massey, 1994,
p.254):
[While the] spatial scientist has posited an autonomous sphere of the
spatial in which ‘spatial relations’ and ‘spatial processes’ produced spatial
distributions, … [the Marxist critic sets out to show that] all these socalled spatial relations and spatial processes were actually social relations
taking a particular geographical form… The aphorism of the time was
‘space is a social construct’. That is to say … space is constituted through
social relations and material social practices (p.254).
The first geographer to move well beyond aphoristic polemics and forge a Marxist
geographical theory was David Harvey. His second major work, 1973’s Social Justice
2

This comment is not meant to disparage descriptive regional geographies as a wholly unworthy endeavor,
but I will not review this geographical paradigm because it does not really inform or influence my research
project. Nor is this comment meant to imply that spatial science simply replaced regional geography
(indeed, this vein of regional geography still exists, but these geographers make up a significantly smaller
cadre of the discipline than they did in the 1950s and 60s). One ‘take home’ point here is that spatial
scientists did forge their theories as explicitly theory-based, in opposition and reaction to non-theoretical
regional geographies.
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and the City (Harvey, 1973), “records Harvey’s move from a liberal, critical, position
focused on ethics, to a Marxism based in the science of historical materialism” (Peet,
2000, p. 75). His experience in the inner city of Baltimore (he was then a professor at
Johns Hopkins) combined with his readings of Marx made him acutely aware of the
necessity for a radical, materialist theory of urban space (Peet, 2000). But how, exactly,
does Marxist materialism offer a departure from the methods of ‘bourgeois social
science’?
Developed throughout his early philosophical works, Marx’s materialism was
foremost a deliberate repudiation of philosophical idealism. Marx’s most concise and
famous materialist maxim states that “it is not the consciousness of men that determine
their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”
(Marx, 1994, p. 211). Citing this one sentence out of context is not to suggest that a
Marxian materialism crudely postulates a one-way determinism; Marxian dialectics is
clearly more nuanced than any such cursory reading might suggest. The materialist fiat
does, however, intentionally counter the idealist premise that ideas constitute the primary
determinants of social change. To forge a radical theory, then, studying ideas and
working toward changing what people think is inadequate. The site of social change (and
therefore, the primary focus of Marxist analysis) must be the social structures that (again,
to a great extent for any materialist, but to what extent is of course highly contestable)
determine the ideological foundations of any society. The geographic analogue of the
materialist critique of idealism lies in the materialist debunking of “spatial fetishism—
that is, [mainstream] geography’s restriction of causality to the spatial realm” (Peet,
2000, p. 110). Claiming that a certain aspect of the urban form3 under capitalism, perhaps
the depression of a particular industrial region, for example, causes a particular
geography of poverty is patently ideological. Such simplistic explanations obfuscate the
3

And, for early Marxist geographers, the urban did serve as something of a stand-in for all social space. As
FitzSimmons (1989) argued so effectively in “The Matter of Nature,” the near-exclusive concern with the
urban (to the exclusion of the rural and undeveloped or less-developed lands) prefigures an analytical bias
that tends to marginalize questions focusing on, for example, environmental problems not directly
associated with cities. Harvey provides a succinct example, when he appears to find everything he needs
for a comprehensive social analysis in the city: “Urbanism appears as a vantage point from which to
capture some salient features in the social processes operating in society as a whole—[the city] becomes, as
it were, a mirror in which other aspects of society can be reflected” (Harvey, 1973, p.16) This urban bias in
Marxist social science has been remedied to a reasonable extent since FitzSimmons published her
groundbreaking essay.
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fact that the constant annihilation and renovation of the landscape (urban or otherwise) is
a requirement for the ongoing reproduction of capitalism. The unceasing quest for capital
accumulation produces space – as a geography of uneven development. Thus capitalist
production spatializes the poverty which is already a necessary component of the
capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 1973). Harvey would dedicate about two decades
and several books toward his development of an adequately spatialized (and
contemporized) reading of Marx’s late political economy (i.e., all three volumes of
Capital and the lesser-known three volume Theories of Surplus Value (Harvey 1982)).
Harvey was, of course, not without his critics. With the publication of the 1980
Annals essay “The Socio-Spatial Dialectic,” Edward Soja set out to craft a more nuanced
Marxist (or perhaps post-Marxist) materialist theory of space. Soja critiqued Harvey’s
conception of space as too deterministic, implicating space as “simply an expression of
the class structure emerging from the social (i.e., aspatial) relations of production” (Soja,
1980, p. 208). The title of Soja’s paper quite effectively outlines much of his thesis.
Arguing for a “socio-spatial dialectic,” Soja is proposing a ‘third-way’, one which
doesn’t fall prey to an uncritical spatial fetishism, where space and (social-) spatial forms
are autonomous of social structure (as employed by spatial scientists), but also doesn’t go
too far in the other direction by evoking causality as somewhat unidirectionally from the
social to the spatial (the framework Harvey resists, but still tends toward, according to
Soja). Soja’s “socio-spatial dialectic” is still materialist, locating this dialectic as “one
defined component of the general relations of production” (Soja, 1980). By adequately
registering the dialectic nature of this (and other) relations within capitalism, Soja argued,
rather than getting bogged down in irresolvable discussions of causality, more fruitful
lines of discussion and analysis are opened up.
My point here is not to take sides on the Harvey-Soja debate. Rather, my intent is
to use this brief review to highlight both the fundamental tenets of the integration of
Marxist materialism in geography (the radical transformative spirit; an analytical focus
on social structures) and some key points of contention within early Marxist geography
(problems of causality and determinism; the ‘place’ of space within Marxist theory).
Space, of course, has never been the sole concern of disciplinary geography. The
emphasis on space and spatial theorizing within early Marxist geography was probably
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more than anything reflective of the fact that the first wave of Marxist geographers was
dominated by urban-economic geographers attempting to counter the spatial science that
had achieved some degree of hegemony within the discipline. It wouldn’t be long,
however, before Marxist geographers would tackle another longstanding problematic of
disciplinary geography – ‘the matter of nature’.
Neil Smith elaborately developed the production of nature thesis his 1984 book
Uneven Development (Smith, 1991).4 Smith prefigures his theoretical contribution with
an historical review of the modern conception of nature, which he argues, is
fundamentally contradictory and ideological. The modern conception of nature as
external to human society is traced back to Francis Bacon. For science (since Bacon)
nature is external “in the sense that scientific method and procedure dictates an absolute
abstraction both from the social context of the events and objects under scrutiny and from
the social context of the scientific activity itself” (Smith, 1991, p. 4). With the
objectification and externalization of nature, science and scientists inherit an automatic
and exclusive authority (an authority that science has more or less managed to retain to
this day). For it is only through scientific method that nature can be known in its true
sense. Science produces truth. Truth – about nature – is those statements that reflect
nature in its objective, non-social, unfiltered form. This is an ontological as well
epistemological claim. Ontologically, there is a nature that is external to human history.
Epistemologically, science provides the procedure through which humans can filter out
the ‘noise’ of sociality and history and comprehend the external objects and universal
laws of nature.
The externalization of nature did not, however, simply supplant previous
conceptions of the universality of nature (e.g., nature as cosmos, nature as the ‘book of
God’ – conceptions in which humans are a part of nature). Universal nature still existed
as natural processes (laws), space and time, and the fundamental physical bits of nature
(matter). Smith argues that there is a conceptual dualism buried within the modern
conception of nature: First, there is external nature, objectified in the labor process. But
no matter how efficient this labor process becomes, no matter how much external nature
4

This review of Smith’s theory is from the 1991 second edition of Uneven Development, but the additions
to the second edition did not constitute a major revision of the book, and certainly not of the production of
nature thesis, which is but one subset of Smith’s larger argument.
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is ‘mastered’, humans are still subject to natural laws (i.e., still at the whims of universal
nature). The irresolvability of this dualism underpins the ideological character of the
modern conception of nature. Smith takes ideology to be
an inverted, truncated, version of reality…, not simply a set of wrong
ideas… [but rather] ideas rooted in the practical experience…of a given
social class which sees reality from its own perspective. Although in this
way a partial reflection of reality, the class attempts to universalize its own
perception of the world (Smith, 1991, p. 15).
Thus prevailing dominant conceptions of nature will reflect the ideology of the
dominant class. Regardless of the contradictory character of a simultaneously external
and universal nature, either conception can be drawn upon (selectively yet
unproblematically) to justify various normative pronouncements or productive activities.
External nature can justify its subjugation (as mere matter, latent profit, or hostile
domain) or its protection (as presocial, undefiled wilderness). Universal nature can
invest certain social behaviors with the status of natural events, by which
it is meant that these behaviors and characteristics are normal, God-given,
and unchangeable. Competition, profit, war, private property, sexism,
heterosexism, racism, the existence of haves and have nots or of ‘chiefs
and Indians’ – the list is endless – all are deemed natural. Nature, not
human history, is made responsible (Smith, 1991, p. 15-16, emphasis
added).
Smith argues that the contradiction of external/universal nature must be attenuated
for its ideological (class-favoring) power to be maintained. But in the end, “the
possibility of the socialization of universal nature is denied” (p. 16). The “socialization of
universal nature” – Smith’s ideal – would register the fact that there can be no nature
external to the social. There is no external nature to subjugate or ‘save’; likewise there is
no universal (nonsocial) nature from which timeless, universal (social) morals can be
gleaned. In his move from review to theorization, Smith adopts the more Marxist term
“production” whereupon the human relation with nature (writ large) is theorized as “the
production of nature.”
Smith rarely shies away from making broad, bold statements, and the opening to
the second chapter of Uneven Development (titled “The Production of Nature”) proves no
exception: “The function of this chapter…is to renovate our conception of nature in such
a way that the dualistic world of bourgeois ideology can be reconstituted as an integrated
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whole” (Smith, 1991, p. 32). Smith takes Marx’s anthropological conception of
production (from The German Ideology) to be the central, defining statement on the
human-nature relation. Marx depicts “production [in general] as a process by which the
form of nature is altered” (p. 35). A “producer” changes nature to make it useful to him
or her and as such nature is changed in the production process. But the alterations
inherent to the production process do not act solely in the direction of human → nature.
In the process of production, the human being is changed as well. Physical, material
changes in the human being are required to fulfill the production in process, and the
makeup of these changes is a product of the natural properties of the ‘nature’ being
produced. But “production” itself clearly remains specific to humans: “It is human
productive activity … as an historical act designed to create means of subsistence that
differentiates human beings from animals” (p. 37, emphasis added). A beaver building a
dam, then, is not the production of nature, but a human building a dam is.
Defined as such, even though the dialectical (two-way) character of the
“alteration” inherent in every act of production is noted, the production of nature clearly
denotes the human production of non-human nature. As Mick Smith notes in his critique
of eco-Marxist theorizing in general, the production of nature thesis holds an undeniably
“explicit emphasis given to human activities and influences” (Smith, 2001, p. 90). When
“the production of nature” stands in for all of nature, as it seems to for Neil Smith, the
ambiguity of the foundational construct ‘production’ arises as problematic, particularly
when deploying the theory to analyze, as in the example of my research project, debates
over an endangered species. To place the debates over grizzly reintroduction in a
production of nature framework, then, do we “widen the definitions of ‘labor’ and
‘production’ so far as to include nature as an active partner in the dialectic” ([Mick]
Smith, 2001, p. 92)? We could, but how then would “the production of nature” be any
more specified – and hence analytically useful – than, say, “society-nature relations”? As
Stephen Seidman notes, we seem to be left with a choice: “[t]he category of ‘productive’
activity either expands to include virtually all human practices, in which case it is useless
as a conceptual strategy, or it narrows arbitrarily to economic laboring activity”
(Seidman, 1992, p. 57, in Smith, 2001, p. 101) (after which, I would argue, it is far too
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narrow a category to be a central analytical construct for many research projects, this one
included).
But perhaps, for an analysis of environmental politics, the production of nature
thesis need not be accepted or rejected in its entirety; that is, either accepting it as The
Theory of The Human Relation with Nature, or rejecting it on the grounds of its narrow
reliance the upon the Marxist “production paradigm” (Smith, 2001, Chapter 3). Perhaps
there are moments within the production of nature thesis that can be employed effectively
to open up avenues for analysis that would be missed if a less explicitly critical-political
framework were used. The production of nature provides, for example, one highly critical
but serviceable ‘window’ through which to asses the mainstream American
environmentalist “fixation on [the] purity” of wilderness (White, 1995, p. 185). More
similarly qualified appropriations will follow in the empirical chapters, but for now, I will
continue with the review of the production of nature thesis as developed in Uneven
Development.
Following the discussion of production in general, Neil Smith moves into a more
specific discussion of “capitalist production” and the production of nature under
capitalism. Two major points are worth foregrounding: (a) “Under dictate from the
accumulation process, capitalism as a mode of production must expand continuously if it
is to survive”; and (b) “[The state] attempts to ensure the economic conditions necessary
for accumulation. In short, it expedites and arbitrates the stable expansion of capitalism”
(Smith, 1991, p. 49). Let me briefly flesh out the relevance of these points for
environmental politics. Regarding point ‘a’ – the endless expansion of capitalist
production – taken from a geographic standpoint, this denotes that no parcel of nature can
remain forever out of reach of the sphere of production for profit. On the one hand, this
could be read as a mandate to ratchet up the removal of selected parcels of nature from
“productive activity” (at least productive activity in the obvious sense, such as timber
cutting or mining or suburban development) through protective measures such as
designating wilderness areas, parks, refuges, etc. On the other hand, it could be argued
that such paper protection should by no means ever be perceived as permanent protection
of nature.
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The recent “Roadless Area Conservation Rule” provides a good example. Passed
by executive order in the final days of the Clinton presidency, this rule states that no new
roads may be built in the 58 million acres of existing roadless national forest lands
(Taylor, 2003). This proposal was viewed by many environmentalists to be the most “far
reaching” environmental initiative passed during the Clinton administration (Coile,
2003). The Bush administration has floated several proposals which would considerably
weaken the rule. One most recent proposal, if passed and implemented, would allow
Western governors to petition to have portions of national forests within their states
exempted from the rule. Clearly, then, the Roadless Rule by itself cannot ultimately resist
capital’s “cancerous imperative to expand” (Kovel, 2002, p. 51), as many Western
governors (the majority of whom are anything but ‘eco-friendly’) would waste no time in
petitioning for exemptions on economically valuable swaths of roadless forests. From a
more general materialist sentiment, it could be argued that under the capitalist mode of
production, a nonexploitative human relationship with nature is altogether impossible.
Here and there, we may be able to (more or less permanently) remove some parcels of
nature from ecologically degrading productive activities, but the landscape as a whole
will remain “sacrificed to accumulation” (Kovel, 2002, p. 82). The blocking off of
wilderness areas would be viewed by most Marxists (including Neil Smith, I suspect) as
creating “false boundary lines” (Kovel, 2002, p. 213) that produce the illusion of the
protection of nature all the while working within the confines of a system bent on its
destruction. This dire assessment is not grounds to dismiss support for wilderness or
parks protection, but it does stand as a warning that these measures, at best, should only
ever be considered part of the solution. If the goal is a sustainable society, the radical
imperative must remain foregrounded.
Regarding point ‘b’ – the state’s role as arbiter of capital accumulation – we are
made aware that, under capitalism, it is false to perceive society as split into two discreet
sectors, a private capitalist sector (under dictate of the profit motive) and a public
governmental sector (under multiple dictates, e.g., social services, national security,
environmental protection). The governmental sector – the state – cannot be counted on to
protect nature from capitalism because the primary function of the state is to “ensure the
economic conditions necessary for accumulation” (Smith, 1991, p. 49). The capitalist
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state can ultimately only ‘save’ enough nature as will still allow (inherently unsustainable
patterns of) economic growth to continue. Environmental political strategies that focus
strictly on land protection via Federal legislation – for example, seeking endless
injunctions in Federal court through endangered species act petitioning – are fighting an
unwinnable war. This theory of the capitalist state reinforces the imperative for a radical
environmental politics, because “that which does not confront the system becomes its
instrument” (Kovel, 2002, p. 171).
One additional component of Smith’s production of nature thesis is worth
reviewing. This is the insistence that now, in contemporary society, there is only
produced nature. Smith argues that National parks serve as the prototypical examples of
supposedly unproduced nature. These are produced environments in every
conceivable sense. From the management of wildlife to the alteration of
the landscape by human occupancy, the material environment bears the
stamp of human labor…Yosemite and Yellowstone are neatly packaged
cultural experiences of environment on which substantial profits are
recorded each year (Smith, 1991, p. 56-7).
I am confident that Smith would argue that this same line or reasoning applies even to
wilderness areas. Although less obtrusively “bearing the stamp of human labor” than
Yosemite or Yellowstone (which include, for example, hotels and swimming pools),
wilderness areas are still the products of human labor. A wilderness area could never
exist without, for example, the ecologists who propose it, the activists who fight for it,
and the politicians who seal the deal. Once designated, a wilderness area can only be
maintained through the real work of “wilderness management” (Hendee et al., 1990). The
lesson, then (short of revolutionary systemic change), is that it is impossible to speak for,
act on behalf of, protect, or ‘save’ nonhuman nature without bringing the nature-assubject fully into the “social production process” (Smith, 1991, p. 60). Every act of
conservation is necessarily social and political. If “the production of nature at the global
scale…is the goal of capital” (p. 62), then we must seek out a place within the system for
the protection of some aspects of nonhuman nature from the vagaries of capitalist
production. The logic here is little different from the impetus for developing social
services designed to protect the low-income laborer, the unemployed, the sick or the
elderly from the same potential ill-fate that capitalism – necessarily blind to its victims –
bestows upon them.

The question, Smith concludes, is not whether and where we
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produce nature but “how we produce nature and who controls the production of nature”
(p. 63). Point taken. The protection of nature – seen as the production of nature –
foregrounds the inescapable political difficulties of forging an ecological politics within
and/or against capitalism.
The production of nature thesis has been relatively influential within human
geography. Numerous studies have taken the basic challenge as presented: that Marxism
provides a more penetrating avenue of analysis for ecological problems than established
methods such as “technocentric … [analyses of] most environmental and resource
geographers…advocating the elusive, if appealing, notion of ‘sustainable development’”
(Castree, 2000a, p. 277), “ecocentric … [analyses which] put nature first and argue for a
more harmonious human-nature relationship” (Castree, 2000a, p. 277), or “tragedy of the
commons” explanations of resource use and depletion (Roberts & Emel, 1992, p. 251).
While Marxists would have different specific objections to each of these analytical
frameworks, the production of nature thesis points to common deficiencies as well. For
one, all three share the “assumption of an external nature” (Castree, 2000a, p. 277), and
as such suffer from the ideological trap of unproblematically gleaning causal
explanations and normative solutions from an objectively known, asocial nature.
Externalizing nature (a) fails to register the social and political grounding of all
naturalistic explanation, and (b) wittingly or unwittingly tends to “embrace the existing
economic, political, and social order” (Castree, 2000a, p. 277). These research
frameworks also all tend toward evoking the specter of “natural limits,” a construct that
most Marxists (starting with Marx, actually, in his extensive and trenchant critique of
Malthus) are loathe to legitimate. And, of course, these methods usually fail to locate the
causes of ecological problems in the inextricable socio-political-ecological structures of
capitalist production, and consequently fail to imagine non-capitalist (i.e., radical)
alternatives.
This evidence of the influence of Marxism and specifically Smith’s production of
nature thesis in human geography notwithstanding, Marxist nature-society geographers
are a fairly small sub-cadre within the broader nature-society tradition.5 It should

5

The lack of a strong Marxist cadre is particularly apparent within “First World” nature-society studies,
although Marxist and ‘neo-Marxist’ political ecology has long been a fruitful analytical framework for
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probably come as no surprise that Marxism never attained any sort of dominance within
nature-society geography. Even in economic, political, and urban geography, the original
‘home’ of Marxist geography (and arguably the subdisciplines within which the Marxist
framework is most directly applicable), Marxism remains a framework practiced by a
few, engaged with by a few more, but more or less despised or ignored by the majority.
The most direct ‘challenge’ to Marxist nature-society geography has been a series of
internal critiques that parallel broader changes taking place within (more or less) ‘radical’
geography. As the dominance of Marxism within radical geography gave way to
manifold ‘post-isms’ (e.g., postmodernism, post-Marxism, poststructuralism) and a move
from ‘radical’ to the more tempered ‘critical’ geography, Marxist nature-society
geography increasingly yielded to studies which foregrounded the so-called “social
construction of nature.”

2.3. Critical Nature-Society Geography II: Constructed Nature(s)
Nature is a part of culture… Our experience of the natural world –
whether touring the Canadian Rockies, watching an animal show on TV,
or working in our own gardens – is always mediated. It is always shaped
by rhetorical constructs… To speak uncritically of the natural is to ignore
these social questions (Wilson, 1991, p. 12).
Important political issues are at stake in questions about the social
construction of nature and environmental problems (Demeritt, 2001a, p.
23).
I will preface this section by stating up front that I heartily agree with both of the
above statements made by Alexander Wilson and David Demeritt. Yes, nature is (in a
sense) constructed, and yes, recognizing the constructed nature of nature has significant
political implications. That being said, by the end of the next chapter, I will have made a
case against employing constructivist rhetoric in my analysis (all the while recognizing,
acknowledging, and employing many of the lessons of constructivist critiques). My
specific case against constructivism will be most fully worked out in the next chapter on
environmental pragmatism. For now, in this section, I will outline the emergence of
constructionist perspectives to nature-society human geography and highlight what I feel
“Third World” environmental problems such as soil erosion (Blaikie, 1985; Guthman, 1997), tropical
deforestation (Hecht & Cockburn, 1989; Peluso, 1992), and agrarian issues (Awanyo, 2001; Grossman,
1993). Whether and how political ecology marks a particularly useful ‘lens’ for “First World” naturesociety studies has recently arisen as a topic of debate (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2002; Walker, 2003).
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are the primary tenets as well as some of the inconsistencies and problems with these
perspectives.
During the late 1980s, a new wave of ‘postmodern’ social theories gained
increasing prominence and influence within the social sciences, geography included. The
most influential of the ‘new’ social theories in academic geography, and political naturesociety

studies

specifically,

has

been

poststructuralism.

The

interfusion

of

poststructuralist theory and geography posed profound new philosophical and
methodological challenges to radical and non-radical scholars alike. And politically, even
as the “postmodern turn” (Best & Kellner, 1997) in the social sciences has (correctly)
been associated with the political left (Demeritt, 2001a), the imperatives of
poststructuralism (for its proponents) marked substantial shifts in the potential and
desirable goals of left politics as well as the means through which they could and should
be achieved. Although I make no claims that the following in any sense represents an
exhaustive summary of poststructuralist theory, I will highlight three components,
broadly shared by poststructuralists, which directly relate to my immediate discussion of
the effects of the postmodern turn specifically on nature-society human geography. These
are (a) an abandonment of the quest for certain truth(s), and with it the dismantling of the
methods, theories, and particular investigations that comprise the scholarly production of
truth (Haraway, 1997; Sayer, 2000); (b) the cultural-linguistic turn, whereby the objects
of inquiry shift from the material to the always-already represented, and the modes of
investigation and description shift from supposedly naïve representation to interpretation,
particularly to textual and discourse analysis (Barnes & Duncan, 1992; Poster, 1989);
and (c) within left circles, a rejection of a politics of solidarity aimed against a perceived
singular oppression in favor of a politics emphasizing difference, identity, alterity, and
play (Butler, 1990; Harvey, 1989).6 The postmodern turn would have a profound impact
upon nature-society human geography.

6

My insertion of two references per bulleted point is not arbitrary. Obviously, for points as broadly stated
as these, there are numerous references that could have been cited for each. What I have done here is to
split each reference between one representative proponent of the referenced poststructuralist imperative,
followed by one author who acknowledges the challenge of the critique, but is critical of its acceptance.
The three latter authors (Andrew Sayer, Mark Poster, David Harvey) are proponents of three broad schools
of social theory (Critical Realism, Critical Theory/Frankfurt School, Marxism) which are generally critical
of the more celebratory renditions of postmodernism.
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I will foreground this discussion with a set of assumptions and resulting questions
that more or less frame the ‘problem of nature’ (even though the development of each of
these assumptions will come later in the section): If nature is neither (a) ontologically: an
external, ‘real’ entity that can be taken-for-granted; (b) epistemologically: something that
can be objectively investigated, understood, and represented; nor (c) categorically: a
fixed, stable “sign” which can be unproblematically drawn upon in (social- or natural-)
scientific discourse; then how can we, as geographers, ever begin to talk about, much less
state “truths” about, nature’s existence? What does it mean to ‘do’ nature-society
geography at all? This is (at least partially) the shaky ground on which nature-society
geography stands once the imperatives of critical social theory are imposed upon the
endeavor. One way in which geographers (and other social scientists) have attempted to
manage this quagmire is by refusing to talk directly about “nature” itself (since this is,
according to select theories, impossible), but to qualify all such discussions as dealing
with “the social construction of nature” instead.
First off, it is important to note that – unlike the production of nature thesis, which
is certainly internally contested and employed in various fashions by different authors,
but does stand as a more or less coherent ‘entity’ or ‘theory’ (in the singular), and
certainly speaks to a broadly shared sense of politics – to speak of ‘the social construction
of nature’ does not, without considerable qualification, reference any specific
philosophical, methodological or political commitment. At the most general level,
foregrounding the construction of nature probably signals more of a starting point for
analysis than anything, a recognition that “we can never refer to nature – something
knowable that exists outside us – unproblematically” (Bird, 1987, p. 260). The ‘cut’ that
Bird is forging here is between constructionists (those who recognize the inherent
difficulties of referencing “nature”) and non-constructionists (those who fail or refuse to
recognize these difficulties). This cut maps roughly onto Kate Soper’s distinction
between “nature-skeptical” and “nature-endorsing” perspectives. Nature-endorsers, for
Soper, are ecologists and environmental advocates who tend to reference a “prediscursive nature which is being wasted and polluted,” while nature-skeptics are those for
whom nature is always and only constructed through “specific conceptions of human
identity” (Soper, 1996, p. 22-3). For pragmatic reasons, I am more inclined to work with
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Soper’s typology than Bird’s. Even if not by intention, the practical effect of Bird’s
proposal (as well as, I will argue, most other constructionists as well) is a rather
wholesale dismissal of “nature-endorsers” brought about by foregrounding the nearly
infinite reasons to be skeptical about ‘nature’. Soper, on the other hand, is working to
produce more defensible grounds for endorsing nature, and is wary of the dismissiveness
that can easily arise from too radically-skeptical a perspective:
[I]t is one thing to expose the myth-making, another to dismiss the
impulse to environmental … preservation as unwarranted or irrational,
since it speaks to an altogether justifiable alarm about the ecologically
destructive and deracinating effects of modernity (Soper, 1995, p. 200).
But I am getting a little ahead of myself here by discussing the effects of theoretical
perspectives; the task at hand is reviewing constructionist theories of nature.
Bird’s 1987 essay on “the social construction of nature” is one of the earliest to
reference this perspective by name, and it is a logical place to begin this review. Roughly
mirroring the ‘members’ of Soper’s nature-endorsing camp, the non-constructionist
targets of Bird’s critique are scientists who unproblematically refer to an external nature
as well as environmentalists who (also unproblematically) base their normative programs
in the findings and conclusions of science. Strong statements are made often and early in
the essay. On the first page, we are told that “it has become philosophically unacceptable
for scientists to claim to know the Truth about nature. The most that they can claim to
know is a relative truth about nature” (Bird, 1987, p. 255). This statement represents a
point of convergence within constructionist theory writ large. A large part of the project
of constructionism is the dismantling of the notion that Truths can be stated; regarding
nature, this refutes the idea that science has some unique and superior access to the ‘real’
through which unmediated and universal Truth statements can be made. This common
ground established, there are philosophical-theoretical divergences regarding the grounds
upon which to support this claim. There are also political divergences regarding, for
example, the reasons one might self-identify as a constructionist or the substance and
import of the various implications to be drawn from the ‘fact’ that all knowledge is
partial.
Bird’s essay is presented as a theoretical survey (subtitled “theoretical approaches
to…”), so she (reasonably) is not advancing one particular theoretical framework over
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other, but she claims that Marxism, science studies, and critical ethnography all “suggest
that nature is inaccessible to representation, because scientific knowledge is a thoroughly
social construct” (Bird, 1987, p. 256). For this statement to be convincing, two key terms
would need to be sufficiently specified. The first is “representation.” This is a highly
contested term and its meaning is hardly self-evident, even in this context. Bird fails to
theorize representation in the essay, and for this reason, this statement fails to register
with much force. The second term needing qualification is, of course, “social construct,”
as to argue that nature is socially constructed because it is a social construct would be a
laughable tautology. This term is not unequivocally defined in the essay either, but there
are a few passages smattered throughout the essay that point to the crux of what it means
to say that nature7 is a social construct, such as:
Scientific paradigms are socio-historical constructs—not given by the
character of nature, but created out of social experience, cultural values,
and political-economic structures (p. 256).
[W]e recognize environmental problems through a variety of… interests.
Those interests, grounded in individual, collective, historical, crosscultural, and visionary experience, are socially constructed (negotiated
through time) and socially interpreted (through received metaphors, stories
and ethics) (p. 256).8
It is worth noting that Bird here introduces an arbitrary and pointless distinction between
“socially constructed” and “socially interpreted.” The interpretation of nature through, for
example, “received metaphors,” is an integral part of – but is in no way distinct from –
the social construction of nature.
I have devoted this much time to the discussion of this essay because it presages
much of what would comprise the constructionist debates over the fifteen or so years that
followed its publication. Perhaps most prominently, the dismantling of Truth is arguably
the broadest philosophically- (and sometimes politically-) shared baseline of
constructionists. The dismantling of Truth ushered in a strong epistemological relativism,
or at least skepticism: As received knowledge is no longer viewed as statements about the
world, knowledge increasingly becomes just another subject for critique and

7

Although it seems that – despite the title of the essay (“The social construction of nature”) – Bird is
arguing most specifically that scientific knowledge is socially constructed, a much less controversial stance
that arguing that nature per se is a social construct.
8
The italicization is mine. In each passage I have placed the quasi-definition, as I read it, in italics.

28

reinterpretation. The ability to ‘say anything’ about the world is rendered increasingly
problematic. Secondly, the issue of representation – an issue of paramount importance in
poststructuralism – is foregrounded (even if it is not fully worked through in this essay).
Thirdly, a rather clean (and problematic) break is established between ‘scientists’ and
‘constructionists’, the latter being the only philosophically defensible camp. A fourth
issue is the ambivalence as to whether constructionism refers solely to conceptual
“natures” (and all constructionists share this common ground; that is, that
constructionism marks an epistemological critique) or whether it speaks to the
ontological construction of material “natures” as well. This ambivalence is difficult if not
impossible to resolve when talking about the social construction of nature in general, as
Marxism, science studies, and poststructuralism each provide different, and often
inconsonant answers to this problem (Demeritt, 2002). Finally, Bird’s essay mirrors
much constructionism in that many of its key tenets – including “construction” itself – are
not as specified as it seems they should be. Indeed, in a retrospective of “social
construction of nature” theorizing written in 2002, David Demeritt was concerned that
“the ‘social construction of nature’ is spoken about in such different and often imprecise
ways that its precise meanings and implications can be difficult to understand and
evaluate” (Demeritt, 2002, p. 768).
There are, of course, general nature-constructionist points missing from Bird’s
essay that are worth mentioning. One key tenet is the polysemous character of the word
‘nature’. Raymond Williams famous three-part typology of the meanings of ‘nature’ is
often used by constructionists to point out one reason exactly why referring to an
unqualified ‘nature’ is fraught with problems (e.g., Castree, 1995; Demeritt, 2001a). As
Williams showed, ‘nature’ can be (1) the essential quality or character of something (its
‘nature’); (2) the inherent force which directs either the world or human beings or both
(‘natural laws’); or (3) the external, material world itself (capital ‘N’ ‘Nature’) (Williams,
1972). So, clearly, it is imperative to recognize the inherently ambiguous character of the
word ‘nature’, and sufficiently specify any usage of the term. This is not, of course, to
imply that referencing one of the three above meanings of ‘nature’ would count as
sufficient specification. Deploying definition ‘3’ without qualification, for example,
might well register the contradictory sense of simultaneously external/universal nature, as
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discussed in the production of nature section above. The broader point is that the word
nature is, as Raymond Williams noted, “perhaps the most complex in the [English]
language” ( Williams, 1972, in Demeritt, 2001a, p. 29), and that it comes loaded not just
with multiple meanings, but with layers upon layers of ambiguity.
Another prominent theme in more recent constructionist writing is the issue of
nature’s contingency.

Indeed, Ian Hacking locates contingency at the center of all

constructionist theories, arguing that (regarding “the social construction of ‘X’”) “social
constructivists tend to hold that … X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is.
X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable”
(Hacking, 1999, p. 6). Replacing “X” with a qualified deployment of the word “nature,”
we find that “‘what counts as “nature”’ was brought into existence or shaped by social
events, forces, history, all of which could well have been different” (internal quote,
Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 17; remainder, Hacking, 1999, p. 7). Constructed, contingent
ideas of ‘nature’ and what is ‘natural’ have indeed helped “legitimate [among other
things] social and sexual hierarchies and cultural norms” (Soper, 1995, p. 3). Thus the
power of constructed-and-contingent categories to affect beings in the world is registered,
and a potential ‘politics of construction’ is opened up:
The metaphor of construction enables [constructionists] to argue that what
we had once accepted as self-evidently pre-ordained and inevitable is in
fact contingent and might conceivably be remade in some other way, if
only we would try (Demeritt, 2002, p. 776).
Geographers and other social scientists have widely and rapidly embraced the political
potential of constructionism. The most openly political (non-Marxist) natureconstructionist writings have drawn largely on poststructuralist theory (Bartram &
Shobrook, 2000; Birch, 1999; Braun & Wainwright, 2001; Cresswell, 1997; Darier,
1999a; Escobar, 1996; Moeckli & Braun, 2001; Willems-Braun, 1997). In addition to an
assertive politics, poststructuralists have attempted to remedy some of the problems of
constructionist theory by, for example, moving beyond the ambiguities of
constructionism to reference nature through the (slightly) more specified term
‘discourse’.
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2.4. Critical Nature-Society Geography III: Nature as Discourse9
The two most prominent theorists influencing contemporary poststructuralist
nature-society geography are Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida (with Foucault easily
being the single-most influential) (Braun & Wainwright, 2001; Castree, 2001). Two
components of Foucault’s social theory have been popularly appropriated in naturesociety analyses, his theorization of discourse (and discursive practices) and his
reconfiguration of the concept of power. For Foucault,
the objects of discourse are constituted and transformed according to the
rules of some particular discursive formation, rather than existing
independently and simply being referred to or talked about in a particular
discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 41).
Discursive practices, in other words, guide what can and cannot be said in particular
places and times. In modernity the ‘rules’ of discourse are increasingly tied to institutions
such as governments, schools, hospitals and prisons (Braun & Wainwright, 2001). These
are institutions that, by design, are in the ‘business’ of producing normative proposals for
(individual and collective) social conduct. Accordingly, Foucauldian analyses tend to be
highly anti-institutional and particularly skeptical of the norms that arise within
(institutional, but not merely institutional) discourse. Methodologically, Foucauldian
discourse analysis tends to focus on the textual aspects of discourse (rather than, for
example, the institutions themselves), as it is from texts that the ‘rules’ of discourse can
be extracted and the silences and displacements inferred. Discourse analysis offers the
opportunity to ‘rewrite’ the discourse, writing back in that which was disallowed or
disavowed. This is an openly political maneuver, designed to ‘destabilize’ primary or
authoritative texts.
As many ‘discourses of nature’ (e.g., biodiversity conservation) are associated
with large-scale institutions (science, the academy, government, national or international
9

Let me here briefly address one potential question of the reader: “What about actor-network theory?” To
this I would reply that (a) My research project is an explicitly political examination of an explicitly political
issue; (b) The emphasis on (“First World”) environmental politics underlies my selection of these three
perspectives as explicitly political theories relevant to my particular research subject; and (c) I fail to find
the political ‘moment’ within actor-network theory, despite assertions to the contrary, such as those of
Sarah Whatmore (2002). That being said, I do find certain strands of actor-network theory (particularly
Bruno Latour’s empirical science studies) to provide quite useful methods for ‘doing’ thick, descriptive
reconfigurations of the ways in which scientific knowledges are made intelligible. As a method, then, actornetwork theory will play a role in my analysis.
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environmental organizations) and also tend to proffer normalizing programs, naturediscourses have come under increasingly scrutiny from poststructuralists:
‘Deconstructing’ [discourses of nature] entails ‘denaturalizing’ them: that
is, showing them to be social products arising in particular contexts and
serving specific social or ecological ends that ought to be questioned
(Castree, 2001, p. 13, emphasis added).
There is, it seems, an assertively normative component to poststructuralism as well:
discourses of nature “ought” to be deconstructed. This passage is representative of
poststructuralism’s radical nature-skepticism (employing Soper’s typology). The task at
hand is not just to call into question the naturalized discourses but to effectively
denaturalize them. As so many discourses of nature rely to a great degree on the efficacy
of their statements regarding nature or ‘the natural’, an effectively denaturalized text
would certainly be stripped of much of its authority. (But then what, ‘mission
accomplished’? This is a problem I will return to in the next chapter.)
Bruce Braun and Joel Wainwright hail poststructuralism as “a departure form
existing work in the field which assumes nature to be an unproblematic category, in the
sense that it is a thing that is self-present to knowledge” (Braun & Wainwright, 2001, p.
42). They argue instead that “the very thing that is taken to be the object of
environmental studies and politics – namely, ‘nature’ – is an effect of power” (p. 41). The
former statement is nothing new to this discussion; it sets out the basic premise of
constructionism, that ‘nature’ cannot be taken-for-granted. The latter statement, however,
takes the premise a step further. Since we are now told that there is no getting ‘outside’ of
discourse (Castree, 2001), nature-as-object can now (theoretically and methodologically)
be conflated with ‘nature’-as-object-of/within-discourse. But even this is not as strong or
as specified a statement as proclaiming nature to be an “effect of power.” To make sense
of this statement, it is necessary to examine Foucault’s theorization of ‘power’,
recognizing that it is through the reconfiguration of power that the politics of discourse
analysis is effected.
For Foucault, “‘power’ is not something which the state or a dominant class has
or possesses and which others don’t have” (Darier, 1999b, p. 17). Power is diffuse and
omnipresent: people (through discourse) are always and inevitably operating within a
“field of power” (p. 17). This concept of power was at least partially formulated in an
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attempt to replace the left-political goal of revolution (the overthrow of a singular,
oppressive, ‘sovereign power’) with one of resistance, whereby individuals and groups
regain a positive political presence within (rather than against) oppression through
everyday acts of destabilizing authoritative discourses (as texts, rules, ways of acting).
Foucault relieves us of the hubris that we can be ‘against’ or ‘outside of’ power.
Regarding knowledge, Foucault argues that there can be no knowledge outside of power,
so the concept of ‘knowledge’ is replaced by ‘power/knowledge’. ‘Power/’ here acts as a
flag, similar to scare-quoting ‘nature’, whereby the thing lost or displaced in dominant,
unproblematized usages of the term (the presence of power within all knowledge, or the
inevitably social character of all ‘nature’) is foregrounded, and the dominant discourse
(‘knowledge’ or ‘nature’) is destabilized.
So, to return to conceptualizing of nature as an “effect of power” is to make an
epistemological claim (Braun and Wainwright, in a statement echoed by most
constructionists, are at pains to let us know that “rest assured, [they] believe in reality!”
(Braun and Wainwright 2001, p. 45)). Scientists, or ecological advocates, (supposedly)
register nature unproblematically, as a rhetoric of “innocent” constructions. Statements
about nature, however, are always “non-innocent,… carry[ing] with them certain
(disavowed) political commitments” (p. 42). Scientists and environmentalists “fail to
recognize the ways in which relations of power are already present” (p. 42). Discursive
practices are inescapable and constituted by power, so “nature” is both “an effect of
power” (p. 41) and an “effect of discursive practices” (p. 46). If perhaps slightly
redundant, for poststructuralists these are not contradictory statements. ‘Discourse’ and
‘power’ are at the very least fully imbricated, if not synonymous. As Demerit notes,
“discursive constructionists” share a common concern for highlighting “power and its
effects” (Demeritt, 2002, p. 774). In a more critical fashion, I might go so far as to say
that to claim that “nature is an effect of power” is indeed to say very little. What it does is
subsume ‘nature’ under the poststructuralist umbrella-term ‘power’, thus philosophically,
methodologically,

and

politically

prefiguring

the

term

for

poststructuralist

‘deconstruction’.
In addition to Foucault, Derrida has also been influential in poststructuralist
nature-society geography. Primary is Derrida’s theorization of the arbitrary relationship
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between signifier (a word) and signified (the “meaning or concept that is understood”
(Braun & Wainwright, 2001, p. 49)). Fully effectuating a break between words and
meaning would certainly set the table for a ‘denaturalizing’ discourse analysis. Derrida is
also associated with the method of ‘deconstruction’.10 Deconstruction is consistent with
Foucauldian discourse analysis, even as their sites of emphasis differ, hence the ability to
lump them both together into one poststructuralist theory/method (Braun & Wainwright,
2001; Belyea, 1992).11 Derridean deconstruction, building on the assumption of the
arbitrary signifier/signified relationship, emphasizes the “undecidability” of all meaning
(Braun & Wainwright, 2001, p. 50). Derridean analysis construes words as ‘signs’, which
(consistent with Foucault’s theory of discourse) are “instances” within a “conventional …
system rather than a direct representation of the ‘real’” (Belyea, 1992, p. 5).
Deconstructive analyses seek out the “constitutive absences” (Willems-Braun, 1997, p. 7)
missing from all authoritative texts, noting that “there will always be something left out”
of any discourse (Sparke, 1995, p. 4), and, importantly for poststructuralists, that there is
always a politics to this absencing. The absencing is an artifact of a reliance upon
categorical constructs that cannot exist, or effect, without exclusion (Dixon & Jones III,
1996), hence the deconstructive project of destabilizing (or even better, dissolving)
dualisms.

All

constructs

remain

“constitutively

dependent”

on

their

often-

unacknowledged Other (Dixon & Jones III, 1996, p. 768). Recognizing that which isn’t
but makes ‘it’ possible is a starting point for the larger project of relocating constructs
within the “larger field of social power” (p. 786).
Bruce Braun’s writing on the temperate rainforests of British Columbia offers
representative examples of deconstructive nature-society geography. Braun locates the
naturalization of the forests of British Columbia (and the attendant normalization of the
‘proper’ management-conservation program) as enabled through the deployment of the
scientific construct of “temperate rainforests” as a way to construct these forests as part
10

Though, perhaps it should be noted, Braun and Wainwright claim that calling deconstruction a method is
“incorrect.” They see deconstruction as “an approach to reading that constantly and rigorously challenges
the possibility of achieving closure of meaning” (Braun & Wainwright, 2001, p. 48). I must say I fail to see
how an “approach to reading” (or, later in the essay, a “strategy for rigorous thinking” (p. 49)) is not
methodological.
11
Belyea (1992), for example, provides a general argument for the consistency of a Foucauldian-Derridean
deconstructive-political theory, while Braun and Wainwright (2001) see Foucauldian and Derridean as
complementary theorists for deconstructing environmental politics.
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of “Nature.” All the while rendering its exclusion invisible, this ‘social construction of
“Nature”’ works politically because of the discursively-produced absence of humans
from the forests. Such exclusion allows environmentalists to ‘erase’ the millennia-old
presence of the forests’ indigenous residents, thus disallowing them a voice in the debates
over the ‘use’ and ‘protection’ of the forest (Braun & Wainwright, 2001; Willems-Braun,
1997). This marks an important intervention into the debates over these forests. More
generally, the poststructuralist imperatives outlined above signal important lessons for
any ‘critical’ or reflexive analysis of environmental problems and politics. That being
said, I will argue in the following chapter that poststructuralism poses political problems
for anyone remotely sympathetic to the conservation cause (or case) targeted for
deconstruction. I will also argue that there are theoretical inconsistencies in some of the
more strongly asserted poststructural constructionist arguments. In Chapter 3, these
critiques will be operationalized through the lens of environmental pragmatism, a
research perspective that has hitherto gone nearly unnoticed by critical geographers.

35

Chapter 3. Endorsing Nature: Environmental Pragmatism as Theory
and Practice
3.1. Introduction/Sentiment
Echoing the feminist insistence of foregrounding personal politics – even, or
perhaps especially, within academic research – I write nature-society geography as an
environmentalist; that is, I believe that our society is producing excessive and needless
deleterious effects on the ecological functioning and consequent sustainability of
communities (human and non-human) and ecosystems. Environmentalism is a political
stance, but at the same time it can reasonably be considered a “pre-political condition that
any future politics must have the ability to address” (Light, 1996, p. 161). My research
goal, then, begins with a self-imposed dual mandate: on the one hand, I aim to produce
substantively rich and theoretically grounded research; on the other, I profess a
commitment to contribute to a broadly conceived ‘environmentalism’, mindful that
environmentalism is just as concerned with seeking solutions to ecological problems as it
is to pointing them out.
In this chapter, I present environmental pragmatism as both a pragmatic (or
practical) and pragmatist (theoretically defensible) basis for an analysis of environmental
problems. Although the distinction between the terms pragmatic and pragmatist can not
(and should not) be thought of as absolute – as perhaps most broadly exemplified by the
overall goal of achieving a mode of analysis that links practice and theory – highlighting
the two-fold nature is necessary, as it foregrounds both the aims and means of the
framework. In short, (a) the pragmatic-practical side works to (a.1.) positively, formulate
a spirit or tenor of investigation that foregrounds the goal of contributing to the
ecological-environmentalist critique of contemporary life (and, importantly, searching for
solutions to these same problems) and (a.2.) negatively, critique certain “critical” modes
of analysis as unable – in the context of ‘nature’ – to move far beyond critique to a mode
of constructive contribution; alongside (b) the pragmatist-theoretical side, which works to
(b.1.) positively, formulate a theoretically-based framework for analysis and (b.2.)
negatively, critique – on theoretical grounds – those critical modes of analysis which
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strive to confound (on theoretical grounds) all efforts to preserve, speak for, even ‘save’
non-human nature.

3.2. The Political Case for Environmental Pragmatism and against
Cavalier Constructionism
I begin my formulation of environmental pragmatism by revisiting Kate Soper’s
distinction between “nature-endorsing” and “nature-skeptical” perspectives (Soper, 1995,
1996). One of the most useful aspects of this distinction is its intuitive clarity. Different
scholars, no matter the area of interest, explicitly or implicitly ground their analyses in
some theoretical framework. Soper develops the nature-endorsing/nature-skeptical
typology in reference to scholarly work dealing with the interactions between human
society and the non-human ‘natural’ world, specifically studies that analyze the sociopolitical aspects of “the ecological crisis” (Soper, 1995).12 Each ‘half’ of the distinction
encompasses various theoretical and political perspectives for approaching nature-society
studies. Nature-endorsers, in the broadest sense, are those whose primary focus is the
“human plunder [of nature and its] destruction [and are] politically directed at correcting
that abuse” (Soper, 1995, p. 3). Nature-skeptics, on the other hand, subscribe to a
different project, foregrounding “the ways in which relations to the non-human world are
always historically mediated, and indeed ‘constructed’” (p. 4). In the following diagram, I
list some theoretical perspectives relevant to my project alongside a few select
proponents of each perspective. I should mention that from here on (including this
diagram) I use Soper’s typology, but the assignments of different theoretical perspectives
within the typology are my own (for example, Soper does not discuss pragmatism in her
book).

12

Although nature-skeptics would quickly flag ‘crisis’ as a particularly political construction of the issues
(e.g., Guthman 1997).
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Figure 3.1. Nature-Endorsing and Nature-Skeptical Theoretical Perspectives
In this section, I present the pragmatic, or “metaphilosophical” (Light, 1996, p.
171) case for endorsing and employing environmental pragmatism. Responding to a
perceived intradiscplinary crisis in environmental philosophy, the case for an
“environmental pragmatism” was initially put forth by Andrew Light and Eric Katz in
1996 (Light & Katz, 1996c). Despite the maturity of academic environmental philosophy
(the subdiscipline having been around for nearly thirty years at the time of their writing),
Light and Katz professed a serious concern that the field was increasingly mired in a
“theoretical dogmatism,” seen by some to have erected more theoretical impasses to, than
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workable solutions for, environmental problems (Light & Katz, 1996b, p. 3). Even
though Light and Katz targeted their critique primarily toward academic debates between
moral monists and mural pluralists, I argue that nature-skeptical social science (including
Marxists, social constructionists, and poststructuralists) can effectuate a parallel
dogmatism that keeps its important insights from being appropriated, or even considered,
by the majority of nature-endorsers (although it would be unfair not to mention that many
nature-endorsers are equally dogmatic). My point here is that there is a potentially
productive cross-over conversation that is limited by both sides’ entrenched theoretical
dogmatism; or, perhaps to state it more mildly, folks on both sides of the aisle sense a
bottom-line (theoretical and/or political) incommensurability between their perspectives
that makes further dialogue impossible or fruitless. As James Proctor notes, there is an
“abyss between constructivists and anticonstructivists [that] is simply too large to be
productive, as it fuels little more than misinterpretation and intellectual hostility among
scholars of nature” (Proctor, 1998a, p. 353). So wherein lies the source of this
“intellectual hostility”?
Constructivists and poststructuralists, for the most part, make the case that theirs
are assertive politics that are by no means anti-science, anti-nature or antienvironmentalism. If this stance was effectively articulated (and sincere), it would seem
that nature-endorsers would have little reason to be defensive or hostile toward natureskeptics. What I will argue here is that nature-skeptics often do give nature-endorsers
good reason to view their assertions as hostile to the fostering of any grounds for any sort
of environmentalism. This examination is necessary because my perceived ‘need’ to
foster an explicitly nature-endorsing approach can only be justified (a) if the natureskeptic/nature-endorse divide is ‘real’ and (b) if nature-skeptics did indeed produce
substantial impasses to endorsing nature. I will make the argument that both halves of
this assertion are correct based on a few examples. My case rests to some degree upon the
assumption that the following examples are representative of nature-skeptical
perspectives taken as a whole. And though a case for any ‘true’ representativeness is, of
course, impossible to make, I would be so bold as to say – after a rather exhaustive
reading of the constructivist literature (as well as responses by “anti-constructivists”) –
that these selections, taken together, do speak for the bulk of constructionists.
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Let me reassert that I am speaking here to the political tenor or pragmatic effect of
the nature-endorsing/nature-skeptical divide. Later I will make the case for a theoretical
pragmatism that also stands as a critique of theoretical constructionism (at least the more
extreme forms of constructionism). Revisiting Castree and Braun’s statement that
“Nature…is on the agenda as never before” (Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 3), in this section
I attempt to extract the spirit and substance of the constructionist “agenda.” Conveniently,
the essay from which this quote is taken – the editors’ introduction to the 1998 volume
Remaking Reality (Castree & Braun, 1998b) – is a logical place to start. Remaking Reality
is an important book in human geography as it stands as the first elaborated
examination/collection of the ‘new’ nature-society studies.13 One way to begin this
investigation is with an examination of the specific constructs that were selected for
‘scare-quoting’. Placing quotes around selected constructs is a common way for
constructionists to flag constructs as broadly ‘problematic’ or perhaps more specifically
as socially constructed (e.g., scare-quoted “nature” is often more or less just a shorthand
for “the social construction of nature”). Following the constructionist logic, there is no
way of escaping the inherently socio-historically constructed-contingent nature of all
language, concepts, and knowledge. Stated another way, we only but always know the
world through constructed concepts. This “logic,” then, informs “us” that all “concepts”
regarding “science,” “nature,” “the social,” “politics” – whatever – are all socially
constructed. I am not trying to be clever here, but rather stressing that foregrounding the
social construction of ‘X’ can only be effectively achieved by not foregrounding other
socially constructed concepts, lest the whole effort degenerate into a meaningless morass
of scare quotes.
On the first page of the introduction to Remaking Reality, there are a couple of
key representative passages; each which will be taken in turn:
From biotechnology to “wilderness” preservation, from the exciting
medical promises and dark eugenic possibilities of the Human Genome
Project to the moral imperatives and neo-imperialist rhetorics mixed
together in discourses of “biodiversity,” and from the complex politics of
deforestation in India to the equally important struggles over models of
global warming in Washington, nature is something imagined and real,
13

And, to address the issue of representativeness one final time, it would seem that this introductory essay
is a logical and fair place to find statements intended to represent the new nature studies in geography.
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external yet made, outside history but fiercely contested at every turn
(Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 3).
There is plenty to deconstruct here. First point, and this one is very specific to my
research project in which questions of wilderness and biodiversity play primary roles:
which constructs are flagged with scare-quotes? “Wilderness” and “biodiversity.” The
discussion that follows should not be taken as a defense of wilderness and biodiversity as
anything other than socially constructed (indeed, in later chapters I will examine
contested constructions of wilderness at length), but more as an extended querying of
why these two were flagged to the exclusion of “deforestation” and “global warming.”
The effect of this selective flagging, I would argue, is to take the problematization of
“wilderness preservation” and “discourses of biodiversity” as the primary point of
departure for any examinations of these issues.
Of all the issues on the nature “agenda” today, it might well be these two issues
(or wilderness-biodiversity preservation taken together as one issue) for which natureskeptics reserve their deepest skepticism. Let us notice how each of the issues highlighted
in this passage is foregrounded as well. Regarding biotechnology, specifically the Human
Genome Project, we are presented with positive (“the exciting medical promises”) and
negative (“dark eugenic possibilities”) of the discourse. Fair enough. All overlysimplistic renderings of this discourse – whether they be the techno-utopian marketing
schemes of its corporate sponsors or the blanket denunciations of the entire project as
“unnatural” – make deserving targets for constructionist critique. We are also urged to
notice the “complex politics of deforestation” and the “equally important struggles over
models of global warming.” Again, fair enough. The politics of each of these issues is
incredibly complex, and while foregrounding the complexity of the issues will not
necessarily produce a crystal-clear activist case for or against one side of the issue, it can
provide the grounds for meaningful and productive interventions. Indeed, Rangan (2000)
and Demeritt (2001b) have produced important works that do just this for deforestation in
India and global warming, respectively.
Besides

the

previously

mentioned

scare-quoting

of

“wilderness”

and

“biodiversity,” how are these issues foregrounded? “Discourses of biodiversity” (and, at
the risk of belaboring my point: why “discourses of ‘biodiversity’” but not “discourses of
global warming” or “discourse of deforestation”?) mix together “moral imperatives” and
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“neo-imperialist rhetorics.” Needless to say, this is not a dual positive/negative
presentation of this issue. For constructionists, biodiversity – amazingly to me, as I think
biodiversity decline is a deservedly paramount issue in environmentalism writ large –
somehow demands doubly-negative flagging when introduced (or even triply-negative, if
counting the scare quotes). The authors feel no need to even connote that there may be a
worthiness to this “discourse.” And there is one final point I would like to make
regarding the “moral imperatives” and “neo-imperialist rhetorics” of “discourses of
‘biodiversity’.” These two selected components of the (incredibly) complex science and
politics of biodiversity conservation represent a common ground upon which Marxists
and poststructuralists can contest this issue. If indeed the case can be made that
biodiversity conservation is first and foremost a discourse of moral imperatives and neoimperialism, then poststructuralists (as anti-moralists) and Marxists (as anti-imperialists),
it would seem, have a duty to join in the refutation of this discourse. More broadly, I
suspect that one significant reasons that constructionist accounts of “nature” have become
so popular with social theory-informed geographers is that – case in point: biodiversity
conservation – discourses of nature provide a grounds for poststructuralists and Marxists
to temporarily set aside their often-intense internal squabbles and rally against a
perceived common enemy. My point here is not to catalyze a polemic against
constructionists, nor is it to argue that moral imperatives and neo-imperialist rhetorics do
not exist within biodiversity discourses. My point is that constructionism, at least as
presented here, does not make for a particularly auspicious perspective from which to
support the general sentiment that we should try to not let grizzly bears go extinct in the
lower 48 States.
Even though I hope to have effectively presented my case through this elaborated
example, a few more examples might help make the argument more convincing. Here is
another passage from the Remaking Reality introductory essay:
More than ever before, then, nature is something made. For some, this
represents the ‘end’ of nature (Bill McKibben’s End of Nature is cited
here), a response rooted firmly in a modern dualism in which nature is
seen as external to society: its other. From this perspective nature must be
defended against its ‘destruction’ by humans, and battle lines are drawn to
preserve its ‘pristine’ character (Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 4).
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The first sentence highlights what I feel is a highly problematic component of much
‘production of nature’ and constructionist theorizing. I would argue that valorizing the
“made” character of contemporary nature is an achingly anthropocentric sentiment,
especially if taken as one of the points of departure for politics. In a critique of David
Harvey’s Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference, Raymond Rogers captures
my reticence toward the perceived need to flag nature’s “destruction” with scare quotes.
Rogers

is

commenting

on

David

Harvey’s

supposedly

dialectics-informed

pronouncement that it is “materially impossible to destroy the earth” (Harvey 1996, p.
196). Rogers counters “[t]he claim that it is ‘materially impossible to destroy the earth’
allows some space for socialism to emerge. To have a more immediate and grief-stricken
sense of loss of species, meaning, and livelihood does not allow for a sense of global
succession” (Rogers, 1998b, p. 48-9). Only a person bereft of any sense of grief
whatsoever over loss of species, or environmental degradation in general, it seems, would
find it necessary to problematize the idea that non-human nature could be destroyed.
The above passage from Castree and Braun also sets up a problematic
insider/outsider binary, with the ‘insiders’ being the constructionists who correctly
recognize the “made” character of nature, and the ‘outsiders’ being the pitiable souls
who, mired in romanticism, insist on forging philosophically indefensible programs
opposing nature’s “destruction.” The outsiders, it seems, comprise the majority of the
contemporary US environmental movement. Gary Snyder argues that deconstructing the
notion of “pristine” nature is “beating a dead horse.” For environmentalists, “‘pristine’ is
only a relative term,” correctly signifying the real differences between the more or less
“wild terrain” that remains and the much more profoundly ‘made’ landscapes that
dominate the world (Snyder, 1996, p. 8).
I will highlight one more passage from this essay.
[Our] first point is that nature… “cannot pre-exist its construction”14: it is
figure, construction, artifact, displacement. It is something made –
materially and semiotically, and both simultaneously. Those, like “deep
greens,” who would still appeal to “nature” as a source of moral and
political guidance will, of course, find this argument scandalous (Castree
& Braun, 1998, p. 5).

14

The internal quote is from Haraway (1992, p. 296)

43

Clearly, the point that nature is “made” is paramount. I have already made clear my
qualms with this issue. What jumps out from this statement is that, of all the “greens” out
there, it is “deep greens” who are targeted as most of all mired in indefensible
foundations. This brusque writing-off of deep ecology is typical for constructionists, and
to me, perplexing. For reasons that I hope to make clear throughout the dissertation, I
think that deep ecology deserves at the very least a sincerely sympathetic-yet-critical
treatment, as it is deep ecologists, who, more than anyone else, have thought long and
hard about what it might mean to think and live in a less anthropocentric manner.
Extending the sphere of moral concern (or even our ideas of ‘identity’ and ‘community’
(Rogers, 1994, 1998a)) beyond the human seems to me to be a worthwhile, even
necessary, project. When Castree and Braun boast that their efforts will be found
“scandalous” to deep greens, it seems less an invitation into a constructive dialogue as
much as a snickering, smug writing-off of the entire deep ecology movement. Castree
and Braun assert that constructionist politics “embodies a liberatory potential, radically
opening the field of debate and action surrounding what kinds of natures we seek”
(Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 5). It is difficult to imagine, however, despite their qualified
pro-nature rhetoric, which existing cadres of self-identified environmentalists, if any,
they are positioning themselves within, even if they have made it quite clear which cadres
they are positioning themselves in opposition to.
It is not just deep greens, however, that are written off more or less
indiscriminately. In an essay examining the Eden Project, Rob Bartram and Sarah
Shobrook find “environmental conservation … being drawn into the duplicative
strategies of scientific and technological simulation … as if to reclaim or protect nature’s
reality” (Bartram & Shobrook, 2000, p. 371). Leaving aside the question of whether
techno-utopian projects like the Eden Project are representative whatsoever of any
“environmental conservation,” after eight pages of critiquing the project (a rather
unchallenging undertaking) they conclude that “the paradox of proximity to nature is that
it only confirms its irrevocable loss and that environmental conservation is no more than
an illusory act of social redemption” (Bartram & Shobrook, 2000, p. 378).
Environmental conservation as an “illusory act” notwithstanding, the authors “are not
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suggesting that nature should be dismissed or forgotten” (p. 378). In nearly as broadbrushed a sweep, Braun and Wainwright dismiss the entire field of environmental ethics:
[T]o assert that environmental issues are primarily about ‘ethics’ (how to
act toward nature) is to assume that it is only our attitudes and values that
are at stake, not the ‘thing’ to which the ethical relation is to be fostered
(Braun & Wainwright, 2001, p. 42).
This passage is rather mystifying to me, but one thing is made quite clear: environmental
ethicists are deluded and somewhat egocentric theorists who care more about their own
values than about non-human nature. Even though the overstated or even fatuous nature
of this claim is probably self-evident, I would point the authors to Val Plumwood’s
“interspecies dialogical ethics” (Plumwood, 2002) or Wim Zweers’ “participation with
nature” (Zweers, 2000) as environmental ethical theories that have plenty to say about the
‘things’ with which the ethical relations are to be fostered.
I conclude this section with two more examples. In Éric Darier’s explicitly
Foucauldian critique of “green ethics” (note the essay’s title: “Foucault against
Environmental Ethics”), he asks:
Would it be possible… to imagine… a ‘Green ethics’ … grounded not in
naturalistic/essentialist assumptions but in practices of transgression of,
for example, these naturalistic/essentialist boundaries? … Wouldn’t the
radical questioning and transgression of given subjectivities, such as the
consumer subjectivity, be an act of resistance which could lead towards a
Green ethics, a Green aesthetics of existence? (Darier, 1999a, p .228).
I recognize why a self-identified “queer theorist” (p. 227) would necessarily ground any
theory in a resolute antiessentialism; and I acknowledge that any social theory would be
foolish not to take the lessons of antiessentialism very seriously. That noted, it seems that
what Darier seems to be advocating here is transgression for the sake of transgression.
Preoccupied with unabashed transgression, he fails to see that transgressing (without
calling it that) the consumer subjectivity (without calling it that, either) is an everyday act
that a substantial portion of self-identified ‘environmentalists’ or ‘greens’ are doing. So
they aren’t doing it for the sake of transgressing a subjectivity? So what? They are doing
it with an eye towards the practical effects that would result from a less wasteful and
ecologically degrading culture, and also for the potential effects on the individual
transformed by ethical action. In similar fashion to so much nature-constructionism,
Darier proposes this as not mere critique, but a positive assertion of a “green ethics” as
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well. What would his green ethics look like? Transgression, subjectivity, resistance: these
“magic words” (Halton, 1995, p. 6) are the keys to the ‘new’ (posthumous) Foucauldian
Green ethics. I fail to see how this is anything other than out-of-the-box Foucauldian
politics. This is not Foucault informing environmental philosophy; this is Foucault
replacing environmental philosophy. This is not, of course, to argue that important
political – even ‘green’ political – insights cannot be garnered from Foucault’s writing. I
would argue, however, that Foucault certainly did not write the entire recipe for a new
environmental politics. Should we be surprised that Foucault, who famously “detested
nature” (Darier, 1999b, p. 6 ), did not produce the grounds for a workable natureendorsing philosophy? Probably not. Foucault and environmentalism may be something
of a square peg and a round hole. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to just fit one into
the other.
Finally, I wrap up this examination of the politics of nature-skeptics with the same
author who kick-started my discussion of critical nature-society studies, Neil Smith. In
his essay “Nature at the Millenium: Production and re-enchantment” (the concluding
essay in Braun and Castree’s Remaking Reality), Smith offers some statements that are
representative of the nature-skeptical attitude toward environmental politics. For one,
environmentalism has lost its critical edge:
The radical genie of the environmental challenge to late capitalist nature
has been stuffed back into the bottle of institutional normality just in time
to calm millennial jitters about nature. The challenge for the twenty-first
century is to start again, to make environmental politics subversive again
(Smith, 1998, p. 272),
This is a fantastic passage, and one I would hardly disagree with taken out of context. But
when Smith lays out the five tasks of “production of nature” theorizing, four are
challenges to the refinement of theory qua theory, while only one deals with
environmentalist practice: through constructionism, we must “try and deflate the
vocabulary of wilderness and pristine nature” (p. 277). Again, if constructionists are
supportive of some environmentalisms (such as the environmental justice movement,
which is deservedly valorized), and ambivalent toward others (such as critics of global
warming), they reserve their most resolute opposition for any and all manifestations of
wilderness preservation. What, for Smith, will comprise the needed project? It will
“involve, in part, scandalizing contemporary appropriations of environmentalism, but it
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also involves the more difficult task of eking out an alternative political vision” (p. 272).
I agree and disagree. I agree that eking out an alternative political vision is necessary, and
I heartily agree that this is a difficult task.
Where I part company with Smith, and nature-skeptics in general, is that I do not feel that
a cavalier “scandalizing” of environmental politics is the most productive point of
departure for such a project. To return to pragmatism (and to kick off the more elaborated
discussion of pragmatism that follows), my assessment of constructionism could come in
the form of answering the “pragmatic maxim”: “If we stop here, if we put it this way,
what difference would it make to our practice?” (Berthoff, 1999a, p. 5). Stopping at
constructionism – its self-avowed liberatory potential notwithstanding – might well place
too much distance between myself and the more openly activist proponents of grizzly
bear or wildlands conservation. If it forged an impassable abyss, and the only
conversation I was able to contribute to was academic discourses of nature and politics,
then I will have failed in the political-pragmatic goal of maintaining a commitment to
contributing to the project of a broadly conceived environmentalism.

3.3. The Theoretical Case for Environmental Pragmatism and against
Cavalier Constructionism
In this section, I lay out the case for adopting a qualified ‘environmental
pragmatism’ as a theoretically sound methodology, or framework for analysis, for my
research project.15 In similar fashion to the previous section, this assertion will also
involve a critique of constructionism. Let me be clear that I am not stating that I am
appropriating philosophical pragmatism as a singular, overarching “theory” for my entire
analysis. In later chapters, in addition to pragmatists I will selectively appropriate the
insights of (among others) eco-Marxists (and some not-so-eco-Marxists), deep ecologists,
environmental historians, and policy analysts to make my case.
In a sense, I am accepting here an ‘offer’ laid out by James Proctor, one that to
my knowledge no geographer has taken up to date. As previously noted, Proctor senses
an unproductive “abyss” between constructionists and anti-constructionists (Proctor,
15

This is distinct from (and will only include splices of) discussions of specific research methods: “the term
methods refers more specifically to individual techniques (e.g., surveys, participant observation) whereas
methodology can be construed broadly to suggest both the presuppositions of methods, as well as their link
to theory and implications for society” (Morrow and Brown 1994, p. 36).
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1998a, p. 353). He seeks out a potential “third position that takes social constructivism
seriously but does not rob us of our ability to speak some degree of truth about nature as a
consequence” (p. 353), and cites pragmatism and critical realism as two potential paths to
fulfilling this goal. I agree with both his perception of the unproductive abyss and his
sense that pragmatism might provide one way ‘out’. Ideally, I will sufficiently elaborate
his more cautious, tentative endorsement of pragmatism into a more robust defense of
pragmatism as a viable ‘third way’ to approach nature-society geography.
It is logical to begin my development of environmental pragmatism with a brief
outline of what I refer hereafter as “philosophical pragmatism” or just unqualified
“pragmatism.” Pragmatism is a school of philosophy that arose (and has remained for the
most part specific to) the United States in the late 19th century. Pragmatism’s most wellknown and influential early theorists included Charles Sanders Peirce, William James,
John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead (Parker, 1996). Though not as well-known or
widely appreciated internationally – or even within American academic philosophy – as
many European philosophers, these ‘classical’ American pragmatists continue to inform a
diverse and evolving contemporary American pragmatism. Although there is a great deal
of variation within pragmatism and between individual pragmatists, 16 commonalities can
be drawn.
Perhaps most fundamentally, “all [pragmatists] agree in their rejection of
foundationalist epistemology” (Parker, 1996, p.22). Pragmatist anti-foundationalism
should not, however, be thought to reflect an anti-realism or anti-naturalism. The early
pragmatists, particularly Peirce and Dewey, were intensely interested in theorizing the
nature of scientific inquiry – in large part for the sake of the development of the
practice(s) of natural science. For the pragmatists, we must continue our scientific
investigations into the ‘truths’ of the world; but our explanations must proceed without
recourse to a priori, unchanging ‘laws’. This emphasis on experience and experiment
(and perhaps the near conflation of the two) “led James to call his philosophy ‘radical

16

For some, no doubt, this assertion would be considered an understatement. For example, Ann Berthoff
cites Walker Percy’s comment that “William James took one idea [from Peirce] and turned it into
pragmatism which, whatever its value, is not the same thing as Peirce’s pragmaticism” (in Berthoff, 1999a,
p.57) But there has probably never been a school of philosophy so uniform in its theory that significant
internal disputes were absent.
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empiricism’” (p.25). All explanation is the product of experience, and experience has
proven that our understandings of the world are nothing if not “fallible” (p.22).17
The concept of ‘fallibilism’ – originally theorized by Peirce – is also foundational
to pragmatism. Clearly related to and consistent with the preceding treatment of
pragmatist anti-foundationalism, a belief in fallibilism means that “pragmatists hold that
there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be had that such-and-such a belief will never
need revision” (Putnam & Conant, 1994, in Warner, 2002, p. 25). ‘Beliefs’ are always
based in certain fundamental constructs. All such guiding constructs – whether guiding
natural science (for example, evolution (Hickman, 1996)) or social (for example,
democracy or community (Dewey, 1960)) inquiry – are also necessarily fallible. We can
never, in other words, assume that there is ever a transhistorical correctness underlying
any concept of belief. This does not mean that no beliefs or constructs are correct or
accurate. It is more that “we may be able to get it [a belief or construct] better and better,
truer and truer, but we never get it completely right” (Hickman, 1996, p. 54, emphasis
added). “May” and “better” are primary qualifiers in this sentence. To anyone who would
conflate the pragmatist optimism, inherent in this sentence, that “we may be able to get
it…truer and truer” with the Enlightenment ‘project’ of the accumulation of knowledge
increasingly nearing absolute Truth, it could be pointed that we only know that we may
be getting it truer. So there is a point in trying, a necessity for inquiry, to be certain, but it
is unverifiable – and therefore a non-issue – to argue whether the development of any
particular truth is approaching Truth. To a staunch anti-metaphysicalist (which would
include most poststructuralists) who might quarrel that “better and better, truer and truer”
still harbors an implication that there is a transhistorical end-state toward which we
‘think’ we might be headed, the flat declaration that follows, that “we [know we] never
get it completely right,” should sufficiently silence this charge. Regarding language, then
(and there will be considerably more on this matter later), pragmatism rejects the
“metaphysical realist” possibility of language (Zeglen, 2002, p. 90). Truth can never be
said to represent “a sort of correspondence” between reality and language; language can
17

And although a similarly humble, empiricist framework for explanation is certainly echoed by many
poststructuralists (e.g., Philo, 2000) there are less nature-skeptical perspectives that echo this sentiment as
well. For example, William Cronon, an environmental historian, endorses a similar course of knowledge
production when he speaks of the need for less bold speculating and more detailed analyses of “very
particular social and ecological changes” (Cronon, 1990, p. 1125)
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not provide a “completely transparent or neutral medium with which to describe the
world” (p. 90). Truths are what we believe. Beliefs are grounded in
accumulations of [empirical] verifications [which] provide the ground for
… contingent, probabilistic, but often practically undoubted, perceptual
claims. The purpose of the creation of meanings is the establishment of
beliefs that allow for successful interaction with a surrounding universe
(Rosenthal, 1986, p. 59) .
To put forth a crude example, when standing on the edge of a cliff, a belief in gravity
allows for a much more “successful interaction with a surrounding universe” than a belief
in the absence of gravity. Recognizing the inescapability of belief, pragmatists are
“antiskeptical, … holding that doubt requires justification just as much as belief”
(Putnam & Conant, 1994, in Warner, 2002, p. 25).
Pragmatist anti-foundationalism and empiricism are thus based in a desire to
explain and understand the world, but (as I hope to have made abundantly clear) in a less
epistemologically confident manner than as practiced within predominant modes of
Western science. This epistemological apprehensiveness applies to both the production of
knowledge and assessments of knowledge, and as such, pragmatism provides a
methodology for reading science (or any field other knowledge production). Pragmatism
recognizes that there is always a “tradeoff between security and definiteness” in scientific
explanation (Rescher, 2002, p. 78). “We can and indeed should be scientific realists …
[at] the level of the looser generalities of ‘schoolbook science’” (p. 78). My above
example of gravity as “true” seems consistent with this sentiment. Following the same
line of logic, it would be less sensible, less meaningful, to flag ‘evolution’ (in its broadest
sense) as a “social construction” than to refer to it as ‘true’. At this crude level, we have a
great degree of “security” that our concepts are true. As a concept becomes further
specified or, particularly, as it is tied into specific causal chains of explanation, we have
increasingly less security that our assertions are accurate. For example, even as we regard
evolution as ‘true’, any assertion that evolution is the causal factor behind this-or-that
human behavioral trait should acknowledge the insecurity of the claim by registering the
statement somewhere on the level of speculation. The level of generality is not, of course,
the sole arbiter as to validating the security of our beliefs and concepts. But the
“definiteness/security tradeoff” is a useful heuristic tool in pragmatist methodology.
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When, in research, one makes assertions based on analysis of whatever object of inquiry,
the ‘tradeoff’ serves as a useful check which can help ‘set’ the appropriate assertiveness
or speculativeness of the tone. Any pragmatism, of course – acknowledging the fallibility
of all human knowledge, constructs, beliefs, and truth production – is “speculative
pragmatism” (Rosenthal, 1986).
Pragmatism also rejects the fact/value dichotomy (Putnam & Conant, 1994). All
facts are the products of a particular socio-historical context (and attention to this is of
course important), but even within a particular socio-historical context, within a
particular inquiring community that broadly shares a standardized approach to
investigation, facts are always the “result of selective attention and of deliberately chosen
experimental procedures” (Putnam & Conant, 1994, p. 206). Moreover, “what sort of
situations appear to us to be problematic” are the problems we choose to (scientifically or
otherwise) investigate (p. 206). So facts are at least doubly value laden from the go: A
problem is chosen (this is a “function of the values we embrace” (p. 206)) and a mode of
investigation is chosen to address the problem. The latter is a function of values as well.
Which features of the problem are relevant? Which information will be helpful? How
must this information be determined? Every step of the fact production process is a
reflection of a value judgment.
Pragmatism here provides the methodological core for both critical and assertive
(or normative) analysis. For critique, attention to context, stated and unstated values,
value-bearing research methods, the inherently selective process of information
gathering, etc. – this has become more or less standard within all endorsed by their
practitioners as ‘critical’ methodologies. On the assertive or normative side, that is,
considering the possibility of contributing to the solutions of problems through analyses,
pragmatism provides a solid ground for assessing/asserting environmental politics, which
always, quite obviously, reflect an entanglement of facts/values (or fact-values). As
“environmental discourse generally justifies its ‘oughts’ based on scientifically founded
assertions of truth concerning the imperiled state of nature” (Proctor, 1998a, p. 353) (but
all the while, it is important to note, often staunchly defending the is/ought, fact/value
dichotomies), the pragmatist requirement of “the democratization of inquiry” provides a
model against which environmentalist politics can both be judged and aspire to meet
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(Putnam, 1995, p. 73). The phrase ‘democratization of inquiry’ is, of course, not selfevident; that is, it is not an ideal model that can be unproblematically summoned and
drawn upon to critique or validate certain arguments. As with any foundational construct,
it requires specificity to be meaningful. Any pragmatist deployment of ‘democracy’
would, for example, be grounded in the positive recognition of moral pluralism that is
foundational to any pragmatism worthy of the name (Hoy, 1998; Light & Katz, 1996a;
McKenna, 2001; Norton, 1996a, 1996b; Rosenthal & Buchholz, 1996). In the following
chapters of the dissertation I will draw on a considerable and diverse selection of
pragmatist (and other) theorists in considering how pragmatist political theory might
inform and help shape environmentalist politics. Pragmatist political theory will also
(partially) inform my critical analyses of the Conservation Biology and Citizen
Management alternatives in the empirical chapters. I will now turn specifically to a
discussion of the pragmatist theory of language.

3.4. Escaping the Prison, Breaking the Mirror: Pragmatism and
Language
Since the bulk of my analysis will consist of examinations of written documents
and verbal statements, a discussion of how I will theorize language is necessary.
Pragmatism provides a useful and appropriate theory of language for an analysis of
environmental debates. Pragmatist theory also, I will argue, provides a more productive
and defensible mode of analysis for a sympathetic reading of environmental politics than
constructionism. I will argue that pragmatism provides a qualified naturalism and as such
avoids the bogeyman of anti-naturalistic debunking or refutation that mires so much
constructionism at the level of critique-for-the-sake-of-critique. I will also make the case
that anti-naturalism as refutation is theoretically problematic. This ‘pragmatic naturalism’
reflects the “pragmatic focus on the human biological organism and organismenvironment [relation]… Neither human activity in general nor human knowledge can be
separated from the fact that this being is a natural organism dependent upon a natural
environment” (Rosenthal & Buchholz, 1996, p. 40). A pragmatist theory of language
properly embeds human beings in nature, while certain forms of constructionism allow
for language, text, and discourse to ‘float’ freely, “arbitrarily” even (Braun &
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Wainwright, 2001, p. 49), above the material world of necessity, probability, and
possibility.
I will begin this section by briefly revisiting and critiquing Bruce Braun’s
representative constructionist writing. The first essay examined is the highly influential18
(and explicitly poststructuralist) essay “Buried Epistemologies” (Willems-Braun, 1997).
In “Buried Epistemologies,” two documents serve as the primary objects of analysis, one
published by an industrial forestry group and one by environmentalists. One of the
primary analytical goals of the paper is to assess the conditions through which particular
knowledges are made intelligible, and the effects of the sedimentation of these
knowledges; that is, what happens when these representations are made to work. This
emphasis is counterposed to more positivistic methods that assert accurate representations
of the world, or the ability to judge the accurateness of these representations. The forestry
and environmentalist documents assume, we are told, a “metaphysics of presence” (p.
25), meaning they wrongly believe that they can accurately represent the ‘whole’ of
nature. Braun emphatically argues that “what is at issue is not whether [these documents]
represented the landscape accurately” (p. 15, emphasis in original). To do so would frame
the issue as one of representations versus misrepresentations of nature, a method which
masks the “power” that underlies any individual or group’s ability to make a particular
representation work. Fair enough: not attending to aspects of power in environmental
controversies would certainly lead to a fairly impoverished analysis. But, as the
“metaphysics of presence” accusation implies, the critique goes much deeper than this.
Braun argues that “the production of an ‘effect’ of truthfulness [is always] tied to a
metaphysics which assume[s] that behind representation lies an order that representation
continually approache[s]” (p. 16, emphases in original – no minor point). Once the
possibility of any sense of accuracy is demolished – a task largely accomplished via the
poststructuralist ‘magic word’ accusation of “metaphysics” – the ‘real’ work, of assessing
the effects of power, can begin.

18

According to “Web of Science,” “Buried Epistemologies” has been cited fifty-five times in journals
referenced in their database, including fifteen references in the Annals of the Association of American
Geographers and nine times in Progress in Human Geography.
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Alongside the strongly asserted anti-metaphysical perspective, however, are some
starkly realist assertions. Perhaps the best example comes from Braun’s discussion of the
concept of “old-growth forests” in a footnote:
What constitutes ‘old-growth’ forests—and their significance—is widely
debated. Most generally, ‘old-growth’ forests are characterized by the
following: huge accumulations of biomass; large trees exceeding 1-2 m
diameter at 1.3 m height and reaching 60-80 m total height; old trees,
often older than 200 years and occasionally exceeding 1,000 years; and
structural diversity, including various tree sizes, snags (dead standing
trees), down logs, and so on (p. 26).
How else, other than assuming that nature can be represented more or less accurately, are
we supposed to make sense of this passage? (This is a rhetorical question: we couldn’t.)
There is a flat inconsistency at work here. One the one hand, Braun unsheathes antimetaphysical accusations for the purposes of refuting the claims of whatever target is
under scrutiny. On the other, for the purposes of explanatory clarity, and (importantly) for
the purposes of analysis, Braun repeatedly resorts to realist assertions that, we can only
assume, he believes accurately represent reality. “Discursive constructionism” is
employed as both philosophical critique and as a vehicle to refute the statements,
practices and representations of others (Demeritt, 2002, p. 774). As Demeritt argues,
construction-as-philosophical-critique is a valuable method for descriptive renderings of
representations of nature (or whatever else), but the “strong plea for epistemic caution”
ushered in through discursive constructionisms does not provide solid grounds for
refutation (p. 774). There is, then, something of a double standard at work here: Braun
employs a philosophical stance that effectively denies anyone the ability say anything
about the world, all the while making very “strong empirical claims” about their research
objects, nature notwithstanding. Positively interpreting objects of analysis is enabled
through the methodology of poststructuralist discourse analysis. Such a method of
interpretation is possible, we are told, because the objects of analysis are not nature, but
“discourses

of

nature”

(Castree,

2001,

p.

12).

Biologists,

ecologists,

and

environmentalists, those who craft (primary) representations of nature, are not granted the
same capacity to interpret and accurately represent their objects of analysis. We are
granted direct access to ‘texts’ and ‘discourses’, but only indirect (at best) access to
nature. The result is a thoroughly bifurcated world, one of an inaccessible ‘nature’
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(always in scare quotes to highlight its inaccessibility) and an accessible realm of
discourse. Pragmatism points to both the source of this conundrum as well as a potential
way out.
Ann Berthoff traces French poststructuralist theory as developing in reaction to
positivistic currents of French literary analysis and linguistics. In a rather strong
assertion, Berthoff argues that such theories – deconstruction or discourse analysis, for
example – often end up reinforcing positivism’s dualizing and finalizing tendencies.
Statements like “knowledge is socially and historically produced rather than found”
(Braun & Wainwright, 2001, p. 46) reflect this “oscillation between a linguistic idealism
… and a self-refuting scientism” (Putnam, 1995, p. 75). Clearly, for Braun and
Wainwright, those who understand the produced nature of knowledge are placed in a
privileged position over those who naively think that knowledge can be discovered; the
same goes for genealogically over scientifically produced statements. Why should we,
human geographers, be surprised when ecologists react in a hostile fashion to
constructivist critiques if our point of departure rather brusquely removes their ability to
say anything about their objects of study?
This dualistic framing is reliant upon a dyadic semiotic, through which the
significance of meaning becomes obscured as language is perceived as a “bottomless
regress of interpretations” (Putnam, 2004, p. 119). “Bottomless” (as I read it, ‘never
touching the earth’) may indeed be the key to this passage, as it marks the principal
divide

between

poststructuralist

and

pragmatist

theories

of

language.

For

poststructuralists, reference – to the world – becomes impossible, so that “there is no
there out there, with the result that kindergartners and historians, cell biologists and
novelists can only tell stories” (Berthoff, 1999b, p. 674, emphasis in original). Few
geographers, however, make a career out of merely telling stories. Even poststructuralists
invariably return, in the last instance, to interpretation. It is this, interpretation, which
becomes the key to Berthoff’s remedy for the radically skeptical poststructuralist anxiety
over our inability to “escape the prison of language” (Demeritt, 2002, p. 774). The
complexities of language, for pragmatists, are not the proof that we can never know the
world, but rather the very enabling grounds for the social process of making sense of and
getting by in the world.
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Interpretation is the ‘third’ in the pragmatist triadic-semiotic theory of language
and meaning (Berthoff is drawing primarily on the early pragmatist Charles Sanders
Peirce here). No sign is a “clean machine awaiting a competent operator”; every sign –
whether it be a word, symbol, phrase, text, or forest – must be interpreted to achieve
significance (Berthoff, 1999b, p. 671):
To understand interpretation as the third element of the sign is to
recognize mediation – and once mediation is understood as not
constituting a barrier but as the logical condition of significance, there will
be certain epistemological consequences, chief among them the
recognition that all knowledge is interpretation and that all interpretation
must itself be interpreted (Berthoff, 1999a, p. 5).
The idea of a sign achieving significance through always-mediated interpretation brings
to light the processual and relational nature of thinking, speaking, and writing, always in
and through signs. Interpretation is the act of making sense of signs as things-in-theworld, whether bacteria, or texts, or interpretations of texts. Only within a dyadic
semiotic, such as the signifier-signified model, could the idea of an ‘arbitrariness’
between words and worlds arise. Employing a triadic semiotic, signs are only inert, or
‘confined’ to the site of language, until they are interpreted. And it is through every
instance of interpretation that language works. Granting language, texts, or discourse
autonomy from the world fails to recognize the constancy of interpretation, the
productivity (world-altering character) of language.
Acknowledging the productive, relational nature of language does not, of course,
make the task of analyzing language (in the form of discourses or particular texts) any
easier. It does not remove the problems of, say, agency, power, or contextuality. If
anything, pragmatism strongly echoes the “epistemic caution” (Demeritt, 2002, p. 774)
that (ideally) guides constructionist analysis. This materialized, active model of language
also does not discount the self-referential dangers of interpretation:
[M]any … ‘observations’ are but implications of the particular
terminology in terms of which the observations are made. In brief, much
that we take as observations about ‘reality’ may be but spinning out of
possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms (Burke, 1966, p. 46).
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This passage comes from Kenneth Burke’s discussion of language as a “terministic
screen” (Burke, 1966, Chapter 3, pp. 44-62). “Screen” here serves as a powerful
metaphor for language that echoes the pragmatist contradistinction to both scientistic
(language as “mirror” (Proctor, 1998a, p. 353; Rorty, 1979)) and discursive (language as
“prison” (Demeritt, 2002, p. 774)) models of language. Consistent with Burke’s concern
over the tenuousness of many taken-for-granted notions of ‘reality’, numerous authors
cite the growing mediatization and commoditization of social life, that is, the increasingly
densely stratified nature of language in contemporary society (Chouliaraki & Fairclough,
2001; Davies, 2000; Davis, 1995; Fairclough, 1992; Gee, 1999; Hall, 1997; Harré et al.,
1999; Penley & Ross, 1991; Poster, 1989; Wilson, 1991). That (analytical) problem
noted, pragmatism still rejects the idea that language in any form can ever be theorized or
analyzed as a wholly self-referential entity.
My aim so far has been to present pragmatism in general, and the pragmatist
theory of language specifically, as a theoretically defensible and politically enabling
framework for a critical, yet broadly nature-endorsing, analysis of environmental debates.
To conclude this chapter, I will discuss an examination of environmental politics that
broadly shares the epistemological, political and ethical sentiments of the environmental
pragmatist perspective I am developing. What does it mean, in other words, to do
environmental pragmatism?

3.5. Pragmatism and Writing Nature-Society Geography
This discussion will focus on a recent essay by James Proctor, the one geographer
(that I am aware of) who has explicitly endorsed environmental pragmatism as one
potential way out of the naïve-realist/abyssal-constructionist impasse (Proctor, 1998a).
That essay, however, did not have any empirical content; it was solely a theoretical
overview (and his discussion of pragmatism was quite cursory anyway). In a later essay,
even though pragmatism per se is never mentioned, Proctor begins to show what an
empirical environmental pragmatist analysis might look like.
In the concluding contribution to Castree and Braun’s second edited collection on
‘social nature’, Proctor finds it necessary to “tak[e] social constructionism seriously,” but
this endorsement comes with a qualification, as he “would be gravely concerned [if
appropriating a constructionist-informed perspective] were to rob [ecologists] of their
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ability to speak about [nature]” (Proctor, 2001, p. 225).19 I empathize with his problem, to
be sure, even if I might invert the emphasis of the declaration.20 In his empirical analysis,
Proctor discusses a short environmental news piece decrying the loss of freshwater
animal species. He shows how the authors of the story follow the scientific ‘facts’ about
the species’ decline with normative statements regarding what ‘needs’ to be done to halt
their decline. The news piece jumps from an ‘is’ (freshwater biodiversity decline) to an
‘ought’ (the need to halt it) without any discussion whatsoever about why we should care
or why we should act. Proctor argues against the idea that “such a clear case [for action]
is morally indisputable” (p. 228). He follows this initial ‘problematizing’ of the issue
with a detailed consideration of how a constructionist analysis might enrich our
understanding of this particular environmental issue. One thing about this essay that is
particularly significant for my purposes is Proctor’s rationale for adding constructionism
to his analytical toolkit:
The social constructionist perspective can enrich environmental ethics by
reminding us that any human pronouncement on nature entails social as
well as biophysical considerations, that there are, so to speak, important
truths about the truths we invoke in our defense of certain normative
positions (p. 229).
Proctor’s point of departure is the potential contribution of constructionism to
environmental ethics. This is a decidedly different political stance than most
constructionists take. He proposes no grounds for the refutation or dismissal of
environmentalist concerns; these concerns indeed underlie the entire discussion. There is
also a point of convergence with the pragmatist theory of language that I outlined in the
previous section. The notion of “truths about truths” echoes Berthoff’s (philosophical and
methodological) assertion that all interpretations are always subject to further
interpretation.
19

And, it is probably worth noting that, despite the relentless skepticism that dominates constructionist
renderings of biodiversity issues – with Castree and Braun as exemplars (a point I hope I have already
made clear), allowing Proctor’s much more sympathetic essay to be the literal last word on social nature
stands as evidence that there is a willingness on the part of (at least these) constructionists to ‘problematize’
their own endeavor. Proctor’s essay undeniably opens up an alternative space for considering
environmental concerns that would have been missing without it. Its inclusion is a testament that the
professed commitment to openness in dialogue is not merely rhetorical, and for this they should be
commended.
20
I would more likely say, for example, “I believe that nature-society geographers must take the findings of
ecologists seriously, but I would be concerned if such a stance were to rob us of the ability to think
critically about the relationships between language, science, the ‘public’, and politics.”
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A space for a realist acceptance of the possibility of truth is readily
acknowledged: “It is important to know … whether or not it is indeed true that freshwater
species are going extinct at a rate five times greater than terrestrial animals, and that is
what scientists … are for” (p. 230). This does not mean, of course, that a rigorous
analysis (pragmatist or otherwise) should uncritically accept such statements as fact. This
would be to irresponsibly ignore important issues of power. If I was to make a statement
along the lines of “after constructionism, we can no longer ignore ________ ,” the blank
would indeed likely be filled in with “issues of power regarding who is authorized to
speak truths, and which voices are excluded in the process.” Assessing the veracity of
scientific statements, then, is a necessary task of any ‘critical’ analysis of environmental
problems. This task poses analytical problems to be sure. In Proctor’s empirical example,
this task would require assessing, among other things: how the primary data from which
the conclusions were made was gathered; what previous studies informed their models
(and how they were integrated into these models); how the extinction trends were
estimated; what assumptions had to be made to finalize these models of nature; if these
assumptions were made explicit or if they were intentionally buried. There are research
methods available that can answer these questions. The empirical “science studies” of
Bruno Latour are particularly appropriate for these tasks (e.g., Latour, 1987, 1999).
Again, I stress that I am outlining my methodology and not specific methods in this
section. Discussions of particular methods will accompany specific analytical tasks in the
empirical chapters that follow. In this vein, specifically, I will draw on Latour (and
others) when I assess the various specific articulations of scientific facts evoked in
support of the different cases for and against reintroduction. My analysis will, then,
‘problematize’ these facts to the degree that facts are always intentionally selective
simplifications of nature, but not for the purposes of removing anyone’s ability to speak
truths about the world.
I will close this chapter with one more example from Proctor’s essay. In this
example, Proctor finds William Cronon’s notion of environmental history as “narrative”
helpful. Thinking of environmental debates as narratives helps make sense of the
necessary act of simplification inherent in any “story” about humans and the
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environment. Proctor quotes William Cronon at some length, but the power of the
passage more than justifies its inclusion in his discussion as well as mine:
Narrative is the chief literary form that tries to find meaning in an
overwhelmingly crowded and disordered chronological reality… By
writing stories of environmental change, we divide the causal relationships
of an ecosystem with a theoretical razor that defines included and
excluded, relevant and irrelevant, empowered and disempowered…
Narrative succeeds to the extent that it hides the discontinuities, ellipses,
and contradictory experiences that would undermine the intended meaning
of the story (Cronon, 1992, pp. 1349-50, in Proctor, 2001, p. 232).
A narrative, adds Proctor, “is a story, not a fairytale devoid of real content but rather an
intentional selection and construction of evidence to bring forth some meaning or moral”
(p. 232). Does this undermine Berthoff’s previously noted (and my personally endorsed)
rejection of the idea that all we can ever do is tell stories? I would argue not. Berthoff,
you will remember, was polemicizing specifically against the misguided idea that a story
is a story is a story; that we have no philosophical grounds on which to judge the veracity
of any story, much less judge a story’s confirmation of experience (as the material
condition of embodied human existence in nature). Cronon’s deployment of the concept
of narrative, if anything, grounds all stories we tell of nature in experience; even more so,
it theorizes experience as moral experience. This echoes the pragmatist insistence that
lived experience is immanently normative, and that all such (honest) narratives reflect the
shared social process of making sense of the world. This neither empties the notion of
experience of its politics nor destroys the ground for learning what we can from nature.
In closing, I want to emphasize the dual-nature of what I have tried to accomplish
in this chapter’s final section. Primarily, the examples from James Proctor’s essay ideally
will have helped sketch what an environmental pragmatist nature-society geography
might look like. This examination has come in the form of sentiments regarding the
rationales for asking different analytical questions, but I also have provided a ‘snapshot’
of research that is philosophically consistent with the more explicitly pragmatist
discussions that preceded it. Secondly, having outlined some of the multiple theoretical
and methodological perspectives that will inform my research, I have prefigured the case
that this ‘environmental pragmatism’ can constructively inform more than just the field of
environmental ethics, the domain to which environmental pragmatism per se has been
more or less confined up until now (though I do aim to make a contribution to this field).
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Specifically, my most robust contribution will be to critical nature-society geography.
Through the discussion in these more theoretically-focused chapters, complemented by
considerations in later chapters of how my empirical analyses can further inform theory,
my dissertation will contribute to both theoretical and empirical nature-society studies.
As Jody Emel put it, the goal of doing critical nature-society geography is “to be
provocative but to stay in the game” (Emel, 1991, p. 384). In the empirical chapters that
follow, I will provide what I hope is a convincing model of environmental pragmatism as
“provocative” analysis. My parallel aim is for environmental pragmatism to provide the
means by which I can stay in the game(s), by contributing to academic nature-society
geography all the while the maintaining a commitment to the ‘cause’ of
environmentalism.
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Chapter 4. Rewilding Nature: Conservation Biology, Deep Ecology and
the ‘New Conservation Movement’
4.1. Introduction
The philosophy of deep ecology and the science of conservation biology have
provided the wilderness movement in North America with a spark – a new suite of
justifications for nature conservation. So revolutionized is the programme that one of the
movement’s leading proponents has dubbed it the “new conservation movement”
(Foreman, 1995b, p. 55). The revitalized wilderness movement has grand ambitions and
laudable goals. The goal, quite simply, is protecting Earth’s biological diversity, to keep
plant and animal species and ecosystem communities from going extinct. No region plays
a more prominent role in the “continental conservation” (Soulé & Terborgh, 1999b, book
title) of North America than the Northern Rocky Mountains (Clark et al., 1996; Gaillard,
2001; Noss et al., 1996), and no species is more integral or poses more challenges to this
effort than the grizzly bear (Primm, 1996; Wilcox, 1997). Protecting biodiversity in the
Rockies (or anywhere, for that matter) is, to put it mildly, no simple task. The complexity
of the task is not lost on the leading proponents of continental-scale conservation biology
in North America; they realize that “success in this endeavor depends on two conditions:
good science and the popularization of a compelling, practical and inspiring vision”
(Soulé & Terborgh, 1999a, p. 3).
Neither the vision nor the science, however, has developed unscathed from
criticism. Deep ecology, the preservation of wilderness, even biodiversity conservation –
all have been the subject of intense recent scrutiny by environmental and social theorists.
In this chapter, I review some of the critics of the new conservation movement, and use
their insights as a lens through which to assess the science, underlying philosophy, and
politics of the movement. This analysis initiates one significant component of the
dissertation, producing a sympathetic and reconstructive critique of the Conservation
Biology proposal for grizzly reintroduction in Idaho and the burgeoning ‘ecocentric’
environmentalism of which it is a part. In doing so, I hope to help remedy one significant
lacuna in geographical nature-society research: our general “unwillingness to entertain
ecocentri[c]” thought as a noteworthy political endeavor (Castree, 2002, p. 207).
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In the first section of the chapter, I develop a brief genealogy of the philosophy of
deep ecology and one of its dominant North American offshoots. Following this, I
examine the environmental group The Wildlands Project and its journal Wild Earth. This
group espouses the ecocentric ideology of deep ecology and has been described as the
radical vanguard of American environmentalism (Sessions, 1992). The Conservation
Biology alternative for grizzly recovery was modeled on The Wildlands Project’s
signature conservation reserve design. Following the discussion of The Wildlands Project
is a discussion of prominent critiques of deep ecology and wilderness preservation. These
critiques frame an empirical analyses of the conservation biology proposal for grizzly
recovery and The Wildlands Project as representative examples of “deep ecology on the
ground” (Taylor, 2000, p. 269) – bringing to light some deficiencies in this version of
ecological politics. In highlighting these deficiencies, my goal is not to provide a
rationale for dismissing this wing of the environmental movement. Rather, in a
reconstructive and pragmatic spirit, my aim is to help point a way toward a more roundly
defensible and effective politics of wild nature.

4.2. Deep Ecology Comes to America
Nearly any genealogy of deep ecology begins in 1973, when the Norwegian
philosopher Arne Naess (1973) coined the term in the short essay “The Shallow and the
Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary.” As the title of the paper suggests,
this was at once a positive formulation of deep ecology and a critique of what he
disparagingly termed “shallow ecology.” These “ecologies” were not divisions within the
science of ecology but branches of the environmental movement. For Naess, shallow
ecology – or what would later be called “reform environmentalism” in the North
American deep ecology literature – carried “an exclusive concern with issues of pollution
and resource conservation insofar as these impacted on the interests of people in
developed countries” (Mathews, 2001, p. 218). Consumed with the search for piecemeal
solutions to particular issues, shallow ecology failed to ask “deeper questions” about the
causes of ecological problems and therefore could never hope to solve the ecological
crisis itself (Fox, 1990, p. 92). Deep ecology, on the other hand, offered a wholesale
“normative critique” of human society and particularly the human relationship with
nonhuman nature (Katz et al., 2000a, p. ix).
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The bookends of Naess’s philosophy of deep ecology are “Self-realization” and
ecocentrism.21 These two idea(l)s are interrelated and arise out of the (scientific)
ecological understanding of the living (and non-living) world as comprised of
interrelated, interdependent, and mutually constitutive beings. The philosophy of deep
ecology is thus at once naturalistic in that it is derived from ecological science and
holistic as it appeals to the relationships between all beings constituting a whole, living
Earth. Deep ecology offers a corrective against the (related) dominant Western, modern
views that the human species is separate from nonhuman nature and that human
individuals are in any sense separate from other living beings (humans included). “Selfrealization,” for Naess, is the logical conclusion of any truly deep ecological questioning
(Fox, 1990). When “we” realize the interconnectedness of all things, it becomes evident
that any concept of the self must expand beyond the individual to include all things.
Promoting Naess’s ideal of Self-realization, Warwick Fox states that
when we realize we are related to the whole, alienation drops away and we
identify more widely with the world of which we are a part. Another way
of expressing this is to say that we realize a larger sense of self; our own
unfolding becomes more bound up with the unfolding of other entities
(Fox, 1990, p. 105).
So while deep ecology purports to offer a planetary-scale solution to the ecological crisis,
the locus of normative change is the human individual.
The second key component of Naess’s deep ecology, ecocentrism, is a logical
derivation of Self-realization. Once an individual realizes that he or she is not a narrow
enclosed self and properly “identifies” (Katz, 2000, p. 18) with all of nature,
anthropocentric (human-centered) thought or behavior becomes illogical. As such, deep
ecology combines “a metaphysic of interrelatedness [with] an ethic of interrelatedness [in
which] human beings are not morally privileged in any way, … other life forms are just
as morally considerable as we are” (Mathews, 2001, p. 218). Although Naess never
writes in a polemical tone, the rhetoric of deep ecology is incontrovertibly divisive and
dualistic. The most prominent example is the binary ecocentric/anthropocentric division,
21

The term actually used by Naess in his early deep ecology essays was “biospheric egalitarianism,” but
“ecocentrism” (and its near-synonym “biocentrism”) have become the more widely used terms in
contemporary deep ecology, particularly in North America (Fox 1990). All three terms are interchangeable
for all but the most hairsplitting philosophical discussions, so I will stick with ecocentrism for currency and
consistency.
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which maps directly onto the deep/shallow ecology division. You – the environmentally
sensitive individual – either possess deep ecological understanding or you do not; you
either practice deep ecology or you do not. This is a prominently problematic feature of
deep ecology which I will return to later in the chapter.
Deep ecology was relatively unheard of in North America until 1985 with the
publication of Sessions and Devall’s Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered.
Contained in this book is a “platform” for the deep ecology movement (developed by
Sessions and Naess). Unlike Naess’s earlier work, the platform was intended to be less an
“ecophilosophy” and more a set of principles that self-identified deep ecologists could
rally around, regardless of “philosophical or religious positions” (Devall & Sessions,
1985, p. 70). The platform was based on the fundamental tenet that nature has “intrinsic
value … independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes” (p.
70). Beyond this fiat of intrinsic value, which is basically a restatement of the deep
ecology commitment to nonanthropocentrism, the platform called for a reduction in
human population, a decrease in human interference in the natural world, a change in
“policies,” and a personal “obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the
necessary changes” (p. 70). So the deep ecology platform at once codified a new
grounding for many American environmentalists (ecocentrism) and recalled resonant
themes within the movement (overpopulation, leaving “nature” to its own devices, and
direct political action). Although summarizing Naess’ early writing on deep ecology as a
singular, cohesive entity is a relatively straightforward task, the same cannot be said of its
American derivatives. Once deep ecology took root in the North American literature, it
quickly irrupted into a diverse and rather amorphous catch-phrase, summoned by
different writers to mean quite different things. It is will beyond the scope of this
investigation to attempt to outline the various streams of the now incredibly-diffuse deep
ecology movement in the US.22 What is necessary is to demonstrate the influence upon
and continuity with the biodiversity/wilderness preservation movement in the US.
Although biodiversity/wilderness advocates in the US are not always selfidentified deep ecologists, several writers have traced its influence on and pervasiveness

22

Self-styled deep ecologists also include (among others) spiritual ecofeminists, proponents of Gaia theory,
and Western Buddhist- and Taoist-environmentalists.
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within the movement. Andrew McLaughlin locates deep ecology as one of five “streams”
within “radical environmentalism” (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 258).23 He states that “deep
ecology grows out of a nature tradition extending back to John Muir and Henry David
Thoreau” (pp. 258-9). This is familiar company for American environmentalists: along
with Aldo Leopold, Muir and Thoreau comprise the “current canon…of American (read,
United States) wilderness theory” (Van Wyck, 1997, p. 93).24 Ramachandra Guha sees “a
focus on the preservation of unspoilt wilderness” as foundational to the “uniquely
American” version of deep ecology (Guha, 1998, p. 232, 233). Dave Foreman, perhaps
the most prominent and outspoken wilderness defender in the contemporary US, lists
deep ecology and conservation biology as the main inspirations behind his championed
“new conservation movement” (Foreman, 1995b, p. 55). Before getting into an
examination of this “new conservation movement,” a short outline of the rise of
conservation biology is necessary.
Conservation biology emerged in the early 1980s as an interdisciplinary field
comprising “mostly biological and social scientists” dedicated to developing a scientific
understanding of and response to the “biological diversity crisis” (Soulé, 1987, p. 4).
Brulle states that “[d]eep ecology… inspired the formation of the academic discipline of
conservation biology” (Brulle, 1996, p. 200) and it is not difficult to defend this assertion.
Indeed, in 1985 Arne Naess gave the keynote address at the Second International
Conference on Conservation Biology (Soulé, 1986). This talk was basically an
introduction to deep ecology, highlighting the aforementioned key tenets of ecocentrism,
Self-realization and the (then-new) deep ecology platform, culminating with a plea for
conservation scientists to become active in the social realm, as policy advisors and even
strong advocates of radical conservation measures (Naess, 1986). At the time, this call to
action was perceived by many scientists as a bold proposition that might threaten their
status as objective purveyors of scientific truths (Takacs, 1996). But the call was heeded
by many, as most conservation scientists realized that all the data in the world on species
decline and habitat degradation would be of little value if the resultant necessary
protective measures were never achieved. The Society for Conservation Biology has
23

The other four “streams” are “human-centered environmentalism calling for radical social change, social
ecology, ecological feminism [and] bioregionalism” (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 258).
24
The parenthetical section of the quote is van Wyck’s.
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grown immensely since its inception in 1985, now including over 5,000 members from
100 countries with annual conferences attended by over 1,000 people (Society for
Conservation Biology). The society launched its flagship journal Conservation Biology
and the journal is now ranked as the top environmental sciences journal in Thompson’s
Scientific Citation Index (Dalehousie Whale Research). While the bulk of the journal’s
essays are scientific-ecological analyses that would not be out of place in less activist
journals such as Ecological Monographs or Trends in Ecology and Evolution,
Conservation Biology also regularly includes more openly normative essays focusing on
the social aspects of conserving biodiversity.
In the following section of the chapter, I will trace the rise of what Dave Foreman
calls the “new conservation movement” (Foreman, 1995b, p. 55). I locate the advocacy
for the Conservation Biology proposal for grizzly recovery within this wing of the
environmental movement. This uniquely American deep ecology cum wilderness
preservation movement will be introduced here through an examination of its most high
profile and representative activist group The Wildlands Project and their journal Wild
Earth.

4.3. Biodiversity and the Preservation of Big Wilderness
The Wildlands Project (TWP) emerged in 1991 when a small group of members
of the radical environmental organization Earth First! (most notably Dave Foreman and
Reed Noss) decided to dedicate their full-time energies to the service of “the biocentric
grassroots elements within the conservation movement and advocating the restoration and
protection of all natural elements of biodiversity” (Wild Earth, 1991, inside front cover).
Rejecting the “radical anarchism [and] New Left anticapitalism” that guided Earth
First!’s commitment to “localist” direct action campaigns (Luke, 1997, p. 35), these
former “ecowarriors”25 were both upping the scale of wilderness/biodiversity activism
and fashioning the movement with a veneer of scientific respectability.26 While Earth
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This moniker is from Foreman’s (1991a) memoir of his “monkeywrenching” days as an Earth First!er.
Murray Bookchin is helpful in explaining this shift away from the activist left and to scientific deep
ecology (Bookchin’s extensive writing on the subject paraphrased here by Matthew Humphrey): “Elements
which has always existed in 1960s counter-culture – such as a fascination with Asian mysticism – but had
been weighed down with a rationalistic left-wing political ballast exploded freely on to the political scene
with the withering away of New Left ideology. The social analysis brought to 1960s counter-culture by the
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First!ers were busy defending specific wilderness areas against specific threats, the folks
at TWP were thinking big, “set[ting] the stage for the development of a North American
Wilderness Recovery Strategy” (Davis, 1991).
Courtesy of the findings of the nascent academic discipline of conservation
biology,27 “Big Wilderness” had become ecological necessity (Foreman, 1991b).
Wilderness, we are told, should no longer be perceived as “scenery” but rather is the
foundation for the preservation of all “Nature” (Foreman, 1995a, p. 10). This is no minor
point. The “issue theme” of Wild Earth’s inaugural issue was “ecological foundations for
big wilderness.” Proposing this as merely the “theme” of the first issue of the journal was
a radical understatement. Advocating Big Wilderness as ecological necessity has
persisted as the mission of TWP to this day.
In the 1992 Wild Earth special issue “The Wildlands Project: Plotting a North
American Wilderness Recovery Strategy,” the “mission statement” opens:
The mission of the Wildlands Project is to help protect and restore the
ecological richness and native biodiversity of North America through the
establishment of a connected system of reserves… It is time to … begin to
allow nature to come out of hiding and to restore the links that will sustain
both wilderness and the spirit of future human generations (Foreman et al.,
1992, p. 3).
Linking wilderness to the human spirit recalls the “old platitudes” of gurus like Thoreau
and Muir, for whom wilderness was a “place to be loved, enjoyed, [and] inhabited
respectfully” (Rothenberg, 1995, p. xiv). These (arguably anthropocentric28) sentiments
inspired the American wilderness movement for over a century, and ultimately led to the
preservation of tens of millions of acres of national parks and wilderness areas (Soulé &
Noss, 1998). What was protected, however, was mostly “‘rocks and ice’ – high elevation,
arid, or rough areas which are beautiful and are popular for backpacking, but which are
relatively unproductive habitats” (Foreman, 1995a, p. 14). The relict patchwork of
New Left faded away, leaving [for example, deep ecology] – a mystical, potentially anti-humanist politics
of the person in place” (Humphrey, 2002, p. 88).
27
I would place The Wildlands Project as a subset of conservation biology, with a much more openly
radical agenda, in the sense of an organization-wide consensus toward championing strict protection for
huge wilderness areas. Not all conservation biologists adhere to the grand-scale ambitions of TWP, but
nearly all contributors to Wild Earth echo the science-based advocacy of The Society for Conservation
Biology.
28
And this is not to baldly characterize Thoreau or Muir as anthropocentrists, but to note that the early
wilderness movement succeeded mainly in preserving scenic and often spectacular locales irrespective of
ecological considerations.
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reserves has gone some ways toward preserving North America’s endangered species and
ecosystems, but for the most part, only by accident.29 TWP rejects the wilderness-asscenery model in favor of a reserve model that would “protect wild habitat, biodiversity,
ecological integrity, ecological services, and evolutionary processes” (Foreman et al.,
1992, p. 4). The old model produced isolated wilderness areas unable to sustain the full
complement of native species and ecological processes (Soulé & Noss, 1998).
What TWP proposes is a radical modification of the existing nature-reserve
model. The dual spatial model of “discrete islands of nature in a sea of human modified
landscapes” (Foreman et al., 1992, p. 4) is rejected in favor of a four-parcel model. Now
called “core reserves” – defined as large areas “without roads, dams, motorized vehicles,
powerlines, overflights, or other artifacts of civilization” (Foreman et al., 1992, p. 4) –
wilderness areas still form the heart of the model. Existing wilderness areas and other
relatively undeveloped Federal lands would serve as the initial core reserves. As such it is
no accident that this conservation reserve model has been so heavily promoted in the
Rocky Mountain Northwest. No other region in the country contains both extant
populations of endangered charismatic species (e.g., grizzly bear, wolf) and huge existing
wilderness areas and national parks – de facto core reserves for the Wildlands Project’s
planning purposes. In these regions a “wildland matrix” would dominate the landscape
(Noss et al., 1996, p. 956, see Figure 4.1). In areas where existing protected area reserves
are smaller and significant expansion is not a possibility, a “human dominated matrix”
would dominate the landscape, while smaller yet still connected and buffered core
reserves would function to preserve and maintain biodiversity and ecosystem functions.

29

For example, the creation of Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks may well have saved the grizzly
bear from extinction in the lower 48 states, but neither park was created to help save the grizzly. A few
species, such as the bison, have had large protected areas created specifically on their behalf. Other species,
like the black-footed ferret, had little or no native habitat protected incidentally or intentionally, and have
not benefited whatsoever from the creation of wilderness areas or national parks.
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Figure 4.1. Reed Noss’s Idealized Conservation Reserve Design (from Noss et al.,
1996, p. 956)
Whether in a wildland or human-dominated landscape, core reserves would be
managed as unobtrusively as possible to allow for natural ecological processes to
flourish. Core reserves would be linked together by “biological corridors” (the second
parcel in the model) enabling the dispersal, genetic exchange, and migration of wildlife,
thus mitigating the ‘island effect’ of isolated protected habitats and ecosystems (Foreman
et al., 1992, p. 4). Both core reserves and corridors would be surrounded by “buffer
zones” (parcel three) designed to protect the “integrity [of core reserves] from disruptive
human activities” (Foreman et al., 1992, p. 4). Limited human activities “compatible with
protection of core reserves” would be “allowed” in buffers (Foreman et al., 1992, p. 4).
The forth parcel in the model is areas of “intensive human activities… agriculture,
industrial

production,

urban

centers”

(Foreman

et

al.,

1992,

p.

4).

This

core/corridor/buffer model has been most thoroughly developed by Reed Noss (Noss,
1992; Noss & Cooperrider, 1994; Noss et al., 1996), past president of the Society for
Conservation Biology and science editor of Wild Earth since its inception. With
occasional slight terminological modifications (for example, corridors as “landscape
linkages” and buffers as “compatible use areas” (in Foreman et al., 2000)), the model has
persisted relatively unchanged to the present day.
In addition to the radically revolutionized reserve design model, two other
prominent motifs in TWP’s conservation programme deserve highlighting. These are the
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concept of “rewilding” and the role of large carnivores in TWP’s conservation strategies.
Since the program’s inception, these components have received increasing prominence
and emerged as central to TWP’s ‘mission’. Reed Noss and Michael Soulé, the most
prominent conservation biologists associated with TWP,30 envisage TWP’s conservation
model as the third wilderness preservation paradigm in the US, and the first one capable
of fully “rewilding” the landscape (Soulé & Noss, 1998, p. 20). The first paradigm was
the monumentalist model of Muir and others (as discussed above). This wilderness is the
mostly high elevation, spectacularly scenic landscapes that Foreman disparagingly refers
to as “rocks and ice” to highlight the fact that most of these wilderness areas lack much
biological richness (Foreman, 1995a, p. 15). The second paradigm, the “biological
conservation” model, followed discoveries made in the nascent science of ecology and
the visionary leadership of Aldo Leopold. The biological conservation movement worked
to create preserves in often less spectacular, but more ecologically rich ecosystems. Such
sentiments inspired the protection of places like the Okefenokee National Wildlife
Refuge in 1937 and Everglades National Park in 1947.
Early empirical research by conservation biologists in the 1980s, however,
demonstrated that even this model failed to fully protect biodiversity. In all but the largest
reserves, mammal species had gone extinct or were in serious decline (Newmark, 1985).
Typically the first species to go extinct were the large predators. Large predators act as
“keystone species,” defined as species “whose influence on ecosystem function and
diversity are disproportionate to their numerical abundance” (Soulé & Noss, 1998, p. 22).
The disappearance of large predators from any particular ecosystem, then, while perhaps
appearing to be a minor ecological event (as the numbers of species and individuals of
large predators are never high) often has enormous structural and functional effects on
the ecosystem. For example, top predators can have a positive effect on songbird
populations by keeping populations of smaller “mesopredators” in check (Terborgh,
1999). Top predators can even positively affect game species which they prey upon
through the regulation of trophic functioning (Palomares et al., 1995). Predators’
regulating function is not limited to other animal species. In an example from the
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Dave Foreman is the other high profile founding member and spokesperson for TWP, but Foreman is not
a biologist.
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northern Rockies, the reestablishment of wolves in Yellowstone has been linked to
reinvigorated, healthier populations of aspens, due to the wolves’ effects on elk browsing
behavior (Bragg, 2000; Ripple & Larsen, 2000; Ripple et al., 2001). These examples are
not meant to imply that all species simply increase their numbers when top predators are
reintroduced. Yellowstone elk populations, for example, have declined since the
reintroduction of the wolf in 1995, though it has also been shown that the reduced elk
herds contain healthier, more robust individuals (Wilmers & Getz, 2004). While the
effects of predator reintroductions in any given ecosystem will vary and be only partially
predictable, what is undeniable is that predator reintroductions (or recolonizations) cause
some set of signal changes in ecosystem function. For an increasing number of
environmentalists, no matter what the changes, the difference marks a net gain in
“wildness.”
Soulé and Noss define “rewilding” as the protection or restoration of the full suite
of native predators to ecosystems, thereby “restoring self-regulating land communities”
(Soulé & Noss, 1998, p. 23). Large carnivores (grizzly bears not just being an example,
but the Northern Rocky Mountain exemplar31) require enormous tracts of relatively
undisturbed habitat (Noss et al., 1996; Weaver et al., 1996). If such habitat is protected
with carnivores present, their regulating functions ensure (or help to restore, if the
predators are reintroduced) a relatively healthy ecosystem. “Simply put, if enough habitat
is protected to maintain viable populations of large predators …, then most of the other
species in the region will also be protected” (Foreman, 1995a, p. 13.). So what to call a
wild or rewilded landscape? “Core reserves” works well in the technical literature,
certainly in the context of the reworked reserve design model. It does fulfill the first of
Soulé and Terborgh’s (1999a) two necessary conditions for success, that is, the “core
reserves” concept is backed up with “good science” (p. 3). But can the protection and
defense of core reserves “popularize … a compelling … and inspiring vision”? Likely
not. Certainly, it makes sense to choose a construct that connotes the wildness that should
define it. What the folks at TWP and the proponents of the Conservation Biology
alternative have done – instead of attempting to frame their agendas around an entirely
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The grizzly bear is “the most telling barometer of the health of the Northern Rockies ecosystems”
(Wilcox, 1998, p. 15).
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new construct – is attempt a revitalized case for the protection of “wilderness.”
Wilderness, now (or even “now more than ever” (Noss, 1994/5)), is not determined by
any particular land protection status. “True wilderness”32 (Foreman et al., 1992, p.4) is a
function of “wildness,” and wildness requires the presence of keystone species, including
large predators.
Wilderness as a foundation for environmental politics has been the subject of
scrutiny and sometimes rather intense criticism over the past couple of decades. Deep
ecology as well has received its fair share of critical examination. In the next section of
the chapter, I examine some recent debates regarding the politics of deep ecology and
wilderness advocacy.

4.4. Deep Ecology and Wilderness Defense Meet Critics
Although there is a wide body of scholarly literature discussing and critiquing the
philosophical basis for deep ecology and ecocentrism,33 in this section I focus more on
pragmatic critiques, that is, how deep ecology as a body of thought manifests as “deep
ecology on the ground” (Taylor, 2000, p. 269). This is considerably less of an issue when
dealing with critiques of wilderness preservation, as these discussions nearly always
focus on the practical politics of the environmental movement.
For the purposes of terminological convenience, I will refer to the first critique of
wilderness preservation outlined here as the “production of nature” thesis. The term
“production of nature,” as discussed at length in Chapter 2, was coined by Neil Smith
(Smith, 1991). There is little reason, however, for limiting the term to critiques that
directly reference Smith’s initial theorizing. I use the production of nature to refer to
more or less Marxist critiques rooted in historical examinations of the justifications for
the preservation of wilderness, particularly those focusing on human labor and the
transformation of nature in capitalist society. Carl Talbot argues: “Within the Western
tradition the idea of wilderness is closely linked to its function as a salve for a spiritually
battered workforce” (Talbot, 1998, p. 326). Due to the inevitability of “the degrading,
32

To use a good example of one of the times the wilderness construct has been qualified to designate its
new sense.
33
Easily the best single-source for sympathetic critiques of the philosophy of deep ecology is Katz, Light
and Rothenberg’s (2000b) edited collection Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep
Ecology. The distinction between philosophical and pragmatic critique, of course, is by no means clear cut,
and some of the literature I reference probably does tend as much toward theoretical as practical critique.
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alienating, and ‘unnatural’ character of the work process under capitalism,” nature – as
wilderness – is “banish[ed] … to the realm of leisure” (pp. 327, 328). Wilderness
becomes a mere cog of “nature … organized so as to meet the spatial, economic, and
psychological needs of capitalism” (p. 326).34 While contemporary wilderness defenders
perceive themselves as being part of a longstanding tradition of resistance to an
alienating, capitalist, consumer-driven society, in this light they are little more than
unwitting dupes aiding and abetting its production and reproduction.
This critique, if convincing, certainly would undermine statements that rewilding
might constitute a “radical environmentalism” (Sessions, 1992). Thus we are presented
with a rather cynical debunking of wilderness-defense-as-resistance. But perhaps we need
not accept or reject this critique tout court. I would argue that this critique is neither
‘true’ nor ‘false’ as applied to some imagined monolithic wilderness preservation
movement (which certainly doesn’t exist today, if ever it did). What this thesis points to,
positively, is hypotheses to be tested through empirical analyses of particular wilderness
narratives or particular political actions. For example: Would rewilding on-the-ground
require “capital’s ideologues to seal the deal”? (Talbot, 1998, p. 330); or, Can the
construct of wilderness be radicalized, rescued from its ideological and obfuscatory
history? Clearly, these questions will not have simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers either, but
such a line of “deep questioning” is fundamental to any deep ecology worthy of the name
(Evernden, 1999; Fox, 1990).
Another strength of the production of nature thesis is an insistence on bringing
every act of ecological advocacy firmly into the realm of the sociopolitical. Nature can
never be preserved in-itself and/or for-itself (Smith, 1991). Every act of nature protection
– no matter how much it enables “natural processes [to] reign” (Noss et al., 1999, p. 99) –
is necessarily “the result of social decision-making and social action” (Talbot, 1998, p.
326). This “social decision-making” (i.e., politics), even in purportedly liberalized
democratic societies such as the US, can (quite obviously) take various forms, some more
desirable than others. Deep ecologists have long ordained decentralized, democratic
politics as the necessary means to their desired ends (e.g., Devall & Sessions, 1985;
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And I think the parallels to Smith’s thesis are pretty clear in this essay, even as Talbot’s examination is
considerably more specific, dealing with wilderness per se.
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Naess, 1973; Soulé, 1992). This commitment notwithstanding, many critics (both
sympathetic and hostile) have feared that deep ecologists would not shy away from an
opportunistic alliance with authoritarian or reactionary politics (Bookchin, 1994; Ferry,
1995; Harvey, 1993).
The most salient examples of actually existing undemocratic wilderness
conservation come from the Third World, where the exportation of the American model
of wilderness preservation has often been “frankly imperialist” (Guha, 1998, p. 236), with
“the setting aside of wilderness areas … result[ing] in a direct transfer of resources from
the poor to the rich” (p. 235). American deep ecologists, for the most part, have been
anything but vocal opponents of the Third World eco-imperialism described by (among
others) Guha in India and Neumann in Africa (Neumann, 1995, 1996, 1998). That noted,
Soulé and Noss have of recent been careful to construct “rewilding” as a model
appropriate for the North American context specifically, while recognizing “other
rationales and strategies for conservation” in other parts of the world (Soulé & Noss,
1998, p. 21). Hopefully, this represents a heightened sensitivity to cultural context taking
root within the wilderness preservation movement.
Human (“over”)population receives enormous attention from deep ecologists and
wilderness defenders. This issue also marks one of the seemingly more intractable rifts
between these groups and Marxists and other leftist theorists and activists. This rift traces
back to Marx and Engels’ reaction to Malthus. Malthus argued that human population
rises geometrically while the food supply can only rise arithmetically. Misery and
poverty will beset a great majority of humans – this is the sad fact of human existence.
Marx and Engels argued against the universality of the law of exponential population
increase, adding that a surplus population was a historical feature distinct to capitalism
(Benton, 1989). The Marxist rejection of Malthus’ theory of natural limits was wholesale.
Ted Benton – a sympathetic reader of Marx – has gone so far as to refer to Marx and
Engel’s “Utopian over-reaction to Malthusian epistemic conservatism” (Benton, 1989, p.
58) and this over-reaction has persisted through to many present-day Marxists. But again,
taking this as an either/or issue (e.g., either nature can tell us exactly what limits it places
on humans or all talk of natural limits is ipso facto reactionary) creates a meaningless
standoff between green and red straw men. I would argue that a tempered skepticism

75

toward evocations of, for example, overpopulation as the cause of ecological degradation
(particularly in the abstract), can expose some latent conservative-to-reactionary
tendencies in environmental discourses.
Examples taken directly from bear conservation in the US should help make my
point. The first example is taken from Craighead, Sumner and Mitchell’s (1995) The
Grizzly Bears of Yellowstone, a 500-plus page coffee-table book that is the most
ambitious natural history of grizzly bears yet written. In a whistle-stop history of the
Euro-American colonization of the American Northwest, the authors begin (logically)
with Lewis and Clark, who found a “wilderness, its flora and fauna supporting small,
widely dispersed tribes of Native Americans” (p. 457). The Native Americans were part
of nature, ecologically “co-dominant” with the grizzly bear, “which was worshipped,
feared, and always respected. The two species coexisted.” But then, the settlers arrived:
Even at that time, the major threat to the pristine landscape and its flora
and fauna was not the wasteful destruction and use of the natural
resources, but the rapidly growing Caucasian population with a greed
ethic that sanctioned genocide to all forms of life that threatened European
man’s manifest destiny. The raw, ugly disdain for life exhibited in the
“annihilation” of Native Americans, the bison, and the large predators
appears to be innate in the human species (p. 457, emphasis added).
Life-hating annihilating tendencies become “innate to the human species,” and a slip of
logic goes apparently unnoticed. If for thousands of years the Native Americans lived in
harmony with and mutual respect toward the grizzly bear, in a pristine landscape of
abundant flora and fauna, then how can this “greed ethic” brought by “European man”
(sic) be naturalized — that is, universalized — to the human species? This inconsistency
is never resolved. Perhaps it cannot be. For, if the “greed ethic” is the problem causing
this (and no doubt other) forms of ecological degradation, and if this ethic is not inherent
to the human species, then alternatives become necessary. Essentialist discourses that
blame humanity obviate the need to imagine these alternatives. To be fair to these
authors, they do attempt to peg down the causes of problems with grizzly conservation
beyond blaming just “humanity” or a completely abstracted “greed ethic,” but the rest of
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the investigation remains as muddled, inconsistent, and generally unhelpful as this
passage.35
On the homepage of the Craighead Environmental Research Institute website we
find that “world population growth” is “the problem”:

Figure 4.2. World Population Growth Counter from the Craighead Environmental
Research Institute’s Website (Craighead Environmental Research Institute, 2002a)
Clicking on the “World Population Growth” link takes us to a page where we find
following passage:
One obvious solution is to reduce the number of human beings to levels at
which all can enjoy a high quality of life without endangering other
species. This is clearly not going to happen overnight (at least not in any
humane fashion). Another possible solution is to develop sustainable
economies and to maintain large areas of natural habitat in order to
provide ecosystem functions and provide space for other species. This is
the approach we are working toward at CERI (Craighead Environmental
Research Institute, 2002b, paragraph 2).
Developing sustainable economies and maintaining adequate wildlife habitats would
undeniably be a wonderful solution, and I cannot fail the staff of the Craighead
Environmental Research Institute for being unable to state exactly how these changes
might come about. I would argue, however, that the problems are not simply functions of
overpopulation. Moreover, a reduction in human population is not such an “obvious
solution” – fewer people wouldn’t necessarily lead to sustainable economies or more
areas of healthy habitat. My point is not to denigrate the efforts of the Craigheads and
their colleagues nor is it to represent them as Malthusian reactionaries. My point, rather,
is to agree broadly with Marxists and social ecologists36 that blaming “humanity” (under
whatever guise) is not only a copout – if one is actually trying to assess the causes of
ecological degradation – but can also be ideological by deflecting attention away from
35

Other causal agents include “misguided bureaucrats” (p. 459), “our politico-economic system” (p. 491),
and “catering to special interests” (p. 492).
36
Social ecology here referring to the body of theory formulated by Murray Bookchin. A representative
work that gives a concise version of his critique of deep green thought is his Which Way for the Ecology
Movement? (Bookchin, 1994).
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class, racial, and region inequalities and indeed may mask a programmatic reinforcement
of dominant exploitative social relations (Benton, 1989).37
Returning to the production of nature thesis in general, deep ecology’s relative
silence on nature outside of wilderness is also rendered problematic: “The [deep
ecological] journey leads away from the urban setting, where this environmentalism has
little, or nothing, to say about humanity’s relation to nature in the sphere of production, to
the ‘wilderness’” (Talbot, 1998, p. 331). Too often, when American deep ecologists do
speak of the “sphere of production,” it is in a wholly cynical and condemning tone.
Logging, mining, ranching, road building: these become the unqualified ecological
villains of the American West (Foreman & Wolke, 1989). Despite token nods toward
“compatible” human uses in buffer zones, a sharp rhetorical and material dichotomy
between “true wilderness” (Foreman et al., 1992, p. 4) and human-occupied lands is
forged and relentlessly defended.
There are multiple potential levels on which to critique this “fixation on [the]
purity” of wilderness (White, 1995, p. 185). For one, environmentalists often hold
privileged and affluent occupations which do not require a daily working, transformative
relationship with nature. Indeed, most “environmentalists have come to associate work …
with environmental degradation” (p. 172). It can come as no surprise, then, that many
“environmentalists disdain and distrust those who most obviously work in nature” (p.
172). This disdain and distrust often eliminates any potential for ‘working alliances’ with
local communities, the very grounds of support which are so often needed for preserving
particular parcels of nature. This is not to naively posit that engendering working
alliances with resource-dependent communities is a straightforward task, if only it were
attempted. In a case study from the northern California redwood forests, Jonathan
London has shown how difficult it was for radical environmentalists to ally with timber
workers, even when it was fairly obvious (at least to the environmentalists) that the
timber companies did not have their workers’ best interests at heart (London, 1998).
Pragmatic difficulties noted, I would still argue that a purist wilderness ideal – whether
37

Having a leading environmental group replaying the overpopulation card like this cannot, for example,
help the Sierra Club (and, with the Sierra Club being arguably the highest profile environmental group in
the US, the environmental movement in general) overcome the black eye worn after an anti-immigration
proposition made its 1998 annual ballot (Solnit, 2004).
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scientifically, aesthetically, or spiritually based – can and does preclude the development
of potentially productive lines of communication (this thread will be most thoroughly
elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7).
Further, if we are to protect thirty, forty, or even fifty percent of the land as
wilderness (e.g., Noss, 1991; Shaffer, 1992), this must mean that our relationship with
lands outside of wilderness will need to be transformed as well. The relative silence on
the actual requirements of this forgotten half of the equation is evidence that, at best,
rewilding advocates should be humbled by the fact that they have yet to produce anything
close to all the remedies for our ecological ills. As Bron Taylor succinctly puts it, “little if
any theory of social change” accompanies deep ecologists’ profoundly radical proposals
(Taylor, 2000, p. 283).
A second broad criticism of deep ecology and ecocentric environmentalism is the
divisive

nature

of

the

rhetoric

and

the

hubris

that

arises

from

the

ecocentric/anthropocentric dualism. Divisiveness and hubris, quite obviously, are built
into the term ‘deep ecology’ itself. From the go, environmentalists are divided into two
camps, the ‘shallow’ and the ‘deep’, and it is clear that one term is “pejorative” and the
other “self-congratulatory” (Fox, 1990, p. 120). ‘Shallow’ also maps directly onto
‘anthropocentric’, another term of derision, with the flipside being the more enlightened
deep-ecocentric approach. For contemporary American deep ecologists, direct references
to “shallow ecology” are relatively rare, but the ecocentric/anthropocentric divide is
relentlessly guarded and defended. The rejection of anthropocentrism adds fuel to the fire
of deep ecological hubris. Anthropocentrism is seen as a characteristic feature of Western
society and the root cause of ecological degradation (Norton, 2003; Taylor, 2000). Those
who subscribe to this tale, therefore, see themselves as not only having overcome an antiecological prejudice but also having risen above and beyond their entire cultural heritage.
The American environmental movement, we are told by deep ecologists, is basically
anthropocentric and must adopt a biocentric perspective. “Acceptance of the primacy of
this distinction constitutes the litmus test of deep ecology” (Guha, 1998, p. 232). The
often-smug dismissal of all questions ‘anthropocentric’ allows deep ecologists to view
themselves as the vanguard of the environmental movement (e.g., Milbraith, 1984;
Sessions, 1992).
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Bryan Norton rejects the ecocentric/anthropocentric divide as counterproductive
and empirically unverifiable. Deep ecology implicitly invokes a “divergence theory”
where “[e]nvironmentalists gravitate toward ultimately incompatible policy programs …
because they are split between those who accept and those who reject anthropocentrism”
(Norton, 2003, p. 79). But where, Norton asks, is the evidence that such a split exists in
the American environmental movement? Why do deep ecologists disparage the various
non-ecocentric arguments supporting biodiversity conservation? Why choose to “attack
the ultimate values” of everyone other than self-identified ecocentrists rather than seeking
pragmatic alliances with other environmentalists (Norton, 2003, p. 80)? Certainly, if they
are to achieve anything close to their ambitious goals (all the while maintaining their
commitment to democracy!), defenders of wilderness need at the very least a broad base
of support within the environmental community. After all, what is it deep ecologists are
defending, wilderness and biodiversity or individual commitments to ecocentric purity?
Mick Smith (2001, p. 122) argues that American deep ecologists rely on
increasingly “scientistic route[s]” to arrive at their normative proposals. An institutional
culture of unreflexive scientism effectively inhibits a self-critical, pluralistic politics.
Normative proposals that can be questioned on a number of levels are given a
philosophical gloss when touted as ecocentric. Anyone who dares to argue, for example,
that the case for wilderness conservation might rest on shaky (ethical, epistemological,
political, etc.) ground is dismissed as an anthropocentric “humanist” (Smith, 2001, p.
124). This is a strong critique for someone purporting to forge a theory “true to the spirit
of radical ecology” (p. 3). But, as I read it, what Smith is attempting (and my sentiments
and research intent echo this spirit) is to help foster a more constructive and mutually
productive dialogue between radical ecology and progressive politics. Both ‘sides’ have
much to learn from the other. Perhaps more significantly, for the sake of political change,
I think it is very likely that neither movement can be as successful on its own as it would
allied with the other. To be clear, this is not meant to imply a rigid binary typology of
green/red or environmental-movement/social-justice-movement (or whichever various
titles might apply). If this division ever applied, it would certainly be archaic to employ it
today. Rather, my point is to survey various critiques of green thought, ecocentric
politics, and wilderness conservation, and then assess whether and the degrees to which
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they are relevant to the US conservation biology movement. My hope is that an honest
assessment of the movement in light of trenchant but fair and insightful critiques can
serve as one piece in the larger project of fostering a stronger movement. That digression
allowed, I will return to Mick Smith’s critique of “scientistic deep ecology.”
Smith shows that deep ecologists often employ biologically determinist
explanations of human behavior, down to and including the very action of advocating on
behalf of wild nature. 38 Much of this is due to the influence of Paul Shepard, who over
the course of three decades wrote volumes of work speculating on the biological basis for
human attitudes and behaviors toward nature. George Sessions (co-author of Deep
Ecology and two-time contributor to Wild Earth) approvingly paraphrases Shepard’s
thesis as stating that:
Humans are genetically programmed for wild environments, and that …
modern urban humans who have not bonded with wild nature are
ontogenetically stuck, remaining in some ways in an adolescent stage of
human development (Sessions, 1995, p. 15, in Smith, 2001, p. 122).
Writing in Wild Earth, Shepard’s wife and longtime editor Florence Shepard states that
he “implored us to return to the integrity of our genes, to trust them and follow their lead”
(Shepard, 1999, p. 25). It is not terribly difficult to make the case that this represents a
scientistic sensibility, that is, that the methods and findings of science can ultimately
explain all actions and behaviors (human and non-) including normative-ethical
statements regarding right and wrong actions toward nature. There are problems with a
scientistic propensity in general and with the particular scientistic influence of Paul
Shepard specifically, each of which is deserves brief comment. Scientism in general, and
this is a point Mick Smith convincingly makes, “relies upon a homogeneous picture of
scientific discourses, ignoring the very real debates within sciences” (Shepard, 1999, p.
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If the charge of “scientism” appears abrasive, perhaps an example of scientistic conservation will help
quell the potential charge that the critique is more damming in the abstract than in the real world. George
Wuerthner, in his Wild Earth essay “Selfish Genes, Local Control, and Conservation,” while arguing
against local-based conservation efforts, states that “given a free hand, most humans tend to maximize their
individual welfare at the expense of the collective whole… Indeed, our selfish nature may be a genetically
determined behavior” (Wuerthner, 1999, p. 89). One of the “policy implications” he draws from this
inanely simplistic and questionable (Lewontin, 1992) ‘natural’ species-wide selfishness and the resultant
ecological degradation is that “rather than expect local support for conservation proposals, we should
expect opposition, and work beyond it” (p. 91). “Expecting opposition,” I would add, need only be the case
when taken as an assumption when designing the conservation proposals in the first place. Stated another
way, if we expect local opposition, it is likely that our proposals will live up to this expectation.
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122). Not all ecological science, for example, suggests that grizzly bears require huge,
connected roadless areas to remain ecologically viable in the lower 48 states (McLellan
& Shackleton, 1988; Mincher, 2002). But the conviction that science can so
unequivocally produce a sole potential solution establishes intolerance toward competing
views and a generally disparaging attitude toward anything that might smack of
compromise. It can and does, in other words, result in a sort of fundamentalism.
Regarding the influence of Paul Shepard, there are obvious positive effects his
writing has on wilderness defense environmentalism. Most obviously it inspires people to
care about wilderness enough to support its protection. Moreover, as Shepard’s books
postulate the significance of interactions with non-human animals to human development
(Shepard, 1996, 1998b), the conservation-biology wilderness movement would seem to
be truer to Shepard’s ideal than the rocks-and-ice of spectacular mountain vistas. That
being said, Shepard’s work is very dichotomous, splitting human history between a
valorized pre-modern era of human-animal bonding and “normal” ontogenetic
development and a modern world of alienation from nature and stunted human
development. This is potentially problematic on at least two levels. For one, it allows
wilderness advocates who harbor the proper sensibilities toward nature and just as
importantly the proper nature pastimes (e.g., backpacking, hunting39) to feel like they
have overcome the modern alienation from nature. This, of course, is only problematic if
it fuels an arrogance and derogation toward those who think and act differently. Whether
and to what degree this sentiment exists and assessing its effects are, to put it mildly, very
difficult to gauge (even if the presence of the sentiment is rather easy to demonstrate).
But it is a fair and worthwhile exercise to point out when a more or less foundational
theory contains inescapably divisive elements. Shepard’s meta-anthropology can also
foster or further anti-urban attitudes, as the rise of sedentary life and agriculture mark the
transition to alienated modernity (Shepard, 1998a). The charge of an anti-urban bias
within deep ecology is nothing new, nor by any means should it be placed squarely on the
shoulders of Paul Shepard. Pro-nature and anti-urban sentiments have been linked at least
since the romantics. The real effects of anti-urbanism, again difficult to pin down, could

39

Shepard’s work strongly valorizes hunting. Perhaps this should not be surprising, since his model human
societies are Paleolithic hunter-gatherers.
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at the very least reinforce the aforementioned tendencies to marginalize non-wilderness
portions of landscapes in conservation efforts as well as denigrate nature-transforming
activities such as logging and agriculture.
I would agree with Bron Taylor that, within the deep ecology movement (and, I
would add, its conservation-biology-inspired offshoot), “a social critique and social
philosophy are needed” (Taylor, 2000, p. 287). Perhaps the lack of a sufficient social
theory should not be surprising due to deep ecology’s holistic aims (as exemplified by
Paul Shepard’s “mythologizing” (Taylor, 2000, p. 282)) and individualistic character (as
exemplified by Naess’s “Self-realization”). Too often, such theories do seem to foster a
retreat into “simplistic binary oppositions” that often results in “mono-causal
explanations [that tell us little about] the causes of and solutions to environmental
degradation” (Taylor, 2000, p. 275). It is not terribly difficult, then, to make the case that
deep ecologists often exhibit tremendous “interpretive hubris” (p. 275). Instead of deep
ecology “informing [other] radical social movements seeking profound changes in our
relationship with nature” (as it should), divisive posturing and potentially reactionary
scientism do little to silence those who would “mak[e] deep ecologists everybody’s
favorite misanthropes” (Smith, 2001, p. 124).
It only makes sense to end this section with a discussion of William Cronon’s
essay “The Trouble with Wilderness.” The essay is one of the more challenging of the
sincerely sympathetic critiques of wilderness yet written. Probably for that reason, it
sparked something of a firestorm of response from many wilderness defenders. Cronon
begins the essay by stating that we can no longer honestly hold forth wilderness as “a
pristine sanctuary where the last remnant of an untouched, endangered, but still
transcendent nature can for at least a little while longer be encountered without the
contaminating taint of civilization” (Cronon, 1995, p. 69). Moreover, and this is where
his critique hits at the heart of the rewilding movement, “we mistake ourselves when we
suppose that wilderness can be the solution to our culture’s problematic relationships
with the nonhuman world, for wilderness itself is no small part of the problem” (p. 70). I
will examine each of the assertions in turn.
The first claim, that wilderness is not untainted nature but a particular way of
perceiving particular types of landscape, should be nothing shocking for even the most
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fervent defender of the wilderness idea. Few now are unaware that the idea of wilderness
had much stronger negative than positive connotations in European and Euro-American
culture through most of the nineteenth century. Far from connoting a paradisiacal nature
in need of preservation, wilderness was places “savage”, “desolate”, “barren” (p. 70) –
places defined negatively due to their relative lack of (obvious) human presence and
improvement. Romantics and transcendentalists (most famously in the US, Henry David
Thoreau and John Muir), however, changed the perception of wilderness so profoundly
that “it was frequently likened to Eden itself” (p. 72). Cronon sees the debates over the
damming of the Tuolumne River in Hetch Hetchy Valley (well away from Yosemite
Valley from within the bounds of Yosemite National Park) as the first major national
wilderness debate. Damming the valley was a way to ensure the growing city of San
Francisco with a reliable source of freshwater, but for the new wilderness preservation
movement, “such an act [was] not improvement or progress but… desecration and
vandalism” (p. 72). This would mark the first of a long line or environmentalist protests
to large-scale development projects. Contemporary resistance efforts to such projects are
not often couched in such explicitly religious metaphors as “desecration.” In today’s
more secular society, the defense of wilderness is more likely to be justified by the
preservation of biodiversity. As such, “the concept of wilderness [continues to be] loaded
with some of the deepest core values of the culture that create[s] and idealize[s] it” (p.
73).
The American West has always been the most prominent geographical region for
the wilderness preservation movement, and Cronon places a large part of this
geographical bias as emerging out of Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis. For
Turner, a substantial portion of the “source of American democracy and national
character” arose from Americans “moving to the wild unsettled lands of the frontier,
shed[ding] the trappings of civilization, rediscover[ing] their primal racial energies, [and]
thereby reinfus[ing] with vigor, independence, and creativity” (p. 76). His famous 1893
essay simultaneously declared and lamented the closing of the frontier. The conclusion is
nearly self-evident: “if wild land had been so crucial in the making of the nation, then
surely one must save its last remnants as monuments to the American past… To protect
wilderness was in a very real sense to protect the nation’s most sacred myth of origin” (p.
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77). The rugged individualism implied and valorized in the frontier thesis is alive and
well in the contemporary wilderness preservation movement, with backpackers and
scientific fieldworkers having replaced cowboys, trappers and homesteaders as the new
wilderness travelers. The myth of the rugged individual – at home in the wilderness –
obfuscates the considerably “dishonorable” (Jackson, 1965) history of the massive
colonial effort by the US government of making the Western frontier safe and accessible
for settlement, most obviously by way of the extermination of the indigenous nations who
for millennia had produced the very nature that would later be deemed in need of
protection. This is not meant to imply that rewilders are uncritical proponents of the
frontier myth – far from it. Wilderness defenders often hold highly idealized and
romanticized conceptions of Native Americans’ relations with nature (Willems-Braun,
1997; e.g., Craighead et al., 1995)40 and their resistance to US colonization (e.g., the
famous Earth First! bumper sticker and t-shirt picturing a group of armed Indian warriors
with the caption “My Heroes Have Always Killed Cowboys”). What is less common,
however, is a soul-searching self-indictment of environmentalism’s complicity in colonial
projects. Examples abound, from John Muir’s advocating the removal of the Indian
residents of Yosemite to recent charges of Blackfeet Indians’ “poaching” inside Glacier
National Park – lands on which their right to hunt in perpetuity was reserved by treaty
(Cronon, 1995; Warren, 1994). A more strident renunciation of the dishonorable aspects
of the history of the movement would help quell those critics who (rather cynically, in my
opinion) see wilderness preservation as little more than a contemporary manifestation of
colonial desire (e.g., Braun & Wainwright, 2001; Chaloupka & Cawley, 1993; Gregory,
2001; Moeckli & Braun, 2001) or an ideology of nature (e.g. Castree, 1995, 2000b;
Kovel, 2002; Smith, 1991, 1998).
Cronon does not stop with the historical contextualizing of the wilderness
narrative.

Wilderness
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contemporary

environmentalism because it reproduces the very human/nature dualism that
environmentalism should be working to overcome.
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To clarify this citation, Willems-Braun depicts the romanticized (and highly selective) treatment by
environmentalists of indigenous Americans. Craighead, Sumner, and Mitchell, by contrast, serve up a
recent, romanticized representation of indigenous Americans.
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If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild,
then our very presence in nature represents its fall. The place where we are
is the place where nature is not. If this is so … then also by definition it
can offer no solution to the environmental and other problems that
confront us… We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what
an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually
look like (Cronon, 1995, p. 85, emphasis in original).
The resulting problem is that everything outside of wilderness receives at best short shrift
or at worst contempt within the movement. Cronon quotes no other than Dave Foreman
as openly admitting as much: “The preservation of wildness and native diversity is the
most important issue. Issues directly affecting only humans pale in comparison”
(Foreman, 1991a). Such a bias can never produce “an environmental ethic that will tell us
as much about using nature as about not using it” (Cronon, 1995, p. 85). Even more
troubling would be if the valorization of wilderness fostered a “dismissive or even
contemptuous” (p. 491) attitude to all those places outside of wilderness. Again, as I
noted in the production of nature section in this chapter, acknowledging this critique need
not tempt us into setting up binary analytical dilemmas, for example, assessing if the
rewilding movement either fosters a broader environmental ethic or fails to do so through
its fixation on the purity of wilderness. As I will show in the empirical sections that
follow in this and later chapters, neither characterization would be fair or helpful.

4.5. Conservation Biology and Rewilding: a Sympathetic Critique
How does the perceived mandate for Big Wilderness materialize as specific
conservation agendas in particular places? How do these agendas fare in light of critiques
of deep ecology and wilderness preservation? These questions mark my point of
departure for examining and critiquing the Conservation Biology alternative for grizzly
recovery in Idaho.
Although the Conservation Biology proposal was not the FWS’s ‘preferred
alternative’ in the EIS, this alternative nonetheless did receive substantial support from
many scientists and environmentalists (and scientist-environmentalists). Indeed, among
all those who testified in favor of grizzly recovery in the Bitterroots at the Draft EIS
public meetings, the vast majority of those who specified a preference favored the
Conservation Biology over the CMC alternative In the public hearings held in seven
Idaho and Montana communities as part of the Draft EIS NEPA process, 70% of the
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testimonials and written comments gave unqualified support for the Conservation
Biology alternative, 18% supported the CMC alternative without modifications, and 12%
supported the CMC alternative with sometimes major modifications (USFWS, 1998, p.
13). The latter group was mostly made up of elected officials or their spokespersons in,
mostly from Montana, pushing for greater CMC authority and autonomy. The vast
majority of Idaho elected officials rejected both recovery alternatives.
Originally drafted and presented to the FWS by the Alliance for the Wild Rockies,
a good-sized41 regional environmental group based in Missoula, Montana, the
fundamental components of the Conservation Biology proposal were (a) a grizzly bear
recovery zone that included all of the Federally designated wilderness in central Idaho,
plus all contiguous roadless areas and the “developed public lands” that lie within the
area bounded by the wilderness/roadless area; (b) two “habitat restoration areas”; (c) a
“habitat linkage corridor” which would link the central Idaho recovery zone to the
existing grizzly population in the Cabinet-Yaak ecosystem of northern Idaho and
southern British Columbia; and (d) reduced timber harvest on national and state forests
within the recovery zone, due to the reintroduced grizzlies receiving fully protected status
under the ESA (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, pp. 1 – 11).

41

At the time of the Draft EIS public hearings (October 1997) Alliance for the Wild Rockies claimed a
regional membership of 6,000 (USFWS, 1997c, p. 11).
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Figure 4.3. Alternative 4, the Conservation Biology Alternative from the Final EIS42
(USFWS, 2000a, p. 2-56)
Many (but not all43) of the hallmarks of the rewilding model are present. The
designated recovery area is enormous, covering 21,645 square miles of central Idaho and
extreme western Montana (USFWS, 2000a, p. 2.55). The proposal requires a strict
human/nature segregation, on the premise that grizzly bears need enormous extents of
land free of human use to survive. Almost all human use – save perhaps scientific data
collection and recreational uses like backpacking, horsepacking and hunting – would be
prohibited in the proposed recovery area. Perhaps most fundamentally, the proposal was
proffered as representing the best available grizzly bear conservation science. Anything
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I created this map while working for the Nez Perce Tribe Natural Resources Department from 19971999. The Nez Perce Tribe was awarded a small contract to do the mapping for the EIS public meetings
and documents.
43
Missing are the “buffer zones.” Their absence bolsters my claim (above, this chapter) that areas of human
occupation make up the “forgotten half of the [rewilding] equation.”
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short of the full implementation of this ambitious proposal was said to be at best, political
compromise, and at worst, an insincere effort at recovering grizzly bears.
In this section of the chapter, I examine the 1996 Alliance for the Wild Rockies
(AWR) handbook promoting the Conservation Biology (hereafter, CB) alternative for
grizzly recovery (Bader & Bechtold, 1996). AWR was the lead organization in the efforts
to counter the FWS’s service official “preferred” alternative with a stronger one,
particularly one that would give Bitterroot grizzlies full ‘threatened’-status protection
under the ESA (Bader, pers. comm.).44 In this section – the initial cut at the CB
alternative – I will focus primarily on the scientific justification for the proposed recovery
area, after which I will the findings back into the previous discussion of the problems
with wilderness. In Chapter 6 I will greatly extend this empirical examination of the CB
proposal. On page one in the first paragraph, the scientific mandate is presented:
Population viability analysis has revealed that to ensure longterm viability
(a 95% or better chance of surviving for several hundred years), a
population of grizzlies in the Northern Rockies will need to consist of
approximately 2,000 bears or more (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 1).
For the recovery goal of 2,000 grizzlies to be attained, reestablishment of a Bitterroot
population would be necessary to augment existing populations in Yellowstone, the
Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem, and northern Idaho. Population viability
analysis (PVA) is a quantitative modeling technique in which demographic, genetic,
spatial, and other requirements of a given species of plant or animal are used to predict
the population size necessary for the species to maintain its ecological viability, that is, to
not go extinct. Not surprisingly, PVA has become one of the most prominent tools in the
conservation biology toolkit (Fiedler & Kareiva, 1998; Soulé & Terborgh, 1999b). A
quick look at the scientific literature on PVA, however, reveals that PVAs are highly
malleable and require the inclusion of arbitrarily defined variables in the models. The two
prominent variables that must be arbitrarily chosen by the modeler are (a) the percent
chance of the extinction of the population, and (b) the time period for which the model is
predicting ecological viability (Boyce, 1992) (for example, a PVA model might be based
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Mike Bader was executive director of AWR during the Bitterroot recovery efforts. Bader was not around
the summer I interviewed people in Montana and Idaho, but I have since had some short email
correspondences with him.
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on assessing the requirements for species ‘x’ to have a 90% chance of survival over a 100
year time frame).
As with all ecological models, these models are data-driven, yet there is an
enormous amount of variability among the types, numbers, and quality of variables that
go into any PVA. Mark Boyce, a proponent and practitioner of PVA modeling and a
leading grizzly bear population ecologist, has noted the precarious nature of PVAs:
I maintain that PVA ought to be an integral part of any species
management plan, but rather than being so presumptuous as to claim that
we can actually use modeling to define a [minimum viable population], or
to estimate the probability of extinction, I use it as a forum to champion
the adaptive management approach (Boyce, 1992, p. 482).
I want to stress that this statement is no outlier by a renegade trying to shake up the
conservation biology establishment, but is instead representative of the scientific
community’s awareness of the malleable and contestable nature of PVAs. My argument
is that the Alliance did employ Boyce’s PVA as a “forum” for championing a particular
management approach, that is, the rewilding model. Without any recognition of the
precarious nature of PVA modeling, PVA is presented in the manner of Bruno Latour’s
“black boxes…, in which ‘observations’ are presented as ‘discoveries’, which then
become ‘facts’” (Forsyth, 2003, p. 164)45 after which they can be freely summoned as the
sole justification for future actions. The PVA cited in the handbook, has revealed that
2,000 bears are needed to “ensure longterm viability” of the grizzly population. Granted,
we are given the parameters through which this “longterm viability” was established: a
“95% or better chance of surviving for several hundred years.” Leaving aside the
potential critique of the assumption that ‘x’ amount of habitat and regulatory protection
for a species could ever be maintained for a period of several hundred years,46 the
scientific literature notes that PVA models become less reliable predictors the farther out
in time they extend (Knight et al., 1999). The figure of 2,000 bears, it seems, is the
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To clarify, this quote is Tim Forsyth paraphrasing Bruno Latour.
Parameters on the order of several-hundred years are not out of the ordinary in the PVA literature. Paquet
and Hackman, for example, model their PVA estimates by defining survival over “the long term” as
“greater than 1,000 years” (Paquet & Hackman, 1995, p. 34). My point is not to argue whether or not
estimating the necessarily reserve size should be based on the chances of a species going extinct over 1,000
years – although the time-span does seem extremely long. My point, rather, is to demonstrate that the
results of PVA are very much dictated by the whims of the modeler. If you desire results that suggest a
smaller reserve size is necessary, choose a shorter recovery period, or vice versa.
46
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product of a PVA deliberately modeled to produce the largest reasonably credible
necessary population estimate, and therefore the largest required amount of land to be set
aside in reserves. Instead of being candid about the highly conservative nature of the
model, it is immediately “black boxed” as a verified, indisputable fact, after which no
further discussion of its origins or production is necessary. For ecologists, the problem
and its problematic solution are nothing new. In 1981, John Livingston addressed the
double-bind that predictions and projections effect for ecologists:
Historically, [ecology] found it necessary to accept the burdens of proving
the effect on wildlife and wildlands of various kinds of human activities. If
the prediction could be quantitative, so much the better… [But] I can think
of no ‘hard’ sciences so helplessly adrift on an endless sea of variables,
their process relationships so complex that no individual mind can either
encompass them or corral them for computer counting. Ecology does not
know what its variables are, much less how to project them… Ecology
cannot predict in a scientific sense (Livingston, 1981, p. 66).47
Paralleling PVA’s professed revelation of the necessary population size for
grizzly bears, we are told that “Geographic Information Systems analysis has identified a
proposed recovery zone covering approximately 21,645 square miles” (Bader &
Bechtold, 1996, p. 3). This rhetoric implies that science-cum-technology magically
reveals the previously unknown geographic needs of bears. However, the statement that
the “proposed recovery zone” has been “identified” masks how the recovery zone itself
was delimited. The next two sentences read:
Not all of this area is secure habitat, and some areas may have little value
as grizzly habitat. Still, the region represents the largest block of secure
47

I should note that I find much of the more radical, but nature-endorsing, environmental writing such as
Livingston (1981; 1994) and Raymond Rogers (1994; 1995; 1998) very compelling and potentially helpful
toward the broad goal of crafting a more sustainable society. This admiration was probably made clear in
Chapters 2 and 3, as well as my deployment of the production of nature critique in this chapter. If this
positive accounting of radical nature-society scholarship seems mismatched with my endorsement of the
mainstream-ENGO/timber-industry Citizen Management proposal (that will be articulated in later
chapters), I would respond that despite the apparent power that a Federal/national-ENGO/timber-industry
coalition might wield, in the context of the Bitterroot grizzly debates the conservation-biology/rewilding
movement had achieved relative dominance within environmentalism in the region (a status which, as
Cooper (1996) notes, The Wildlands Project has been attempting to achieve since the inception of the
movement). I would also counter, even as this point has probably already been made clear, that the implicit
and avowed radical components of the conservation biology movement are questionable and problematic.
The Citizen Management coalition, by contrast, was insurgent at least in that it seriously challenged –
offended even – many deeply entrenched ideologies and power structures of the conservation biology
movement. Whether there was any truly radical potential for the Citizen Management proposal is, of
course, now only a matter of speculation.
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wildland habitat remaining in the lower 48 states (Bader & Bechtold,
1996, p. 3).
“Secure habitat” is defined on the previous page as roadless or extremely low-density
(0.25 linear miles of road per square mile) roaded lands (p. 3). It is fair, then, to ask the
question “What exactly was ‘identified’, a grizzly bear recovery zone, or merely the
largest block of roadless and near-roadless lands in the region?” The acknowledged
inclusion of lands “with limited value of grizzly habitat” in the proposed recovery zone
will do little to quell critics, like the residents of Salmon, Idaho, who claimed that this
proposal really isn’t about the grizzly bear at all, that it is about restricting access to and
use of all Federal lands.48 A later study that delineated grizzly bear habitat in Idaho
actually bolsters the “junk science” accusation of many grizzly recovery opponents. The
town of Salmon nearly abuts the grizzly bear recovery zone, but even the roadless lands
within 30-50 miles of Salmon are not “productive grizzly bear habitat” (Merrill et al.,
1999, p. 243).
A smaller pamphlet than the full AWR recovery proposal put out jointly by AWR
and the Salmon-Selway Grizzly Coalition bares itself for critique along similar lines.
From the section of the pamphlet answering the question “Why Reintroduce Grizzlies to
the Greater Salmon-Selway?” we are told:
The field of conservation biology has made several new discoveries which
are enabling scientists to devise plans to preserve endangered species such
as the grizzly bear. One of these is metapopulation theory. Conservation
biologists now believe we can preserve the grizzly bear in the Northern
Rockies if we protect subpopulations, or metapopulations of grizzly bears
and connect them with linkage corridors (AWR, 1997, p. 5).
Theories, of course, are not discovered. A theory is “is a set of assumptions about reality
that underlies the questions we ask and the kinds of answers we arrive at as a result”
(Johnson, 2000, p. 178). Beyond this dubious assertion and its implication of the preexisting, factual nature of all that metapopulation theory tells us, it doesn’t even get its
48

Salmon, Idaho was one of seven communities in which the USFWS held public comment meetings after
the publication of the Draft EIS. The other communities were Challis, Lewiston, and Boise in Idaho, and
Missoula, Hamilton, and Helena in Montana. The best example of this rhetoric was given by Lenore Hardy
Barrett, the Idaho State Representative for Custer, Lemhi, Jefferson, and Clark Counties, who stated that
“[r]ecovery isn’t even about grizzlies. Recovery is about the blatant exercise of federal power, usurpation
of state sovereignty, all this in tandem with the green group’s search for a problem to go with their solution.
Their solution? Render the West off limits to resource production and human habitation” (USFWS, 1997f,
p. 29).
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technical terms right. Metapopulations are not ‘also’ subpopulations but rather “consist of
many small subpopulations linked by dispersal” (Riffell, 1998, p. 2212). A
metapopulation – a linked set of subpopulations – is the conservation biology goal for
ensuring grizzly recovery.
By critiquing these particular deployments of metapopulation theory, my intent is
not to discount the problems of ecological degradation on Federal lands due to decades of
industrial and recreational abuse. But, as critics of the Big Wilderness movement have
noted (e.g., Cronon, 1995; Callicott, 1999), blocking off or ‘locking up’ all favored lands
as wilderness or core reserves does little to tackle the underlying causes of ecological
degradation. Moreover, doing so under a pretense of protecting grizzly bear habitat calls
into question the sincerity of the purportedly scientific case for the conservation biology
proposal. By no means is my point here to discount the entire conservation biology
proposal or ‘debunk’ the science that underwrites it. Unlike William Cronon (1995, p. 86)
I cannot simply “leav[e] aside the legitimate empirical question in conservation biology
of how large a tract of land must be before a given species can reproduce on it.” Neither,
quite obviously, can conservation biologists. It is clear that grizzly bears fare best, and
probably literally require, large blocks of relatively inaccessible, unroaded habitat
(Wilcox, 1997). It is also undeniable that the Bitterroot ecosystem contains the largest
and best block of habitat not currently occupied by grizzlies. That being said, Alliance for
the Wild Rockies does not make a convincing case that the entirety of the proposed
recovery zone is necessary for grizzly recovery, thus leaving open the potential charge
that this was first and foremost an opportunistic wilderness ‘land-grab’.
The presence of grizzlies makes the problem of wilderness management more
difficult, not simpler. It is, I argue, evidence of both “social-scientific naïveté [and]
interpretive hubris” (Taylor, 2000, p. 270) within conservation biology advocacy that
makes it appear as though drawing lines around – and effectively fencing off – all “true”
and potential wilderness can recreate some idealized pre-human, unmanaged landscape
“where nature reigns” (Noss et al, 1999). On page seven of the Alliance for the Wild
Rockies pamphlet, we are told:
In order to assess the effectiveness of habitat linkages, they must be
established now, and grizzly bear restoration in the Greater Salmon-
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Selway region provides the opportunity to study this concept out on the
land (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 7).
This statement serves as a representative example of how the “true wilderness” ideal
harbors irresolvable contradictions and fosters a “social-scientific naïveté” that can only
serve to weaken the movement’s effectiveness. The rewilding model is premised on the
idea that “huge roadless areas” serve as core reserves wherein “nature can operate in its
own way in its own time” (Noss et al., 1999, p. 100). Once in place, the core reserves will
be “essentially unmanaged” and operate as “controls, baselines against which we may
measure the effects of management experiments” (Noss, 1999, p. 409).
The dualistic and untenable fantasy of a non-social ‘pure’ nature is reproduced.
Wilderness – our social goal, our human product – is envisioned as a nonsocial
place/state of unencumbered ecology. Core reserves, however, are not something against
which “experiments” can be gauged. They are but one of many human experiments. This
is implicitly acknowledged in the AWR pamphlet when they state that the conservation
biology alternative presents an “opportunity to study [the rewilding model] out on the
land” (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 7). Following Neil Smith, the fantasy of unmanaged
nature frames an “ideology of nature” in which
an exorcism of social activity from universal nature [is enacted] in order to
attenuate the contradiction between external and universal nature. The
possibility of the socialization of universal nature is ultimately denied not
on the basis of historical experience but by the contradiction with external
nature (Smith, 1991, p. 16).
Conservation biology is an admirable – even necessary – “social activity.” No rhetoric of
Edenic-ecological restoration can exorcise the labor that produces any particular nature
reserve (including the ecologists who propose it, the activists who fight for it, and the
politicians who seal the deal). Nor does Big Wilderness, once established, in any way
become (or restore) “external nature.”
The 1992 Wilderness Society report Keeping the grizzly bear in the American
West: a strategy for real recovery (Shaffer, 1992) from which the Alliance drew their
PVA figures is another document representative of the tenuousness of the wilderness
concept. The following passage almost deconstructs itself:
The ecosystem the grizzly bear requires is wilderness. Existing and
proposed wilderness areas in the Northern Rockies are absolutely essential
to the grizzlies’ survival. But pure wilderness is too limited to maintain
94

this species. The challenge in recovering the grizzly, then, is to devise a
plan that can maintain and/or restore enough functional wilderness – areas
where human activity is not so intense that it increases mortality or
decreases reproduction – to meet the species’ needs (Shaffer, 1992, p. 10).
Wilderness-as-ecosystem, wilderness areas, pure wilderness, functional wilderness? Do
grizzly bears require “pure wilderness” in the form of designated wilderness areas? No,
even if this land management classification provides the best protection due to its limits
on human use. What the grizzly requires is the broader category “functional wilderness,”
where the functioning is defined as capable of supporting grizzly populations. So what,
then, is the meaning of wilderness in this context? It seems – circular though the logic is
– that wilderness is anywhere the grizzly can survive and reproduce. Picking apart this
passage is not to imply that it is wrong. It is not difficult, however, to make the case that
this line of argumentation is grounded in uncontestable scientific constructs. If the
scientific basis for using the “ecosystem” concept itself is questionable (Grumbine, 1992;
Minta & Kareiva, 1994; Takacs, 1996), then surely qualifying it through an expanded and
increasingly tautological usage of “wilderness” cannot help bolster its scientific
credentials. As William Cronon has noted, scientific endangered species conservation
strategies that call for the conservation of wilderness often wind up “vulnerable and
easily attacked” by those who wish to see them fail (Cronon, 1995, p. 82).
We can envision a rewilded landscape, but will it work? This question only be
answered by us, “out on the land” (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 11). The Wilderness
Society report and the AWR pamphlet acknowledge this – that a particular produced
nature is the goal – but it has to be teased out of the traditional, originary pre-social
wilderness narrative. The managed/wild dualism does not hold. There is no ontological
divide between social nature (developed, degraded, managed) and external nature (wild,
pristine, ecological), yet it is precisely this divide which the conservation biology
proponents relentlessly forge and defend. As “one of the functions that ideologies are
held to play is the bridging of the gap between conceptual thought and political action”
(Humphrey, 2000, p. 249), the (unresolved, contradictory) narrative of an asocial nature
enables the (unresolved, contradictory) politics of conservation biology. This ideology of
nature propagates an iterative recourse to a literally unattainable goal. Not surprisingly,
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the result is a “radical disenchantment…of the [ecologically defiled] world” and a cynical
dismissal of all things human (Taylor, 1992, p. 94).
Reed Noss no doubt speaks to the sentiments of many conservation biologists
when he states that ecologists are “cursed…with an ecological conscience” (Noss,
1991/2, p. 56). Thus enlightened, the path is unequivocal: “conservation plan[s] cannot
give equal weight to biocentric and socioeconomic goals, or the former will never be
realized” (Soulé & Noss, 1998, p. 25). John Dewey is helpful here, foregrounding the
effects (the “smothering [of] argumentation” (Keulartz, 1999, p. 95), the denial of context
and complexity) of foundationalist normative declarations:
The notion that a moral judgment merely apprehends and enunciates some
predetermined ends-in-itself is, in fact, but a way of denying the need for
and existence of genuine moral judgments. For according to this notion
there is no situation which is problematic. There is only a person who is in
a state of subjective moral uncertainty or ignorance” (Dewey, 1989, in
Minteer, 2001, p. 69, emphasis added).
Whether Marxist (with the biocentric/socioeconomic split as “the ideology of nature”
(Smith, 1998)) or pragmatist (with the split seen as “codes that set up fixed and
unchanging ends” (Dewey, 1998b, p. 32)), the conclusion is consistent – the assumption
that (biocentric) science and (socioeconomic) politics are separate realms is erroneous.
Yet this assumption is internalized in nearly every normative proposal derived from the
science, giving (this stripe of) conservation biology the appearance of being beyond
politics, untainted by compromise. This scientific-ecocentric foundationalism is an
integral component of a normative model that is unnecessarily divisive (Minteer, 2001)
and may be severely limited in its potential effectiveness (Norton, 1991, 2003).
Alongside insisting that their proposal represented the ‘best available science’,
proponents of the conservation biology proposal also voiced contempt toward the idea of
a citizen committee being put in charge of the management of the reintroduced grizzly
population. The typical complaint was that the management of the grizzly bears should be
scientific’ and not ‘politicized’. The fear seemed to be that the committee members
wouldn’t have a sincere commitment to grizzly recovery and that the committee would
therefore fail in its appointed mission. It should be mentioned that checks against this
possibility were built into the CMC alternative: it was clearly stated that the committee
members would base their decisions on the best science available; that at least two
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scientists would sit in on the committee to make scientific recommendations; and that if
the FWS judged that the committee’s decisions were not leading to the recovery of the
grizzly bear, the committee would be disbanded and the FWS would take over the
management of the bears.
While there is plenty of mention within the conservation biology literature of the
need for local support for initiatives, it’s much more difficult to find calls for local
participation. For supporters of the CB alternative, local support, it appears, meant
educating the uninformed as to the wisdom of the proposal, and hopefully swaying them
over to your side of the cause.
Local participation in conservation efforts would, of course, involve actually
listening to others’ concerns. The difference between garnering local support and
enlisting local participation is the difference between a one-way transfer of knowledge
and an actual dialogue. The wholesale disparagement of the citizen management idea
showed that most proponents of the CB proposal had no such dialogue in mind. The strict
but untenable separation between science and politics keeps proposals like this one from
gaining anything close to a foothold of support within affected rural communities.
Without a sincere commitment to local involvement, the only option for conservationists
is an entrenchment and centralization of authority in environmental management.49 In this
context, I would concur with John Bellamy Foster that
An earth movement of this kind [may] contribute little to the overall green
goal of forming a sustainable relationship between human beings and
nature, and may even have the adverse effect – by splitting popular forces
– of creating more opposition to the environmental cause (Foster, 2002, p.
105).
Too often, for conservation biology proponents, the “popular forces” are viewed
as obstacles to progress instead of potential allies. That the conservation of biodiversity
will necessitate some centralization of knowledge – as science is expert knowledge – is
undeniable. The administration of this knowledge, however, “may be more or less
democratic or authoritarian” (McLaughlin, 1993, p. 58). All the while extolling the
virtues of the “devolution of … power … along bioregional lines” (p. 58) – a primary
deep ecological ideal, endorsed throughout the issues of Wild Earth – conservation
49

These two paragraphs serve as something of a prelude to Chapter 6, where this critique will be given
empirical validation and worked out more thoroughly.
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biologists display a profound mistrust toward the very people who would be the
beneficiaries of such a devolution. There is little evidence that any abdication of power is
in the making. This seems to be almost an institutional sentiment within conservation
biology. In issue number one of the journal Conservation Biology, Soulé provides a
telling (and representative) statement:
We assume implicitly that environmental wounds inflicted by ignorant
humans and destructive technologies can be treated by wiser humans and
by wholesome technologies (Soulé, 1987, p. 4).
The problem is ignorance, the solution is wisdom. Who are the ignorant? Well, the usual
suspects – loggers, ranchers, (some) hunters, ATVers – to be certain. But some less-thanusual suspects are cast off as ignorant as well.
Dave Foreman writes in the journal Wild Earth that “deconstructionist scholars
are … an unusual group of wilderness foes … who criticize conservationists out of
ignorance” (Foreman, 1997, p. 4, emphasis added). The main target of Foreman’s rant
was William Cronon and the social scientists who conferred to produce the collection
Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (Cronon, 1996). Instead of taking these
nature-society essays to be potentially productive contributions, the good portion of a
1996 issue of Wild Earth was made up of essays that flatly, and in a sometimes very
hostile fashion, rejected Uncommon Ground. Donald Waller, for example, acknowledges
that wilderness is a human construct but insists that “wildness” is really what the new
conservation movement is intent on preserving. His definitions of wildness – “that which
is not, and cannot be, a human construct,” that which falls on the wild side of “the gap
separating the artificial from the wild” (Waller, 1996, p. 38, 39) – remain just as dualistic,
tenuous, and vulnerable to attack as do those of wilderness. George Sessions – perhaps
regrettably the Dean of American deep ecology, as he rarely shies away from bizarre,
overreaching statements – opens his essay by portraying Cronon and his colleagues as
espousing “postmodern deconstructionism, … a 1960s spinoff of Marxism; a
contemporary form of anthropocentric humanism which espouses cultural relativism, an
antipathy to science, and a preference for cities” (Sessions, 1996p. 46). Sessions
completely misses the point of the essays in Uncommon Ground, missing the irony and
political intent of the subtitle “reinventing nature” – Sessions radically misreads the
careful critiques of the commodification of nature in such places as Sea World (Davis,
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1995) and The Nature Company retail stores (Price, 1995) as uncritical celebrations of
nature consumerism. Dave Foreman opens the issue with a vitriolic renunciation of
Cronon and his crowd of “deconstructionist colleagues” (Foreman, 1997, p. 4). He
accuses Cronon of being scientifically ignorant and “careless about the consequences of
his critique” (p. 4). But he closes by giving Cronon an opportunity to repent:
Cronon claims he cares about wild things. He says his criticism has been
misunderstood. Let us now see if he can admit his poor understanding of
the conservation movement. Half a century ago, Aldo Leopold warned us
that there were those who could live without wild things, and those who
could not. That still explains it (Foreman, 1997, p. 4).50
The all-too-common hostility of the self-appointed ecologically enlightened is
often and understandably taken to mark a generalized misanthropy within the movement.
Soulé and Terborgh conflate the presence of humans with “ecological pathologies”
(Terborgh Soulé, 1999, p. 200). Noss states that “humans are fundamentally a part of
nature (though arguably a malignant part)” (Noss, 1994/5, p. 60). The eminent grizzly
bear ecologist John J. Craighead laments the “disdain for life [that] appears to be innate
in the human species” (Craighead et al., 1995). With an unqualified “human species”
perceived as anti-ecological, anti-nature, the solution preexists any particular on-theground conservation problem. The enlightened few must develop a strictly segregating
model of conservation reserves to protect nature from humanity. Noss defends the
segregated reserve model when he states that “until we can bring our numbers down and
learn to walk humbly everywhere, let us at least do so within our remaining wild areas”
(Noss, 1994/5, p. 63). Such statements, I would argue, do a fine job of keeping the finger
of blame pointed firmly away from the self-identified ecologically enlightened. As long
as you are one who keeps “your numbers down” and “walks humbly,” it appears that you
are no part of the problem. Such individualistic sentiments reflect the crass idealism of
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This examination of the responses in Wild Earth to Uncommon Ground is not meant to imply that there is
nothing of substance to any of these essays (though if pushed I would say that the Sessions piece is garbage
and that the issue would have stood as a much more reasoned reaction without it). Even Foreman’s tirade
has moments that deserve consideration, and Waller’s piece has strong points. Having made that
disclaimer, my point in this chapter is to assess how conservation biologists and the conservation biology
alternative fare in light of their critics, and these essays provide plenty of empirical evidence that the
critics’ charges are far from baseless. To restate my broader thesis: defensively rejecting all criticism not
only eliminates potential allies, but also slams the door on opportunities to strengthen the movement’s
underlying justifications.
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deep ecology, as the ultimate goal of Self-realization obviates immersion in the messy
world of politics and social change.
The dualistic wilderness reserve model reinforces, and is reinforced by, the
divisive and self-congratulatory rhetoric of its proponents. For every line drawn on a
conservation proposal map, there is a rhetorical line drawn in the sand. Only under the
strictly segregating reserve model does the proclamation “outside of biologically viable
large reserves, ecological pathologies will continue to spread and take their toll”
(Terborgh Soulé, 1999, p. 200) even make sense. “In wildness is the preservation of the
world” (Turner, 1999). Perhaps so, but wildness cannot be conflated with (and confined
to (Birch, 1999)) wilderness (Cronon, 1995). The cynical dismissal of everywhere except
“a wilderness we ourselves can never inhabit” (Cronon, 1995, p. 83) leaves no space for
positive social change. The unpeopled wilderness perhaps indeed is “not an auspicious
position from which to evaluate the nature of human society and political life” (Taylor,
1992, p. 99).

4.6. Conclusion: Two Steps toward a Wider Path
My intent in this chapter is not to try conservation biology proponents on a set of
charges (scientific foundationalism, social-scientific naiveté, interpretive hubris,
misanthropy) and, finding them guilty on all counts, dismiss the entire endeavor. Quite
the contrary. I fully and sincerely support the overarching goals of the rewilding
movement. Life would be much richer – much wilder – if we worked to grant nonhuman
nature more autonomy, to foster the free-flow of ecological and evolutionary processes. I
do contend, however, that these ‘charges’ represent a (partial) list of deficiencies in the
rewilding model – deficiencies not just to be highlighted and rebuked within academic
journals, but that also serve to severely limit the movement’s potential effectiveness. It
may be the case that rewilding proponents present “ideals that are too lofty [and
therefore] tend to lose their power to motivate and thus become divorced from the very
practice they are meant to inform and guide” (Gunderson, 1998, p. 204). If this pragmatic
critique is correct, it only makes sense to widen the “peculiarly narrow path” (Proctor,
1995, p. 285) of wilderness preservation.
How might this process of widening the movement begin? I will conclude this
chapter with two suggestions. First, conservation biologists could do a better job of
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recognizing sincerely sympathetic criticism as complementary and potentially helpful,
instead of perceiving anything short of outright boosterism as “oppositional [and]
fundamentally conflictive” (Birch, 1999, p. 447). As Bron Taylor argues, “deep ecology
movements must open themselves to greater cross-fertilization with other perspectives”
(Taylor, 2000, p. 287). It is a start to acknowledge, as Soulé and Noss have, that
rewilding alone cannot “heal the wounds of the land,” that “a diversity of approaches,
often complementary and context dependent, will be needed” (Soulé & Noss, 1998, p.
26). But such pluralistic nods cannot just be tacked onto the end of proposals that offer
simplistic, scientistic solutions to the terribly difficult problem of “satisfy[ing] the
practical necessities of [the human] relationship with wild land, and with wildness itself”
(Birch, 1999, p. 447).
Secondly,

rewilding

advocates

will

never

mollify

their

sympathetic-

environmentalist critics until they steadfastly renounce the “authoritarian option for
[ecological politics]” (Light, 1996, p. 173). There is a profound contradiction in
professing the deep ecological commitment to “biospheric egalitarianism” (Fox, 2003, p.
257; Naess, 1973, p. 95) – which of course includes humans – and simultaneously stating
that the conservation of biodiversity is “the most important war ever fought [and that] the
enemy … may ultimately be ourselves as a species” (Noss, 1991/2, p. 58). Thankfully,
the leading theorists in the rewilding movement have, in recent years, substantially
retreated from such openly misanthropic and masculinist warrior rhetoric. Nonetheless,
they have yet to fully place an egalitarian commitment as central to their ecologicalpolitical theory and vision. This commitment, to be fully convincing, will need to be
foregrounded in actual conservation proposals. Only then will conservation biologists
have finally taken the teeth out of the claim that “there is always an authoritarian edge
somewhere in ecological politics” (Harvey, 1993, p. 21). As I will argue in Chapter 6 and
the conclusion, the conservation biology movement in the Rocky Mountain Northwest
might do well to take these critiques seriously and rethink their political-participatory
models. But before proceeding with an elaborated examination of the Conservation
Biology proposal, in the next chapter I will examine in detail the FWS’s preferred
alternative for grizzly recovery in the Bitterroot – the Citizen Management proposal.
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Chapter 5. The Citizen Management Alternative Marks its Place
5.1. Introduction
The main objective in this chapter is to critically evaluate the Fish and Wildlife
Service’s “preferred alternative” for grizzly recovery in the Bitterroots – the “Citizen
Management Committee” (CMC) recovery alternative. As the initial analysis of the
Conservation Biology proposal required a review of the philosophy of deep ecology and
the science of conservation biology, so the CMC proposal justifies contextualizing
through a brief history of public lands management culminating with a detailed
assessment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. With this policy and historical
context provided, the remainder of the chapter is devoted to document analyses of
promotional literature and a made-for-television film advocating the CMC proposal. The
analysis focuses primarily on how the CMC alternative rhetorically and strategically
negotiated the difficult middle ground of environmental debate. The CMC alternative
deployed a radical simplification of the issue. My examination of this process of
simplification seeks to show how this process of simplification was achieved, as well as
to explain why it was deemed necessary.

5.2. A Geo-History of Federal Lands in Central Idaho
Historian Marion Clawson breaks up the history of Federally owned lands into
five more or less chronological (but overlapping) eras, beginning with the “era of
acquisition” in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century (Clawson, 1983). The Rocky
Mountain Northwest was acquired through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 (Montana and
Wyoming east of the Continental Divide) and the Oregon Compromise with Great Britain
of 1846 (Montana and Wyoming west of the Continental Divide along with what would
become the States of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington) (Clawson, 1983). These lands
were not purchased with any intent that the majority of these acquisitions would serve as
or become the ‘public domain’. Indeed, “the shared assumption was that the public lands
– all of them, save the forts, the office-building parcels, and Yellowstone and some
battlefields – would be disposed to new states, the railroads, homesteaders, and miners”
(Wilkinson, 2003, p. xvi). Thus the “era of acquisition” was nearly immediately followed
by the “era of disposal” (Clawson, 1983, p. 17).
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As is well known, the interior Rocky Mountain Northwest wasn’t even
“discovered” by Euro-Americans until 1805 when Lewis and Clark traveled up the
Missouri River drainage and eventually over Lolo Pass51 west to the Pacific. The
Northern Rockies may have been open for disposal during the nineteenth century, but due
to the rugged, inaccessible terrain and arid climate, there was little to draw homesteaders
to the region. Almost no Euro-Americans, save a few missionaries and scattered trappers,
settled in the interior West in the first few decades after the Lewis and Clark expedition
(Moore, 1996).
The first wave of settlers in the Northern Rockies west of the Continental Divide
followed on the heels of Elias Pierce’s discovery of gold at Orofino Creek in 1860 near
present day Pierce, Idaho (Moore, 1996). Pierce was illegally prospecting on the Nez
Perce Reservation, which had been officially established five years earlier at the Walla
Walla Council of 1855. Even though the mines would play out in only a few years
(Peterson, 1976), there was enough gold found quickly enough to spark a wave of tens of
thousands of prospectors trespassing on Nez Perce tribal lands (Josephy, 1979). Under
the auspices of not being able to guarantee the safety of the Nez Perce amidst the
onslaught of settlement, the US government quickly began formulating ways to diminish
or abolish the eight million acre 1855 treaty. In 1863, a small group of “Christianized”
Nez Perce leaders – including the “Head Chief” Lawyer (a position invented by the
Federal Government signifying a centralized system of governance alien to the Nez
Perce) – signed a treaty that ceded roughly 90% of the 1855 treaty lands to the Federal
Government for a payment of $262,500 (Moore, 1996, p. 51). The Nez Perce were left
with a 770,000 acre reservation, although they retained the rights to hunt and gather at
their “usual and accustomed places” throughout their aboriginal territory. While the story
of the Nez Perce is fascinating and tragic in its own right,52 it has direct relevance to a
51

Lolo Pass is where US Highway 12 crosses the Idaho/Montana border. It is also the epicenter of the
potential new jobs proposed in the Conservation Biology Alternative’s “habitat restoration area” and
“habitat linkage corridor.”
52
The signing of the 1863 treaty led to a rift within the Nez Perce between those who accepted the terms of
the diminished reservation and those who would not. The oppositional band of Nez Perce, led by among
others Looking Glass, White Bird and the mythologized Chief Joseph, remained outside the boundaries of
the diminished reservation, living in northeastern Oregon. In 1877, the US Cavalry forced this band of Nez
Perce to flee their home territory, and thus ensued one of the most famous Indian wars in US history, the
end of which was marked by the Nez Perce surrender and Chief Joseph’s famous declaration “I will fight
no more forever.” The oppositional band of Nez Perce were eventually moved to a reservation in
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discussion of the history of the Federal lands in the region. As the mines played out and
settlers moved north and west off the former Nez Perce reservation, all but a few hamlets
in the river valleys and the remains of early mining towns remained basically devoid of
settlement for the rest of the century.53 Millions of acres of forested lands ceded by the
Nez Perce in 1863 would wind up as early additions to the US National Forest System.
The establishment of the national forest and national park systems ushers in
Clawson’s third era of public lands history, the era of reservation (Clawson, 1983). There
are no national parks or monuments within the grizzly bear recovery areas for either the
CB or CMC alternatives, but even so they merit mention due to the significance of
Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks to the Bitterroot grizzly debates. In 1872,
Congress passed the Yellowstone Park Act creating Yellowstone National Park –
America’s (and the world’s) first national park (Sutton & Sutton, 1965). Even though
Yellowstone was not set aside for its wildlife, the establishment of the park created a
refuge for many endangered species even as neither the funding nor the regulatory
mechanism for their protection had yet to come about.54 Most famously, Yellowstone
provided a home for one of the last wild bison herds in the country, but even they were
almost wiped out due to poaching before an official recovery effort was put into place
(Zaslowsky, 1986). The bison would eventually become the symbol of the National Park
Service.

Washington far from their aboriginal home, and there has been little interaction between the two Nez Perce
bands since the 1863 split. The Nez Perce Tribe, incidentally, endorsed the Citizen Management
Committee alternative.
53
That the Idaho Gold Rush was short-lived is an understatement. In 1864, following a rush of prospectors
seeking gold, Idaho’s population had swelled to about 24,000. By 1870 Idaho’s population had dwindled to
about 15,000, as the majority of prospectors had left the State (Peterson, 1976, p. 60).
54
A wildlife “refuge,” yes, but not without qualification. Congress created Yellowstone but for the first
quarter-century there was almost no Federal money appropriated for its management. Poaching of wildlife
was one of the many problems park managers faced in the first few decades of Yellowstone’s establishment
(Zaslowsky, 1986). Even after the establishment of the National Park Service, and with it a mechanism to
establish funding, regulations, enforcement procedures and the like for the national parks, the term “refuge”
still deserved the scare quotes, as Yellowstone was the site of just as intense (and just as successful) an
effort to exterminate its resident wolf populations as any other Federal lands in the region (McIntyre, 1995;
Sellars, 1997). Yellowstone wolf eradication was only partly the product of the well-established Federal
extermination programs for wolves, coyotes, and other predators. Many less well-knows animals that were
perceived as keeping down numbers of more desirable species in national parks received similar treatment.
In Yellowstone, for example, pelican eggs were taken from nests in the hopes of reducing the park’s
pelican population because pelicans preyed on trout, which were popular with Yellowstone fishermen
(Sellars, 1997).
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Another animal that would possess highly symbolic (and ecological) value for
conservationists a century later, the grizzly bear, received de facto refuge in Yellowstone
and Glacier, established in 1910 as the nation’s tenth national park. As discussed in the
Chapter 1, the grizzly bear populations in and around Yellowstone and Glacier are far
and away the largest of the five remaining populations in the lower 48 States. Recovering
grizzlies in the Bitterroot stands as the best opportunity for connecting the isolated
Yellowstone population55 to the other grizzly bears in Idaho and Montana (Merrill et al.,
1999). In contrast to national parks, which only tangentially affect the Bitterroot
Ecosystem grizzly recovery debates, national forests constitute the bulk of the region.
The legislation that launched the national forest system was the Forest Reserve
Act of 1891. The act gave the president the authority to set aside forest reserves (what
would later become national forests) from the public domain. The passage of this act,
however, should not be viewed as an act of progressive conservationist foresight on the
part of congress. The act was added to a larger land bill at the last minute in committee,
and received almost no debate or consideration by either branch of congress. After
passage, critics quickly arose in objection to this enormous unilateral executive privilege,
but it would be almost twenty years before congressional approval was required to set
aside national forests (Utley & Mackintosh, 1989). Benjamin Harrison, the original
inheritor of this incredible line item power, and Theodore Roosevelt a couple of
administrations later,56 would exploit the privilege on an immense scale. Indeed, by the
end of the Roosevelt administration in 1909, the vast majority of the current national
forest system had already been established (Clawson, 1983). The aggressive use of the
act by Harrison and Roosevelt would shape in large part the future of Idaho and western
Montana (and later, quite directly determine much of the geography of the Bitterroot
grizzly reestablishment efforts), as the vast majority of the sixteen-plus million acres of
central and northwest Idaho national forests were established by 1909 (Runte & Steen,
1991).

55

The Glacier, or NCDE (Northern Continental Divide) population is not an isolated population per se, as
it is connected to grizzly bears in Canada.
56
Theodore Roosevelt alone set aside roughly 80 million acres of national forests, including 16 million
acres that were added after this executive privilege had been revoked by congress, but before it was
effected into law (Utley & Mackintosh, 1989; Zaslowsky, 1986).
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The interwar period – for Clawson, the era of “custodial management” – was one
of small forest service staffs generally focused on visitor education, wildlife
management, and wildfire suppression. Relatively little timber was cut from these (or
any) national forests until after World War II. The early years of the New Deal heralded
Clawson’s fifth era of Federal lands history, the era of “intensive management”
(Clawson, 1983, p. 37). The management of the national forests became a much more
complex affair up through 1960, as national forest timber production increased
dramatically:
The postwar housing boom created a market for timber from the national
forests. The Forest Service suddenly faced an opportunity to expand
national forest timber production… It changed from a custodial agency to
one aimed at commodity production (Bolle, 1997, p. 163).
Nowhere was the transition more dramatic than in the Northern Rockies. Prior to
1950, no clearcutting of timber took place on the region’s national forests. Most timber
harvests were selective cuts of large Western white and ponderosa pines (Bolle, 1997).
The era of industrial-scale clearcut forestry in the region began in 1950, after the Flathead
National Forest in Montana launched the first-ever “salvage” logging operation, focusing
on cutting down massive amounts of spruce to stop a bark beetle infestation (p. 164). The
clearcutting model quickly took off in the region, especially in western Montana.
Congress passed a resolution in 1956 to dramatically expand timber harvests on
Montana’s national forests – the model being cutting down the “low-quality old forests
and replac[ing] them with desirable stands of high genetic quality planted in neat, orderly
rows to produce the maximum amount of lumber for America’s lumber-hungry people”
(p. 165). The Flathead National Forest provides a startling example of the scale of the
increase, as it saw a tenfold increase in timber harvest between 1945 and 1969 (Bolle,
1997). The increase in timber harvest resulted in dramatic job growth in the region, both
for loggers as well as sawyers in the hundreds of new mills that popped up around the
region. Even though a review such as this can only tap the complex socio-ecological
history of the timber industry in the region,57 any mention of timber in the Northwest
must include a discussion of the nineteenth century railroad land grants.
57

For anyone who’s interested, Clary (1986) and Hirt (1994) are good places to start teasing apart the US
Forest Service and the major role this agency has played in the history of timber here and elsewhere in the
West.
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The history of the railroad land grants begins
[i]n 1864, [when] President Lincoln signed into law the largest of the
railroad land grants, the Northern Pacific Land Grant. This law
conditionally granted public lands for the purposes of building a railroad
from Lake Superior to the Pacific Ocean … 40 million acres … [were]
granted in alternating square miles, which created a ‘checkerboard’ pattern
of ownership that is still visible (Jensen et al., 1995, p. 3).
After a number of “illegal title transfers and negotiated territorial deals” (Robbins,
1997, pp. 128-9), huge swaths of valuable forest lands from the northern Rockies west to
the Cascades became concentrated in the ownership of a few giant timber corporations
(Jensen et al., 1995; Robbins, 1997). These corporations were “undoubtedly the primary
force behind the expanding economic activity and the increase in population from
western Montana to the Pacific coast” from around the turn of the century until World
War II (Robbins, 1997, p. 192). Following World War II, under the sway of decisionmaking in the timber corporate headquarter cities of St. Paul, New York, Chicago, and
Tacoma, timber in the Northwest became nearly as much of a boom/bust economic sector
as mining:
Investors … made the decisions to build new mills, to move on to fresh
stands of timber, or to close operations when the market was tight, but the
men and women in the small lumber towns suffered the social costs of
those actions (Robbins, 1997, p. 130).
In addition to being able to dominate private lands timber harvesting in the region,
the dominant timber corporations (which can be counted on one hand – Potlatch, Plum
Creek, Boise Cascade, and Weyerhaeuser (Jensen et al., 1995)) have been able to
constantly lowball smaller-scale timber producers for national forest timber bids, thus
maintaining their timber oligarchy across the region’s landscapes (Behan, 2001). In
addition to the social costs, the ecological costs of the railroad land grants legacy have
been enormous. Most of the checkerboarded square miles granted to the railroads have
been clearcut, often without being replanted. Ownership checkerboards that show up on
maps are often mirrored on the land as alternating square miles of forests and bare ground
(see Figures 5.1 & 5.2).58
58

Recently, railroads have become a problem (for a reason unrelated to habitat alteration) for the ESA
listed Northern Continental Divide population of grizzly bears. The Burlington Northern Santa Fe rail line
that works its way through the heart of the NCDE population’s habitat has had numerous grain spills that
have caused local concentrations of grizzlies right along rail lines. Timely cleanup of these spills is
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Figure 5.1 Land Ownership in north-central Idaho and western Montana, with the
prominent white/green pattern representing the private/Federal ownership
checkerboard – a legacy of nineteenth century railroad land grants, specifically here
the Northern Pacific and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul railroads (Schwantes,
1993) (map by Hintz).

Figure 5.2. Checkerboard clearcut in Idaho: private lands cutover and St. Joe
National Forest lands forested. Note the extensive roading. This is a spectacular, but
not atypical, example of railroad checkerboard landscape (Osborn, 2001).

difficult, however, due to the rugged, remote, relatively inaccessible terrain. In 2004 alone, three grizzlies
were killed by trains near grain spillage sites (Keefe-Feldman, 2005).
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The checkerboard legacy of the railroad land grants has resulted in massive habitat
fragmentation between the Bitterroot Ecosystem and the north Idaho/western Montana
grizzly populations, and indeed accounts for a good portion of the road removal and
ecological restoration components of the Conservation Biology alternative.
At the same time that Federal lands timber demand and harvest was on the rise,
tremendous increases in recreational use on national forests as well as the burgeoning
science of ecology heralded in new calls for the conservation of public lands. The
increasing, and often conflicting, demands put on the public lands culminated in the sixth
and current era of Federal lands history, an era so complex and full of new regulations,
uses, management strategies, and competing demands that Clawson doesn’t even attempt
to give it an all-inclusive name. Rather, he argues (quite reasonably) that the modern era
of public lands management is best understood through a chronological review of the key
Federal lands legislation passed since 1960.

5.3. Multiple Use, Wilderness, and Public Participation: The 1960s
Federal Lands Management Revolution
The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960 act codified into law
the longstanding Forest Service policy of multiple-use. The wording of the Act is very
ambiguous. MUSYA has understandably been interpreted variously by different groups
at different times. The Act, for example, refers to “the combination (of uses) that will best
meet the needs of the American people; making the most judicious use of the land ...
without impairment of the productivity of the land … and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return of the greatest unit output”
(US Congress 16:528, in Clawson, 1983, p. 35). MUSYA did little more than require the
Forest Service to manage its forests for multiple uses. It gave “no specific guidance on
policy issues and still less guidance for actual forest management in the field” (Clawson,
p. 44). The new paper mandates of multiple use and sustained yield would do little to
stem what had become an institutional Forest Service culture of “timber primacy” (Bolle,
1997, p. 170). Throughout the 1960s and 70s the Forest Service would come to be
dominated by agents dedicated to increasing timber harvests. The agency became
increasingly insulated and hostile in its reaction to critics of overcutting and clearcutting
from local residents, scientific foresters and environmentalists (Bolle, 1997).
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One law passed soon after MUSYA that was much more concrete in its policy and
management directives was the Wilderness Act of 1964. The Wilderness Act – which
upon passage established 54 wilderness areas covering some nine million acres of Federal
lands – was passed after seven years of contentious Congressional debate (Rudzitis,
1996). Since its passage, the size of the Federal wilderness area system has grown more
than tenfold to about 100 million acres, but “this figure is a little misleading since one
State, Alaska, has the majority of wilderness lands with over 60 percent of the total
wilderness acreage” (Rudzitis, p. 22). The idea was to release “pristine” lands from the
multiple use mandates of the Federal land management agencies so as to ensure their
wilderness character in perpetuity (passage from the Wilderness Act):
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is
a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to
mean in this Act an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its
primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or
human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its
natural conditions (Forest History Society, 2004).
There is no wording in the act that privileges ecologically significant lands,59 but
due to their large size (wilderness areas must be at least 5,000 acres and many are
hundreds of thousands to over a million acres) and the fact that they are unroaded, the
Wilderness Act created many de facto ecologically important reserves. This is especially
true for large carnivores, for reasons discussed at length in the previous chapter.
Wilderness areas have always required full congressional approval. Since wilderness
designation prohibits nearly all resource extraction activity within their borders, few
wilderness areas (and fewer still large wilderness areas) have been created in moist, lower
elevation habitats that contain both the highest endemic biodiversity and the most
valuable timber (Foreman, 1995a). Additionally, by 1964 many of the most ecologically
and commercially productive national forest lands were already being intensively
managed for timber and thus could not, and presumably can never, qualify as potential
wilderness areas. The rugged inaccessible interior of central Idaho, on the other hand,
59

Curiously, after listing the three criteria a wilderness area must meet, the act states that a wilderness area
“may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value” (Forest History Forest History Society, 2004, emphasis added).
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remained unroaded and uncut up to the 1964 passage of the act and after. The Selway
Bitterroot Wilderness was part of the original nine million acre system, while the equally
rugged but more arid Frank Church/River of No Return Wilderness – designated in 1980
– was one of the last huge wilderness areas created in the lower 48 States.
The next major piece of Federal environmental legislation was the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. It is almost impossible to overstate the
importance of NEPA. As the Natural Resources Law Center at the University of
Colorado puts is, “NEPA is the nation’s formal declaration of environmental policy.
NEPA affects every major land use and management decision made by the Federal
government” (Natural Resources Law Center, 2000, p. 9). In sum, NEPA provides
dozens of guidelines, some rather vague and reminiscent of MUSYA’s multiple use
mandates, but many others very specific in their programmatic and procedural
requirements. NEPA requires all Federal Government agencies to assess the
environmental impacts of their actions. Most importantly, NEPA requires the Federal
Government to prepare environmental impact statements (EISs) “for all ‘major Federal
projects significantly affecting the quality of the human environment’” (Wenner, 1993, p.
47) (even if, at the time NEPA was enacted, “no one knew what an Environmental
Impact Statement should contain, or what constituted a significant action requiring such a
statement” (Clawson, 1983, p. 51)). “Moreover, NEPA contained a requirement that EISs
would be open to public comment,” ushering in the era of environmental groups using the
Federal courts in attempts to eliminate or forestall Federal projects perceived to be
environmentally destructive (Wenner, 1993, p. 47).
The public comment component of the EIS process is substantial. In the initial
“scoping” phase – where the EIS-issuing agency informs the public of its intent to
prepare an EIS and the justifications for doing so – all affected Federal, State, and local
agencies, Indian tribes, and “other interested persons (including those who might not be
in accord with the action on environmental grounds)” are invited to comment on and
participate in the EIS process (Natural Resources Law Center, 2000, p. 11, wording is
from NEPA). Every EIS published has a “preferred alternative” alongside usually two or
three other alternatives include a “no action” alternative (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992;
Lindstrom et al., 2002). The EIS publication process is comprised of two formal stages.

111

The first is the publication of a draft EIS. The lead agency must invite comments on the
draft EIS, respond to the comments, and as such is liable to have incorporated relevant
input into the final phase of the process, the publication of a final EIS (Natural Resources
Law Center, 2000).
Although anyone would agree that NEPA and the EIS process have “totally
revolutionized federal land management” (Clawson, 1983, p. 51), many authors question
whether the revolution has been as substantive as it has procedural:
[EIS lead agencies] attempt to create … a narrow path of action that has
been chosen or created in advance of the document’s production by
hierarchically arranged powers. And though they may draw upon the
conventions of democratic discourse that is open to information from
diverse sources, [their] aim is never to treat deviant discourses with
respect but always merely to take note of them, to record them, and
ultimately treat them as ‘noise’ in the system, which needs to be ignored
or expunged (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 166).
Partly as a defense against possible legal actions, the federal agencies have
made the Environmental Impact Statements so long, so filled with more or
less meaningful figures, and so costly to prepare that even the Council on
Environmental Quality has sough to shorten and simplify them (Clawson,
1983, p. 53).
But other authors are more positive about NEPA and the EIS process, seeing it as still the
most democratic model for environmental decision making implemented on a national
scale despite its flaws (e.g., Feldman, 1993). Perhaps the fact that over 3,300 comments
were received during the scoping phase of the Bitterroot grizzly EIS and over 24,000
comments were received after the publication of the Draft EIS (USFWS, 1997a, 1998) is
evidence of the scale of the public comment component of environmental EISs. To what
degree this public felt empowered by their role in the process, however, is a matter of
speculation.60

60

At least one of the attendees of the Draft EIS public meetings had a very specific critique of the Fish and
Wildlife Service’s commitment to true public participation. The Missoula, Montana meeting was scheduled
at a lodge several miles out of town and there was no shuttle or other transportation set up for Missoulans
without cars to get to the meeting. David Havlick, an adamant supporter of the conservation biology
alternative, said he believed this was deliberately set up to exclude from the meeting as many of the radical
environmentalists in the Missoula area as possible (many of whom do not own cars for environmentalethical reasons) (Havlick, pers. comm.).
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5.4. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
The final piece of legislation I will discuss is the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
of 1973. The treaties with the Nez Perce, the creation and evolution of the US Forest
Service and National Park Service, the Wilderness Act, MUSYA, NEPA – discussions of
each of these help situate the Bitterroot grizzly recovery efforts in a geohistorical context.
The ESA, however, is the most significant piece of legislation for the purposes of this
dissertation, and for quite obvious reasons. The Bitterroot grizzly recovery efforts were
one piece of the larger grizzly bear recovery plan that was a product of the grizzly bear’s
1975 listing on the ESA. Without the ESA, grizzly conservation efforts would have
proceeded,61 but the form they took would have been very different from the manner in
which they played out.
In 1973, both houses of Congress passed the Endangered Species Act with
overwhelming bipartisan support (an indication of how much things have changed in the
arena of Federal environmental legislation in thirty years). Votes were 90-0 in the Senate
and 390-12 in the House. The bill was not seriously debated or contested on either floor –
none of the twelve representatives who voted against the bill even voiced opposition on
the House floor or to the media (Petersen, 2002). Opposition would undoubtedly have
been considerably higher if senators and representatives would have foreseen the
“absoluteness” with which the ESA’s uncompromising rhetoric would be interpreted by
Federal judges (Sullins, 2001, p. 3). Although many who voted for the bill saw it as a
formal extension of longstanding and rather uncontroversial efforts to save high-profile
species such as the brown pelican, gray wolf, and American alligator (Burgess, 2001), the
US Supreme Court would interpret it quite differently:
After an exhaustive review of the act and its legislative history, the Court
stated that ‘the plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost’, and
noted further that this conclusion is reflected ‘in literally every section of
the statute’ (Sullins, 2001, interior quote is from US Supreme Court 437,
Tennessee Valley Authority versus Hill).
The ESA provides regulatory protection for imperiled animals and plant species
and “the ecosystems on which they depend” (NOAA, 2005, Section 2.b.). “Species” is
61

Indeed, Idaho and Montana each have State grizzly conservation plans that predate the ESA (USFWS,
2000a).
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broadly (and somewhat awkwardly) defined in the ESA to include any species or
subspecies of plant or animal, and, for vertebrate animals, “distinct population segments”
(Stanford Environmental Law Society, 2001, p. 32).62 For the purposes of listing and
conservation, “species,” “subspecies,” and “distinct population segments” are not given
blanket definitions or specific biological criteria that must be met. Rather, those
determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, based on “standard taxonomic
distinctions and the biological expertise of [the FWS] and the scientific community”
(Clark, 1994, p. 22).
The ESA provides two classifications of protected status, endangered and
threatened. An endangered species is one “in danger of extinction throughout all or a
portion of its range” while a threatened species is “by definition not yet in danger of
extinction, but is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future” (Sullins,
2001, p. 154). For ESA listed animals, this is mainly a terminological distinction, as
threatened species are granted nearly the same level of protection as endangered species.
The only exception to this is a species protected under “special rule” status (Sullins,
2001), an issue that would play prime importance in the Bitterroot grizzly debates.
Once a species is listed, the FWS63 must “design and implement a recovery plan”
for the species, with the ultimate goal being the recovery of the species and its removal
from the ESA (Clark, 1994, p. 22). There are several specific components of the ESA
worth mentioning because of their relevance to the Bitterroot grizzly recovery efforts.
Following convention, I will refer to the components by the “section” of the Act in which
they are written. Section 4 dictates the listing procedures for endangered and threatened
species. Any individual or group, or the FWS itself, can petition to have a species listed
(Clark, 1994). Once a petition is received, FWS has ninety days to decide whether ESA
consideration is “warranted,” after which it has another year to make a final listing

62

The original ESA extended protected status candidacy to any distinct population of animals, but a 1978
amendment to the ESA limited the population designation to only vertebrate animals (Czech & Krausman,
2001).
63
The US Fish and Wildlife Service is actually one of two Federal agencies overseeing and administering
endangered species protection. The other is the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). NMFS
administers marine species, so for the purposes of this discussion, I will refer to FWS responsibilities
solely.
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determination.64 The decision on whether to list a species is to be made “solely on the
basis of the best scientific and commercial data available” 65 (NOAA, 2005, Section 4.b.).
The key word in this phrase is “solely,” added to a 1982 ESA amendment as to when and
to what degree science determines ESA regulatory action. Although the “best scientific
and commercial data” phrase appears in five sections of the Act, only in the listing
process is this data the sole factor dictating action (Baldwin & Corn, 2002). In other
sections, dealing with implementation and the planning process, economic considerations
may be weighed against scientific considerations.
After a species is listed, there are two regulatory provisions that give the ESA its
teeth, so to speak – that make it the “pit bull of environmental regulation” (Sullins, 2001,
p. 13). The first is the interagency consultation required by Section 7:
Under Section 7, federal agencies are prohibited from engaging in any
action … that is ‘likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species’ (Clark, 1994, p. 23,
internal quote is from ESA).
Section 7 consultation has been rigorously upheld by the Federal courts since the
notorious snail darter controversy in 1978 that halted construction of a Tennessee Valley
Authority dam on the Tellico River. Since TVA vs. Hill environmentalists have used
Section 7 to sue Federal agencies to modify or halt countless Federal land management
plans and development programs. The Court’s upholding of Section 7 is likely the single
greatest factor that has inspired so many environmentalist campaigns for endangered
species listing for animals and plants found on Federal lands. One of the great
controversies of Federal lands management is in what manner and how much (if any)
64

Though the FWS regularly fails to meet the one year listing deadline. There is currently a backlog of over
200 petitioned species waiting for the FWS or NMFS to make a determination. The 1995 Congress even
passed an ESA listing moratorium that was lifted about a year later. The Bush administration has repeatedly
claimed that the Department of Interior simply does not have the hundred-plus million dollars that would
be needed to make determinations on the ESA candidate species backlog. A Center for Biological Diversity
report, however, shows that the administration’s claims are patently false, that Interior Secretary Norton
actually refused additional funding that was targeted by Congress for the ESA candidate species backlog
(Nowicki).
65
The word “commercial” in this phrase may seem curious and appear to connote economic considerations,
but in this usage it refers to data on domestic and international trade of the species that affects its
endangerment (Baldwin & Corn, 2002). Trade in animals and animal parts (legal and illegal) has been
recognized for over a century as a leading cause of endangerment for many plant and animal species. A
considerable amount of Federal laws and international agreements pertaining to endangered species
predating 1973 were passed to deal with the endangered animal and plant trade problem (Petersen, 2002).

115

timber should be cut from national forests. Since the 1976 National Forest Management
Act all national forests must publish “forest plans” which are subject to the full NEPA
public participation process, and which must address, among other things, planned timber
sales and endangered species conservation plans. Section 7 habitat prohibitions played a
huge part in the well-publicized controversy over the endangered spotted owl and oldgrowth timber harvesting in Pacific Northwest forests (Petersen, 2002; Yaffee, 1994).
Indeed, a prominent timber operator based in Kamiah, Idaho, a town of 1,160 people
located not an hour from the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, supported the CMC
alternative, stating that prior to its inception “most of the people – especially those in the
timber industry – had a concern that if we weren’t careful, the grizzly bear could become
the spotted owl issue of our region” (Anderson, 2000).
Legal obstructionism, via NEPA and the ESA, is environmentalism’s strongest
weapon for challenging Federal lands management programs (Wenner, 1993). But this
strategy is not without its problems. For one, environmentalists become increasingly at
the whims of conservation-friendly presidential administrations, Congresses, and Federal
judges (Wenner, 1993). Further, the endless-litigation strategy – even when victorious –
usually aims only to forestall or block specific management actions, and as such does
little to enact incremental or progressive change. The litigation model has also resulted in
a polarization between environmentalists, who over the past two decades have
increasingly opposed all public lands timber harvesting, and loggers and millworkers,
whose livelihoods have become increasingly tied to Federal lands logging as private
lands have been overcut. If Section 7 is a pit bull, many people employed in natural
resource-extractive industries in the West must perceive the pit bull to be personally
attacking them.
The other major “prohibitive” (Yaffee, 1982) provision in the ESA is Section 9,
which prohibits the “taking” of listed species (Clark, 1994). True to form, “[t]aking was
defined extremely broadly as harassing, harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding,
killing, trapping, capturing, or collecting organisms or attempting to do the same”
(Yaffee, 1982, p. 57, emphasis in original). Whereas Section 7 requirements only apply to
Federal agencies, Section 9 prohibitions apply to “all persons, agencies and
organizations” (Clark, 1994, p. 23). Section 9 has particular import for species that prey
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upon livestock, including gray wolves and grizzly bears. Predatory species can only be
killed in defense of human life or safety. Listed endangered species cannot be killed or
injured if they are threatening or even attacking livestock, horses, hunting dogs, pets or
other ‘property’. So there are cadres of adamant opposition to these “private take”
(Fischer, 1995, p. 139) prohibitions of ESA Section 9, most notably ranchers, but also
some horse packers and guides and hunting groups.
The other ESA provision that is significant for the purposes of my investigation is
Section 10, which allows for (among other things) the FWS to propose reintroducing
“experimental populations” of listed species to suitable but unoccupied portions of their
former range (Sullins, 2001). Section 10 was not part of the original ESA, but added in a
1982 amendment to the bill. Prior to the flexibility introduced with Section 10’s
“experimental population” provision, the FWS could reintroduce listed species to
portions of their former range, but “once relocated, the full panoply of ESA prohibitions
applied to the newly established population” (Sullins, 2001, p. 131). As such, early
efforts to reintroduce endangered species were nearly always met with fierce resistance
(Sullins, 2001; USFWS, 1997a).
Experimental populations can be classified as “essential” or “nonessential” based
on the following criterion:
An essential experimental population is one the loss of which would be
likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival of the species in the
wild; all other experimental populations are to be classified as nonessential
(Sullins, 2001, p. 135).
For a nonessential experimental population, Section 7 interagency consultation is not
required (Sullins, 2001). Further, conservation plans for specific nonessential
experimental populations can include relaxed Section 9 takings prohibitions (Fischer,
1995). The reintroduction of gray wolves to central Idaho and Yellowstone National Park
– one of the most high-profile and arguably the most successful endangered species
recovery program ever in the Northern Rockies – employed the nonessential
experimental designation for the reintroduced wolves. This designation helped garner a
relatively broad base of support (even if many only “grudgingly” supported wolf
reintroduction) for this historically contentious issue (Fischer, 1995, p. 152). As will be
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demonstrated, Section 10 concessions would play prominent roles in the CMC alternative
and its opponents’ challenges.

5.5. A Methodological Intervention: Environmental Rhetoric as
‘Ecospeak’
My goal in the previous sections of this chapter is to have illustrated the unique
context and confluence of geography, (human and natural) history, land-use and landmanagement policy which framed the Bitterroot grizzly bear reintroduction debates. In
the previous chapter, I examined one outcome of this context, the ambitious efforts by
Alliance for the Wild Rockies and other environmentalists in the region to reestablish
grizzly bears in the Bitterroots as a fully protected species under the ESA. In this chapter,
my primary objects of analysis are advocacy documents for the Citizen Management
Alternative, including the official Federal document promoting the alternative, the
environmental impact statement (EIS). Before I get into the dissection of the EIS and
other CMC alternative promotional materials, I will discuss a useful methodological tool
for making sense of bureaucratic and advocacy documents – Killingsworth and Palmer’s
(1992) theorization of environmental rhetoric as “ecospeak.”
I include the Bitterroot Grizzly EISs66 in this chapter’s objects of analysis under
the subheading “advocacy document.” An EIS is not your standard environmental
advocacy document. Then again, these are rather nonstandard EISs. Most EISs are
written for mining, oil and gas development, and hydroelectric power projects on Federal
lands (Bardach & Pugliaresi, 1977) – as well as national forest ‘forest plans’ as
previously mentioned. All of these have clearly negative ‘impacts’ on the environment,
and the congressional intent of the EIS mandate was defined by the Supreme Court as
making sure Federal agencies take a “hard look” at the “environmental consequences” of
their actions (Bardach & Pugliaresi, 1977). The Bitterroot EISs were part of a project that
was designed explicitly to ‘improve’ the environment – by restoring a key native species
to an ecosystem – markedly different from assessing the environmental impacts of, say, a

66

I will use the shorthand titles “Bitterroot Grizzly EIS” or “Bitterroot EIS,” (or EISs if I am referring to
both the Draft and Final EISs), “Draft EIS,” or “Final EIS” rather than the full “Grizzly Bear Recovery in
the Bitterroot Ecosystem: [Draft or Final] Environmental Impact Statement.”
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new heap-leach gold mine near Yellowstone National Park.67 Even so, the Bitterroot EISs
did follow the standard EIS form, even though well under one hundred pages were
devoted to assessing the “environmental consequences” of the four alternatives. The
Bitterroot EISs also contrast sharply in form from the other advocacy documents
analyzed in this dissertation – the more compact and slick pamphlets, mailers, and web
pages produced by environmental groups advocating either the Conservation Biology or
CMC alternatives.
Existing writing on environmental impact statements is scant in the critical social
sciences or environmental rhetoric studies. It is not difficult to imagine why social
scientists have, for the most part, left these documents out of their empirical and
theoretical studies. They are tedious, dry, repetitive, and usually voluminous documents.
And to be certain, all that is true for the Bitterroot EISs.68 But, despite their dreary form,
the Bitterroot EISs are the primary – and most thorough – documents produced
advocating the reintroduction of grizzly bears to the Bitterroot ecosystem under a citizen
management model.
Killingsworth and Palmer (1992) locate the EIS as one genre of environmental
rhetoric. The “narrative outlines” of environmental discourse, over the past few decades,
have been repeated enough (“contain[ing] similar plots and characters – the confrontation
of environmentalists and land developers, for example”) that we can now view
environmental rhetoric as a
region of ecospeak, where public divisions are petrified, conflicts are
prolonged, and solutions are deferred by a failure to criticize deeply the
terms and conditions of the environmental dilemma. Ecospeak has
emerged as a makeshift discourse for defining new positions in public
debate (p. 8).
Environmental advocacy, as such, has become mired in us/them rhetorical
framings, a process of intentional oversimplification on both sides of most debates. But
this is understandable, as “a more complex view of the rhetorical situation is risky for
either side, because it could result in what Jesse Jackson likes to call ‘the paralysis of
67

This refers to the 1995-6 EIS that assessed the potential effects of building the “New World Mine,” a
19,000 acre gold mine that would have been very near Yellowstone National Park. The project was
abandoned after the EIS publication, threatened litigation by ENGOs, a lot of bad press, and a land-swap
deal between Crown Butte Corporation and the Federal Government.
68
The Bitterroot Grizzly Final EIS totals 764 pages.
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analysis’” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 10)69. Complexifying the issues is risky
(again, for either ‘side’ in a debate) for a variety of reasons.
One risk associated with acknowledging the complexity of environmental issues
is it can make it impossible to focus on “the issue” itself (Evernden, 1999). After all,
there are no solely environmental issues. The autonomy of ‘environmental problems’ qua
environmental problems is itself a fiction – an artifact of the evolution of “ecospeak”
(Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992). This parallels Raymond Rogers’ radical critique of
environmental discourse, where he declares that “the central goal of conservation is to
challenge the assumptions of modern economy” (Rogers, 1998a, p. 1). These
assumptions, as Rogers laments, rarely seem to be seriously challenged. In Northern
California, for example, despite ample evidence that timber companies held little regard
for their employees safety or long-term economic welfare, environmentalists fighting for
increased forest protections failed to establish an alliance with timber workers because
their discourse remained entrenched in a binary conservationist versus extraction rhetoric.
Loggers and sawyers saw little more than unemployment lines waiting for them if such
programs were implemented (London, 1998). Lacking the radical recontouring of
environmental-political action that might enable such alliances, environmental problems
tend to remain at the level of technicalities, glitches in an otherwise working system.
Once ‘fixed’ (and all the while during the fixing), society kicks back into its
unsustainable mode of production and new environmental problems arise around every
corner (Foster, 2002; Kovel, 2002).
But oversimplification in environmental discourse is, of course, not merely a
matter of missing the (arguably) necessary radical critique. There are more immediate
practical reasons – from the strategic perspective of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ specific
environmental debates – that oversimplification tends to dominate the discourse. During
the spotted owl controversy, for example, both sides had much to lose had they
acknowledged the complexity of the issue. On one hand, if environmentalists

had

highlighted the effects of their proposals on rural timber workers (a ‘community’ already
facing dire social and economic problems (Brown, 1995)) rather than demonizing a
monolithic timber industry (Proctor, 1998b), their proposal would have been a much
69

A reference citation for the internal Jesse Jackson quote is not given in the text.
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more difficult ‘sell’ to the mainstream environmentalists across the country who were
being courted to sign petitions and call congressmen. If the timber industry, on the other
hand, acknowledged that its “sound forest management” policies were all about evenaged management of second-growth forests (Wenner, 1993), thus leaving the question of
old growth protection out of the equation altogether (Proctor, 1998b), the industry’s
carefully crafted rhetorical commitments to environmental protection and sustainability
might have appeared rather disingenuous (especially given the context).
The process of simplification also arises out of the scientific uncertainty that
threatens to undermine many conservation proposals. Since at least Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring, environmental problems and their solutions have traditionally been
grounded in scientific argumentation – it has been science that, more than anything,
informs environmental policy. And the scientification of environmental discourse has, if
anything, intensified in the nearly half-century since Silent Spring, but not without cost to
the environmental movement. As ecological knowledge has advanced, so has the
awareness of the limits of our understanding. As Frank Fischer puts it,
“[environmentalists] discovered that [science] could not answer the environmental
questions with enough precision to be decisive. Indeed, it often tended to raise more new
questions that it could not answer” (Fischer, 2000, p. 95). So environmentalists often
back themselves into a corner when arguing that theirs is the scientifically sound case, or,
as was argued so many times by advocates for the conservation biology proposal for
Bitterroot grizzly recovery, that theirs and theirs alone represents the “best available
science.” The challenge, from a critical social science ‘analytical’ perspective, is first to
tease out where and how these processes of simplification take place, but then secondly
and perhaps more significantly to think about how these processes close off alternatives
and circumscribe the possible paths of action. When closely examined, ecospeak can
reveal “conceal[ed] sources of solidarity and conflict [which can] provide hints toward
the kind of social reorganization needed to cut through the environmental dilemma”
(Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 10).
Killingsworth and Palmer provide a typology of “human attitudes toward the
natural world” and the social groups that espouse the attitudes. As with any allencompassing typology, its usefulness is less in employing it as a literal structure within
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which actual attitudes and groups fall, but more as a heuristic device to help tease out the
relationships between rhetoric, perceptions, groups, individuals and social practice.
Similar to Harré et al’s discussion of metaphors in environmental discourse, typologies
“are tools … and as tools they are either useful, harmful, or useless but neither right nor
wrong” (Harré et al., 1999, p. 109). Effective typologies can help us understand why
things happen or happened the way they did, and ideally point toward alternatives as
well.
In

Killingsworth

and

Palmer’s

model,

the

“polarity”

of

environmentalist/developmentalist ecospeak is broken up initially by representing
attitudes toward nature along a continuum from “nature as object” to “nature as spirit”:

Figure 5.3. Continuum of Attitudes and Perspectives toward Nature (in
Killingsworth and Palmer, 1992, p. 11)
The “science” depicted as holding nature as mere “object” represents “experimental
science as it has developed since the seventeenth century, with its fabled detachment
from all natural objects” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 12). The center represents
mainstream “anthropocentric” attitudes that hold “nature [as] a bounty of resources for
human use and enjoyment” (p. 12). But the environmental crisis has brought science (or
at least a good bit of it) out of its isolated laboratory existence, and likewise brought
much religion in line with science-based critiques of modern developmentalism. A
growing sense of an “ecological holism” indeed blurs any distinction between scientific
and spiritualistic attitudes toward nature (p. 14). History, then, has bent the continuum
into a “horseshoe, … bring[ing] science and deep ecology into a closer relationship” (p.
14, reproduced as Figure 5. 4 here).

122

Figure 5.4. “Horseshoe” Model of Attitudes and Perspectives toward Nature (in
Killingsworth and Palmer, 1992, p. 14)
The arrows in the horseshoe diagram represent the “direction of appeals” between
the various groups/attitudes (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 17). These “appeals”
represent efforts to overcome the power differentials and fundamental tensions between
any pair of perspectives. Any environmental debate will consist of various appeals. This
is primarily strategic, as only rarely can a single party (e.g., environmentalists, a business
interest, a governmental agency, a scientific community) bring about a desired outcome.
The typological component in the model is methodologically useful in two
‘directions’. As mentioned above, the categories produce a helpful heuristic device to
assist in logically assembling real-world events and entities. With the heuristic in place,
alternative types and subtypes can modify the diagram when assessing particular debates.
Looking at the typology in the other ‘direction’ – recognizing the limits of this, or any,
pigeonholing structure – we can also recognize the real power of reified categories in
environmental debate. Methodologically, that is, we can see how debaters attempt to
“achieve a measure of control over an audience of an opponent on the basis of a dominant
attitude” (p. 12). Similarly, one “may seek shelter from attack by claiming for themselves
a breadth of attitudinal experience denied them by their opponents.” In other words,
(recognizing its limits) we can superimpose the structure onto rhetoric and real world
events to aid in sorting them out. Conversely, we can assess how opponents deploy these
and other categories to belittle their opponents experience and argumentation.
Additionally, we can assess how these categories operate as identities that are falsely
perceived to be rigidly incommensurable. I will now turn to the document themselves,
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beginning with the “Grizzly Bear Recovery in the Bitterroot Ecosystem: Draft
Environmental Impact Statement” from 1997.

5.6. It’s as Easy as One (Reintroduce Grizzlies), Two (‘Local’
Management), Three (Grizzly Recovery in the Bitterroots!): The
Bitterroot EIS
Environmental Impact Statements are published in two stages, a draft EIS and a
final EIS. The draft document, however, should not be thought of as merely preliminary
or of secondary significance to the entire process. Indeed, the draft document “is not a
draft in the traditional sense of the word. The draft EIS must be complete, meet the
regulatory requirements, and be capable of standing on its own merits” (Eccleston, 1999,
p. 224). Much of the import of the draft EIS is related to its role in the public comment
component of the NEPA process. After publication, the draft EIS is followed by live open
house hearings in local communities and a written public comment period. Moreover, the
issuing agency is mandated to assess, summarize, respond to and where necessary make
changes to the draft EIS based on the submitted comments (Eccleston, 1999). The final
EIS, as the name implies, is intended to be a final decision-recommending document.
There is no mandated comment period after the publication of the final EIS, only a 30day period wherein agencies, groups and individuals can read and assess the document
and notify the issuing agency of any intent to challenge the decision. After the 30-day
period, the final decision can then be forwarded up the chain of command to the head of
the agency and eventually the secretary of the agency’s parent department. In sum, the
draft EIS is a full-scale proposal for a specific action by the Federal Government, and the
comment period following its publication is (in theory at least) the public’s most
empowered moment in the process – the best opportunity to influence the course of
action.
At nearly five hundred pages, it is impossible to analyze, or even review, the
entire Bitterroot Draft EIS. For the purposes of my analysis, there are two sections of the
document that necessitate review. These are the introduction and the chapter outlining the
recovery alternatives. I base this judgment simply in the assumption that these were the
two sections that most readers of the document read first, and no doubt the only sections
that many read.
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Viewed through Killingsworth and Palmer’s ‘horseshoe’ model (Figure 5.4) we
realize that no environmental advocacy rhetoric is ever directed to all possible
constituencies simultaneously. Conservation programs are always targeted to a specific
constituency or groups of constituencies (as represented in the diagram by the arrows, the
“direction of appeals”). Due to the ever-present tensions and incommensurabilities among
the different groups (or “perspectives” (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 11)) all such
targeted rhetoric will invariably be found repellant by other groups. The CMC alternative
appeals were directed to the timber industry, livestock industry, and other local skeptics
of Federal lands managers and management. By directing the proposal to these groups,
however, the potential for support from much of the regional environmental community
was compromised. It should not be surprising that a proposal that unapologetically courts
the timber industry would not appeal to many in the regional environmental community.
The opening page of the document is the “Abstract,” consisting of the following three
paragraphs:
The U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) proposes to
establish an experimental population rule and reintroduce grizzly bears
into the Bitterroot Ecosystem (BE) in east central Idaho. The rule would
allow liberal management of grizzly bears by government agencies and the
public to minimize conflicts over uses of public lands, effects on domestic
animals and livestock, and impacts on ungulate populations. A Citizen
Management
Committee
would
be
authorized
management
implementation responsibility for the experimental population and would
be tasked with implementing the Bitterroot Chapter of the Grizzly Bear
Recovery Plan. Reintroduction could result in grizzly bear recovery in the
BE (achievement of the tentative recovery goal of approximately 280
grizzly bears occupying suitable habitat) in a minimum of 50 years (4%
growth rate), but would likely more than 110 years (2% growth rate) after
bears were released.
The Bitterroot Ecosystem, as characterized by data from 10
counties in central Idaho and 4 counties in western Montana, is
approximately 44,419 square miles and 76% federal land. The area has a
population of 219,061, has a $3.8 billion local economy, has 423,490
cattle and sheep (298,000 are grazed on national forests), has about
274,359 ungulates, with a hunter harvest of 38,007, and receives
approximately 13,268,395 recreational visits annually to national forests in
the area.
A recovered grizzly bear population would kill about 6 cattle (4-7)
and 22 sheep (0-44), and up to 504 ungulates per year. This would not
measurably impact ungulate populations or hunter harvest. Nuisance bear
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incidents could be up to 59 (0-118) per year. There would be no
anticipated impacts to land use activities on public or private land, to
include timber harvest, mining, and public access/recreational use.
Changes to hunting seasons could occur due to conflicts. Risk to human
health and safety from a recovered grizzly bear population would be less
than 1 injury per year and less than 1 human mortality every few decades.
Economic analyses indicate grizzly bear recovery in the BE would lead to
total net economic benefits of 40.4-60.6 million dollars per year and total
costs of $170,300-$176,000 per year (costs during the initial 5-year
reintroduction phase would be $395,900-$401,600 per year) (USFWS,
1997a, p. iv).
I have identified four dominant themes that run throughout the EISs – tirelessly
repeated justifications for the proposal. As would be expected, they all arise in the Draft
EIS abstract:
theme 1: the hallmarks of the proposal are the experimental status of the
reintroduced bears and the Citizen Management Committee;
theme 2: grizzly recovery in the Bitterroot ecosystem is a simple matter,
just waiting to happen; the land and the habitat are there, the only missing
variable is the bears themselves – end of story;
theme 3: the proposal is safe, non-threatening: “no anticipated impacts to
land use activities on public or private land”; livestock losses will be
minimal; ungulate losses won’t affect hunter harvest levels; human safety
risk is nominal; the economic benefits far outweigh the costs;
theme 4: the EIS is a thorough and scientifically sound document, as
evidenced by the very precise (appearing) statistics on project recovery
time and population size, livestock and ungulate losses, economic costs
and benefits, etc.
The hallmarks – the experimental population status and the CMC – are
foregrounded in the abstract and throughout the document for a clear reason: this plan is
marketed as being new, and different. New in that it represents a coalition of business
interests and conservationists working together for endangered species recovery. This is
different from the Federal Government’s traditional strongarm approach that pits locals
against environmentalists, often alienating both groups. In the description of Alternative 1
in the first chapter (the “summary”) of the Draft EIS, the FWS appears almost desperate
in their repetitive trumpeting of the experimental population designation:
The purpose of this alternative is to accomplish grizzly bear recovery by
reintroducing grizzly bears designated as a nonessential experimental
population to central Idaho and implementing provisions within Section
10(j) of the ESA to conduct special management to address local concerns.
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Section 10(j) provides for reintroduction of experimental populations
under special regulations. "Experimental population" designation gives
the USFWS more flexibility because such populations can be treated as "a
species proposed to be listed" rather than "threatened or endangered". If a
reintroduced population of grizzly bears is designated "experimental" and
"nonessential" (refers to an experimental population whose loss would not
likely reduce the survival of the species in the wild) under the ESA 10(j)
amendment, other federal agencies are required only to confer with
USFWS on federal activities that are likely to jeopardize the species.
Management of a nonessential experimental population can thus be
tailored to specific areas and specific local conditions, including meeting
concerns of those opposed to reintroduction. Because reintroduced grizzly
bears would be classified as a nonessential experimental population, the
Service’s management practices can reduce local concerns about excessive
government regulation on private lands, uncontrolled livestock
depredations, excessive big game predation, and lack of State government
and local citizen involvement in the program. A Citizen Management
Committee (CMC) would be authorized management implementation
responsibility for the Bitterroot grizzly bear experimental population.
“Experimental population” appears in each of the first three sentences of the
description of the recovery alternative. The avowed benefits of the experimental status
are made clear from a short sample of phrases all found in merely the first paragraph of
the summary of the description: “address local concerns”; “more flexibility”;
“management … can be tailored to specific areas and specific local conditions”; “meeting
concerns of those opposed to reintroduction”; “reduce local concerns”; “excessive
government regulation”; “lack of State government and local citizen involvement” (p.
xii). Great! Who, really, could be opposed to any of these things anyway? Opponents of
reintroduction, it is fair to say, would generally not.
Few of even the most vocal opponents of environmental conservation in the West
openly espouse being anti-conservation. Indeed, even the notorious Wise Use movement
has labeled its constituency – “the hunters and trappers, the fishermen and watermen …
the miners and the loggers” – as “the true environmentalists” (Pendley, 1994, p. vii, in
McCarthy, 1998, p. 135-6). The experimental nonessential population status was clearly
written with the intent of bringing on-board those who would otherwise oppose grizzly
recovery in the region (probably not many activist ‘Wise Users’, but certainly some of the
many other Westerners who do not self-identify primarily as environmentalists). And the
nonessential experimental status did just that. The experimental status and the CMC were
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the clauses in the recovery program that secured the support of powerful otherwiseopponents, including regional timber industry groups and the Governor of Montana
(Anderson, 2000).
The nonessential experimental population status exempts the public lands
surrounding the recovery area (which is all Federally designated wilderness anyway)
from Section 7 of the ESA: the otherwise required consultation for potential management
effects (e.g., timber harvests) on the listed species and its habitat. The structure of the
summary of the preferred alternative demonstrates that the FWS was not trying to hedge
on the concessions made to ‘local’ opponents and the timber industry. The horseshoe
model (Figure 5.4) works well here initially. The prominent “direction of the appeal” is
(from government and) most directly to “business,” specifically regional timber operators
and workers; secondarily toward “agriculture,” specifically stockgrowers.70 In a personal
interview with Hank Fischer, the primary architect of the CMC proposal, he admitted that
this targeting was intentional, and primarily strategic: “What we did was we tried to
engage some of the people who we thought would be the most vociferous and most
effective opponents of bear restoration. In our view that was going to be the timber
industry … in Idaho” (Fischer interview).
The Citizen Management Committee is the second hallmark of the proposal. In
the summarized Alternative 1 description, two shorter paragraphs follow the long initial
paragraph trumpeting the experimental status. The first is a purely descriptive explanation
of the “recovery area” and the larger “experimental population area.” The second is a
brief description of how many bears will be released over how many years, and where.
Following this is a longer paragraph explaining the establishment and role of the CMC. It
begins:
The CMC would be authorized management implementation
responsibility by the Secretary of Interior (in consultation with the
governors of Idaho and Montana) for the Bitterroot grizzly bear
nonessential experimental population. The CMC would be comprised of
local citizens and agency representatives from federal and state agencies
and the Nez Perce Tribe. Grizzly bear management would allow for
70

Within the 14-county “primary analysis area” that includes and surrounds the central Idaho wilderness
areas and the recovery core, farm income accounts for only 3.8% of the total income in the region, but 72%
of all farm income comes from livestock raising (USFWS, 1997a). The source of the data is not given in
the Draft EIS, but from the demographic categories I would assume that it is 1990 US Census data.
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resource extraction activities to continue without formal Section 7
consultation under Section7(a)(2) of the ESA. The CMC would be
responsible for recommending changes in land-use standards and
guidelines as necessary for grizzly bear management (USFWS, 1997a, p.
xiv).
Clearly the CMC is a supplement to the experimental status – as evidenced by the FWS’s
unwillingness, even by this point in the document, to refer to the reintroduced bear as
anything less than the cumbersome “Bitterroot grizzly bear nonessential experimental
population.” The experimental status provides the Section 7 exemption (thrown in here
again for good measure) and additional management flexibility. Without the CMC,
however, “locals” would have no assurance that the flexibility would be used to their
favor. “Local citizens” (in this context, meaning residents “from communities within and
adjacent to the recovery and experimental population areas” (USFWS, 1997a, p. 2-80)
not affiliated with the Federal Government) would constitute a majority of the fifteen
member CMC.
The fifteen members would consist of seven appointed by the Governor of Idaho,
five by the Governor of Montana, one by the Nez Perce Tribe, one member of the US
Forest Service, and one member of the USFWS. The Draft EIS states that the CMC was
to “to consist of a cross-section of interests reflecting a balance of viewpoints, be selected
for their diversity of knowledge and experience in natural resource issues, and for their
commitment to collaborative decision making,” but establishes no guidelines as to how
this would be accomplished, judged, or enforced. This State-appointed, “local” majority
would, it was hoped, allay fears that local concerns would be ignored despite the
experimental status. The citizen management provision broadens the appeal to include
‘locals’ outside of timber circles, but who none the less oppose highly restrictive
management of Federal lands.
There was, it should be mentioned, one significant clause in the proposal that
assured that the reintroduced bears – or perhaps I should say the “Bitterroot grizzly bear
nonessential experimental population” – would not suffer at the hands of a committee
more committed to the management status quo than to sincere grizzly bear recovery: “All
decisions of the CMC must lead to recovery of the grizzly bear in the BE (Bitterroot
Ecosystem)” (p. 2-80). If the Secretary of the Interior (through the FWS representative on
the CMC) determines that the actions of the CMC are not leading to grizzly recovery,
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then the Secretary (through the FWS) can resume lead management responsibility of the
reintroduced grizzly bears. Moreover, “[s]hould the Secretary resume management
implementation responsibility, the CMC would be disbanded and all requirements
identified in the proposed special rule regarding the CMC would be automatically
nullified” (p. 2-80). So the assurances go both ways. On one hand, this is not a standard
top-down Federal lands management proposal – “locals” have the say in the particulars of
how the management proceeds. On the other, the management must lead to grizzly bear
recovery; otherwise the CMC “experiment” is rescinded.
The Conservation Biology alternative, clearly, contrasts sharply with the CMC
proposal. The CB alternative presented an elaborated and technical-scientifically justified
conservation proposal. This scientific justification for space and habitat, and explanations
of the large reserve design, land-use restrictions, and ecological restoration it attempted to
demonstrate as necessary for “true” grizzly recovery indeed took up the bulk of the
proposal. The CMC alternative, by contrast, presented a simpler and more concise case
for the viability of grizzly recovery: the wilderness itself is large enough and the habitat is
adequate; moreover, it is surrounded by national forests which can accommodate some
grizzlies and buffer the wilderness recovery core. The case was so simplified that the
narrative produced appears almost self-evident (this is the second theme mentioned
above): The wilderness is huge; it contained grizzlies; we killed them. If we put them
back in, they’ll do fine. Once reintroduced, recovery may be accomplished “in a
minimum of 50 years … but would likely more than 110 years” [sic] (p. iv). The most
striking aspects of this theme – the issue of recovery itself – is the lack of space it garners
in the proposal description, the casual tone that accompanies it, and the brief space it
receives. Recovery is basically assumed. Management and control, however, are
meticulously described, planned, and projected.
Life with grizzlies, so goes the story, will be pretty much the same as it was
without them. This is the third theme I found in the CMC alternative. The grizzly
recovery proposition is safe; it is non-threatening to the status quo. Much of this safety is
established through the experimental population designation, the Section 7 exemption,
and the “local” control over management decisions, as discussed at length already. These
clauses, as shown, were primarily (and effectively) established to appease the group
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perceived to be most powerful potential opponent of recovery – the timber industry in
Idaho. Potential economic objections from the livestock industry were accounted for as
well. Defenders of Wildlife would reimburse any rancher whose livestock was killed by a
member of the experimental grizzly population. Beyond the matter of direct kill, “if
significant conflicts occurred between grizzly bears and livestock within the experimental
area, these could be resolved in favor of the livestock by capture or elimination of the
bear” (p. xiv). Sounds pretty straightforward. The promise of continuing existing
economic activities unchanged within the experimental population is made without
qualification: “no anticipated impacts to land use activities on public or private land” (p.
xvii). None.
Grizzly bears, of course, do not present a mere economic nuisance. They are
(justifiably) perceived as dangerous, unpredictable, and potentially aggressive animals.
To allay concerns of safety risks to persons and personal property, the wild,
uncontrollable grizzly had to be rhetorically fenced in (geographically bounded within
public lands), continually monitored, and disciplined when unruly. How to establish the
complete controllability of the bear population? Strikingly similar to felons on
probation71:
Each individual reintroduced grizzly bear would be radio collared and
monitored to determine their movements and how they use their habitat,
and to keep the public informed of general bear locations and recovery
efforts (p. xvi).
Despite the best efforts to keep track of each and every bear in the experimental
population, it is acknowledged that the bears will not respect the recovery area and
experimental population area boundaries drawn on maps. Grizzly bears leaving the
confines of the Federal lands (the experimental population area) and trespassing onto
private lands “would be discouraged in these areas and grizzly bears would be captured,
71

The bears-as-criminals metaphor has an interesting history of its own. In nineteenth and early twentieth
century America, predators were often perceived and represented as criminals, outlaws, bandits and the
like. Bears with human conflict problems were officially classified by the early Park Service as “criminals
… of bad character” (Mighetto, 1991, p. 99). This perception of predators, right down to the specific
metaphor, has persisted to the present day. Responding to a local rancher-critic of the grizzly reintroduction
program who likened reintroducing grizzlies to releasing a prisoner (“maybe rape to child molestation to
pure murder”) into a neighborhood, FWS grizzly bear recovery coordinator Chris Servheen remarked
“grizzly bears aren’t criminals, so that’s a nonsense argument” – no doubt fully aware that he worked for a
government agency which had helped sediment and perpetuate this unfair anthropomorphic
characterization of predators (Anderson, 2000).
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destroyed, or returned to the recovery area” (p. 2-90). For those unconvinced that the
monitoring and control program transforms this dangerous animal into a more benign
presence, we are assured that the risk is infinitesimal in the short term and statistically
nominal even after the recovery goal (approximately 280 bears) is met:
During the first several decades following establishment of a breeding
population of grizzly bears, chance of injury caused by bears would be
exceedingly small due to the low density of bears in the area…
[P]rojections for human injury, once bears are recovered … are less than
one injury per year and less than one grizzly bear-induced human
mortality every few decades (p. 2-96).
The EIS includes many very precise statistical projections of the resulting impacts of
grizzly recovery (the fourth and final theme listed above). These statistics give the
document quantified, scientific validation for the broader claim that recovering grizzlies
won’t stop a thing. Perhaps the most striking thing about the use of precise projections is
how early they appear in the Draft EIS. In the one-page abstract – the first page of the
entire document – we are assaulted with the following figures about the Bitterroot
Ecosystem. The Ecosystem contains:
423,490 cattle and sheep (298,000 are grazed on national forests), has
about 274,359 ungulates, with a hunter harvest of 38,007, and receives
approximately 13,268,395 recreational visits annually.
A recovered grizzly bear population would kill about 6 cattle (4-7) and 22
sheep (0-44), and up to 504 ungulates per year… Nuisance bear incidents
could be up to 59 (0-118) per year.
Risk to human health and safety would be less than 1 injury per year and
less than 1 human mortality every few decades.
[G]rizzly bear recovery in the BE would lead to a total net economic
benefits of 40.4-40.6 million dollars per year and total costs of $170,300$176,000 per year (costs during the initial 5-year reintroduction phase
would be $395,900-$401,600 per year) (USFWS, 1997a, p. iii).
Certainly, the barrage of statistics and numerical projections is partly formulaic.
Ever EIS contains a barrage of statistics, projections, and other various quantitative ‘data’
(Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992). It is also easy to see how quantitative data is needed to
validate the qualitative claims made throughout the EIS – e.g., recovery will be
successful; livestock losses will be minimal; hunter harvest will be unaffected; the
regional economy will benefit.
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Any EIS is also undeniably written as an ‘expert’ document. Historian Samuel
Hays writes about the growing rift since the 1970s between experts and non-experts
within the environment movement. Environmentalism in the 1960s developed as a more
traditional grassroots movement but gradually built strong (and necessary, from a
practical standpoint) alliances with, and within, scientific and bureaucratic circles.72
Scientists and resource managers, the two dominant expert cadres, often perceive “the
political context as one of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, of the knowledgeable and rational expert
and the uninformed and emotional public” (Hays, 1987, p. 9). For the FWS and the
Bitterroot EIS preparers, the case was even more complicated by the fact that they had
adversaries on two sides. One side, the outright opponents of grizzly conservation, yes,
was perceived and treated as ‘the uninformed and emotional public’. But the other,
supporters of the CB alternative, comprised a rival expert community producing a
quantitative analysis that counters many of the claims made in the CMC alternative.
Clearly, CB supporters were going to challenge the CMC’s assertions based on their own
analyses, including the PVA modeling discussed in the previous chapter. By law, the FWS
needed to defend its proposal against such assertions, so quantitative data that could back
the claim that recovery was possible within the CMC recovery area were needed.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the ‘data’ presented in the Draft EIS is even easier to
poke holes in than was the CB data as assessed in Chapter 4. For example, on what is the
assertion that a recovered grizzly bear population “would kill about 6 cattle (4-7) and 22
sheep (0-44), and up to 504 ungulates per year” based? For the livestock mortality
estimates, we have to go to page 182 of Chapter 4, where we finally find the formula
from which this figure was calculated:

Figure 5.5. Livestock depredation estimation formula from page 4-182 of the
Bitterroot Draft EIS
This formula seems reasonable enough for getting a ball park estimate as to how many
cattle and sheep will likely be killed by a recovered grizzly population. The ecosystems
72

Chapter 6 includes a much more elaborated discussion of experts and expertise. For my immediate
purposes, Hays’ review of the historically developing expert nature of environmentalism adequately treats
the subject.
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from which the depredation statistics were taken were the NCDE and the GYC, the two
(by far) largest subpopulations of grizzlies in the Lower 48. And, if you go to the trouble
to dig through several hundred Draft EIS pages in search of the source of these figures,
the estimates are fairly well-qualified: “These predictions are statistical in nature and are
not intended to show exact depredation expected in the BE, but should provide an
indication of what may occur based on other ecosystems” (USFWS, 1997a, p. 4-182).
This does not, of course, explain the way in which the assertion was worded in the Draft
EIS abstract: “a recovered grizzly bear population would kill about 6 cattle…” Granted,
“about” is a qualifier, but why give an exact estimate followed by a bounded range (e.g.,
“6 cattle (4-7) and 22 sheep (0-44)”)?
Whether this was just sloppiness on the part of the EIS preparers, or whether they
actually thought they were presenting a more convincing case by providing firm figures,
or whatever other possible reason might explain it, what is undeniable is that so many of
the figures themselves – when held to really any scrutiny whatsoever – are bizarre to the
point of being almost comical. Did the preparers not have any knowledge about the rules
of significant digits when presenting estimates based on means and averages? By
convention, it is wrong to claim that an ecosystem could contain “about 274,359
ungulates” or that “[n]uisance bear incidents could be up to 59 (0-118) per year.” The
absurdity of the range of 0-118 possible nuisance bear incidents could not have been lost
on most readers of the EIS. As one commenter in Missoula, speaking on behalf of the
Montana Stockgrowers Association, protested:
[T]he EIS concludes that private property incidents involving bears would
range between zero and 118. What kind of science is that? I mean, it just
says we have [zero here], 26 here, [and] 118 there, so we are going to be
somewhere between zero and 118. And we don’t think that was an
adequate analysis (USFWS, 1997e, p. 61).
A more skillful articulation of these statistics and projections certainly could have helped
ward off the objection that the statistics were meaningless – an overstated objection, to be
sure, but one that none the less holds water due to the way in which the figures were
presented.
All of these themes – even as they may have been more or less necessary to
construct the narrative desired by proponents of the CMC alternative, as well as to fill out
the formulaic requirements of an EIS – create spaces for challenges to the validity of the
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document, and these spaces were indeed exploited by opponents on both sides of the
issue. The CMC alternative cannot be judged or assessed adequately, surely not keeping
in mind the broader goal of producing an analysis of the entire debates, without assessing
the opponents’ challenges. That task will be handled in the following chapters. To
complete this initial review and analysis of the CMC alternative, I will now review
promotional literature and a television special produced by the CMC’s most powerful
voice in the national environmental community, the National Wildlife Federation.

5.7. Establishment Environmentalism Makes its Case
What do grizzlies need? Large amounts of suitable habitat where people won’t
kill them and where the grizzly bears won’t be tempted to mix with people. For that much
there is consensus. As I have demonstrated, exactly how much space is necessary for a
“recovered” or “stable” grizzly population is debatable. What constitutes suitable grizzly
bear habitat is debatable – and debated – as well. As is what is necessary to keep humans
and grizzlies out of conflict. For both CB and the CMC supporters, the challenge (or at
least a good part of it) was to convince doubters and potential supporters that their
proposal provided the space, habitat, and protection necessary. It is undeniable that the
CB alternative made a sounder case that their proposal provided the means for grizzly
bears’ long-term survival. The case that was not made by CB supporters was how on
Earth their proposal was going to pass into law.73 For the CMC alternative, it was closer
to the inverse case. They made a convincing case for how their proposal was going to
pass and be implemented (after all, going in it was the FWS’s preferred alternative). But
they still needed to make the case that the area was large enough, the habitat was suitable
and that human/bear conflicts would not jeopardize recovery. To accomplish this, in
every promotional flyer, website, and film supporting the CMC, the Bitterroot Ecosystem
was represented as vast, teeming with wildlife, yet incomplete without the grizzly bear.
73

And “pass into law” is not a misstatement here. It would not have been a mere manner of the FWS
selecting the CB alternative as the preferred alternative and having the Secretary sign on after the NEPA
process was completed. The habitat restoration and road demolition components of the project would have
required new supporting Federal legislation to commence. The FWS exploited this potential
implementation snag in the CB alternative. Their “summary” of Alternative 4 in the Final EIS began with
the statement “Of importance is the fact that the principal laws that govern land management on Federal
lands would have to be changed for the USFWS to implement this alternative” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 2-57).
The exact sentence is repeated one page later as the first “actions that would be implemented” if
Alternative 4 was selected.
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The case was not made in the scientific fashion of the PVA modeling the CB proposal
was built around, but instead ‘common sense’ appeals were employed through repeated
mixed qualitative and quantitative references to, on the one hand, the vastness, space, and
wildness of the recovery area, and on the other, the need to find new ways to do
endangered species conservation.
The National Wildlife Federation’s small (eight four-by-nine-inch pages) color
flyer (hereafter, ‘the NWF flyer’) urging citizens to write to the FWS in support of the
CMC alternative (and send money to the National Wildlife Federation!) begins:
In the heart of Idaho and far western Montana lies the greatest area of wild
country left in the lower 48 states. At the center of this vast region are the
Selway-Bitterroot and Frank Church River-of-No-Return Wilderness
areas, which include more than four million acres of public land…
Ranging across this magnificent landscape are tens of thousands of elk,
deer, black bear, moose and cougar… In 1995, wolves were brought back
to this vast wilderness. But the forests and mountains of this immense land
remain empty of one of North America’s most impressive creatures – the
grizzly bear (NWF, 1997a, p. 2).
This passage, clearly asserting the enormity and ‘wildness’ (that is, devoid of
human presence) of the place, is accompanied by a supporting image (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6. “Selway-Bitterroot Ecosystem Photo” from the National Wildlife
Federation promotional flyer for the Citizen Management Alternative for Bitterroot
Grizzly Reintroduction (NWF, 1997a, pp. 3-4).
This is an impressive image of a classic Western alpine landscape, with three
mountain ridgelines, a spectacular mountain peak, and vast amounts of terrain above
treeline. As the image itself is spectacular, it must have been (at least partially) chosen to
draw up a resonant image for Americans – to make Americans generally unfamiliar with
the Bitterroots realize that, yes, the Bitterroot Ecosystem is what they think of when they
envision the West: “spectacular open spaces” (Guthman & McCarthy, 1998, p. 67), vast,
alpine, wild. The dry alpine and subalpine habitat represented in the photograph,
however, is not likely to contain many elk, deer, black bear, moose, or cougars, nor does
it make particularly good grizzly bear habitat.74 There is nothing disingenuous about the
use of this image. The landscape picture is within the recovery area and portions of it
(though most likely lower elevation portions of it, out of sight in the picture) would likely
be used by a recovered grizzly population. The canyons of the Bitterroot country are
generally steep and narrow, and there would be no way a lower elevation photograph (or
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At least certainly not on its own. Grizzlies utilize similar high talus slopes for winter denning, but when
out of hibernation would spend little time in this habitat.
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one of the less arid portions of the recovery area to the north, either way – one actually of
prime BE grizzly habitat) could give a sense of the enormity of the region.
The CMC alternative was largely modeled along the lines of the similar and
successfully implemented plan to reintroduce gray wolves to Yellowstone and central
Idaho as an experimental population (Fischer, pers. comm.).75 But the Bitterroots, by
name alone, clearly do not carry the cachet of Yellowstone, so marketing the
reintroduction had to include much more deliberate constructions of a familiar and
resonant image to elicit concern and support from non-locals.
People do not care about ‘ecosystems’ any more than they care about
‘watersheds’ or ‘continents’. These are dry, abstract concepts that denote purely
objectively delineated asocial areas or regions. Care and concern from people begins
when watersheds or ecosystems or portions of them become places. Yellowstone is a
place – most Americans can immediately draw upon images of hot springs, geysers,
spectacular waterfalls, wildlife, and tourists in awe of the same. The Bitterroots, however,
are much less well known. Indeed, in a survey conducted as part of the FWS’s planning
process, 63% of “regional” respondents76 and 82% of national respondents were “not at
all familiar” with the Bitterroot area of central Idaho (Duda & Young, 1995, p. 6). For
most people, then, and almost anyone from outside the region, the placeness of the
Bitterroots had to be produced.
Producing the BE as enormous also helps validate the FWS’s claims that the
recovery area is large enough to more or less ‘contain’ a grizzly recovered grizzly bear
population, thereby allaying concerns that bears would regularly be wandering into
populated areas and causing safety risks to humans and pets. In a radio show interview
affiliated with the regional environmental newspaper High Country News (a paper “for
people who care about the American West” (High Country News, 2005)), two of the most
prominent advocates and spokespersons for the CMC alternative – Hank Fischer of
Defenders of Wildlife and Chris Servheen, Grizzly Bear Recovery Coordinator for the
USFWS – do not miss the chance to develop this narrative. Servheen describes a previous
75

Hank Fischer was indeed one of the primary architects of both plans.
Defined as residents of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Oregon and Washington, not including Idaho
and Montana residents living in counties containing and immediately surrounding the recovery – these
were “local” residents (Duda & Young, 1995, p .2).
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reintroduction effort – in the Cabinet Mountains of northwestern Montana – where local
fears were quelled only after a few years of experience showed local residents that
grizzlies tend to keep to themselves, away from humans; and this is followed by the
following exchange:
Betsy Marston (High Country News interviewer): So you really hope the
bears disappear into the wild?
Servheen: That’s exactly right.
Fischer: Betsy, keep in mind this is really an expansive area. The
wilderness areas themselves are over two million acres and they’re
surrounded by another three million acres of roadless area. This is the
biggest roadless expanse in the lower 48 States and there’s just no place
better to put grizzly bears with minimal conflict than this area (Servheen
& Fischer, 2001).
The images of grizzly bears in the NWF Flyer also represented them as gentle,
cuddly animals, hardly the “bloodthirsty killers lying in wait to eat you as you pass by”77
feared by an “uninformed and emotional public” (Hays, 1987, p. 9). The top two images
in Figure 5.7 are from the NWF Flyer. For the sake of comparison, they are followed by
two images of grizzlies put forth in hunting/adventure publications. The one at bottom
left is the cover of Some Bears Kill, a book of “exciting, hair-raising tales of bear
encounters” in the wild (Kaniut, 1997). The book is published by Safari press, a publisher
dedicated to publishing “exceptional-quality hardcover books on big-game hunting,
wingshooting, & sporting firearms” (Safari Press, 2004). The image on the bottom right
is from a similarly sensationalist real-life outdoor adventure book. These images,
intentionally sensationalized as they seem, are rather standard representations of the
grizzly bear in ‘sporting’ publications (keeping in mind that hunters were one of the
groups who remained mostly opposed to grizzly reintroduction throughout the debates).
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For Kate Kendall, a biologists who works around grizzlies in the Northern Continental Divide
Ecosystem, this is the common but false perception of grizzlies (Anderson, 2000).
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Figures 5.7. Which of these bears would you like to see reintroduced into your
‘backyard’? The top two images are from the NWF Flyer (NWF, 1997a); The ones at
bottom (from left) are from the book covers of the real-life outdoor adventure tales
Some Bears Kill (Kaniut, 1997) and Man eaters: true tales of animals stalking,
mauling, killing, and eating human prey (Underwood, 2000).
The task at hand was, of course, more than just producing the Bitterroot
Ecosystem as a vast, wild place and representing grizzly bears as charismatic,
unthreatening animals. The CMC promotional literature also produces a deliberate
rhetoric of inevitability. If the elaborated production of the Bitterroots placeness was
directed at regional (producing the BE as big enough to safely contain a recovered grizzly
population) and extra-regional (producing the BE as a classic wild, Western place78)
audiences, then the rhetoric of inevitability, I would argue, was directed more so at a
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And the NWF and Defenders of Wildlife did work to garner documented support for Bitterroot grizzly
reintroduction from their large, affluent national constituencies by sending out mailers with form letters to
send to the USFWS.

140

subset of the regional audience – those regional residents who still felt outright
opposition was a viable strategic standpoint.
Still on page one of the NWF flyer, the ESA mandate for recovery is invoked, but
in a very curious way.
Under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
listed the great bear as a threatened species in 1975. If grizzlies cannot be
reestablished in this vast wilderness, then the species cannot be recovered
in the lower 48 states (NWF, 1997b, p. 1, emphasis in original).
The first sentence is straightforward and correct. The second sentence is inconsistent with
the logic of the CMC alternative; it actually makes a better argument for the Conservation
Biology proposal. The CB alternative is the plan that argues that only with the Bitterroot
population recovered – and connected to the existing populations to form a healthy
metapopulation – can the grizzly ever be considered truly recovered in the lower 48
States. A nonessential experimental population, however, you will remember is defined
as one “the loss of which would [not] be likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of
survival of the species in the wild” (Sullins, 2001, p. 135). It is difficult to convincingly
argue in the same breath that a recovered Bitterroot population is necessary to lower 48
recovery and at the same time acknowledge that loss of the Bitterroot population does not
reduce the likelihood of the survival of the species.79
Instilling an effective rhetoric of inevitability was important for proponents of the
CMC alternative. The main regional supporters they were courting (primarily the timber
industry but others as well) were not, for the most part, environmental advocates who
needed to be sold on the ecological legitimacy of the proposal. Bill Mulligan, the timber
operator from Kamiah, Idaho, had a “concern” that the grizzly would become the spotted
owl of the region. This is not concern for the grizzly’s ecological viability (though it does
not preclude such concern). This is a fear of intrusive Federal management that could
shut down logging in the region’s national forests. At an early (1993) Interagency Grizzly
Bear Committee meeting convened to discuss the possibility of Bitterroot grizzly
reintroduction (well prior to the development of the CMC alternative) a representative
from Resource Organization on Timber Supply (or ‘ROOTS,’ one of the two main timber
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Additionally, all the while the Bitterroot grizzly debates were taking place, the FWS was examining the
possibility of delisting the Yellowstone population of grizzly bears altogether.
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industry groups that winded up endorsing the proposal) publicly expressed “the timber
industry’s ardent opposition to bringing bears back to Idaho” (Anderson, 2000).
Sure, some with similar vested interests in continued resource extraction on the
national forests might have had the ecological sensibilities to support a compromise
grizzly recovery plan whether or not it was going to happen anyway. If grizzly recovery
in the Bitterroots was perceived as inevitable, however, then every such interested party
would be wise seek some sort of compromise plan that assures that grizzly recovery will
not halt resource extraction activities on Federal lands. Indeed, many who spoke at the
DEIS public meetings echoed such sentiments:
I fully believe that the Federal Government is going to reintroduce bears
over all objections from citizens of Idaho. I don’t believe there’s a thing
we can do about that… So then for me the question became, who’s going
to be managing these bears that we’re going to have? (USFWS, 1997b, p.
78)
I believe this is what Congress had in mind when it passed the Endangered
Species Act … So the question today is not …whether we like grizzlies or
not, it is how are we going to recover grizzly bears? (USFWS, 1997b, p.
95)
I’ve gone to all these bear meetings. Ninety percent of the people don’t
want it, but they’re going to do it anyway. (USFWS, 1997b, p. 140-1)
Should the ultimate decision be to introduce this grizzly bear without
question, the most viable alternative is the alternative that says we will do
it with local people… I think that if we are forced to take them, then we
should take them with the [citizen] management system. (USFWS, 1997d,
p. 103)
Current law leaves decisions regarding reintroduction to the US Fish and
Wildlife Service – the agency that proposed the reintroduction scheme and
appears intent on following it through. For that reason, and despite our
own doubts about the wisdom of reintroducing the grizzly, Potlatch
Corporation supports… the preferred alternative in the Draft EIS.
(USFWS, 1997d, p. 33)
Perhaps here we have the seeds of a productive tension between national priorities
and local practice (Cooper, 1996) – a national citizenry committed to protecting
endangered species (and committed to other environmental issues as well) but one at the
same time willing to experiment with some devolution of authority and flexibility in the
manner in which this commitment is accomplished. I will have much more to say on this
in the following two chapters.
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“Bear Wars,” a quasi-documentary television production produced by the
National Wildlife Federation and Turner Original Productions, employs both the
production of place and inevitability rhetorics as well. The first thing that is established in
the film is the setting of the controversy, the place – the heretofore little-known Bitterroot
Ecosystem. In the opening sequence, viewing the Bitterroot Ecosystem in dramatic
broad-scale aerial shots from a handheld camera in a small plane, we are told:
Bear used to live here, on the Idaho/Montana border in the Bitterroot
Mountains, but the last grizzly in the area disappeared in the 1940s. Now
there’s a plan to reintroduce grizzly bears here, to start a new grizzly
population in the last pristine place in the lower 48 states… These are the
Bitterroot Mountains. They form the core of a huge wilderness area that
crosses the Idaho/Montana border… I am here now to explore the last best
hope for grizzlies in the lower 48 states… In fact, there haven’t been
grizzlies in the Bitterroots for half a century. People keep looking, but they
haven’t found them.80 But it is prime grizzly country. 5,600 square miles
of protected wilderness, that’s the size of Rhode Island and Connecticut
combined, surrounded by 20,000 square miles of national forests. Throw
in New Jersey, twice… Flying east to west, we saw no human
development for over an hour; from north to south, it takes twice as long.
And it’s a six day float on the Salmon River (Anderson, 2000).
There is little need for me to rehash what I just argued about the production of the
Bitterroots as a classic western landscape, as a place, but a place lacking without
grizzlies. That is all quite clearly here as well. The chosen reference marks for the size of
the place (Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey) seem to point to a extra-regional
audience, consistent with my previous observations. Mark Van Putten, President of
National Wildlife Federation, sent a letter to every NWF member with an enclosed
petition urging them to write the USFWS director pledging their support for the CMC
alternative. His letter draws on the same familiar imagery:
80

This is a reference to one of the many subplots of the Bitterroot grizzly debates that I will not be
discussing at any length. Many environmentalists – CB alternative supporters all – argued for years that the
nonessential experimental reintroduction was illegal on the grounds that there were still grizzlies living in
the Bitterroots. Many people on both sides of the debates (meaning the FWS, out to prove that there were
no grizzlies, and CB supporters, out to prove that there were) spent a lot of time trying to assess the
possibility that a few grizzlies remained in the BE. Despite the efforts, no verifiable evidence of a grizzly –
no tracks, scat, prints, hair, photograph, etc. – was ever produced. The FWS eventually made the
determination that there were probably zero grizzlies in the BE, and that there was no reason to believe that
there was a viable reproducing population of grizzlies in the ecosystem – the presence of which would
have made the experimental reintroduction illegal under ESA Section 10 (this information is from the
extensive files on the Bitterroot reintroduction efforts housed at the US Fish and Wildlife Region 6 grizzly
bear conservation office in Missoula, Montana).
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The Bitterroot sits high in the Rocky Mountains of Idaho and Montana.
It’s an isolated place. No highway exit ramps reach its lonely, grassy
slopes. No paved roads come within miles. No telephone lines. No fancy
homes to take in its finest views.81 No sign of civilization at all! But the
sad truth is this. A grizzly hasn’t been seen in the Bitterroots since the
1940s. And without this area as a haven, grizzly bears come closer to
extinction in a part of our nation where they once roamed freely. Without
the grizzly, the Bitterroot Wilderness area can never be complete! (NWF,
1997b, p. 4, emphasis in original).
The CMC advocacy literature as such employs a deliberate and effective “production of
place” (Miewald & McCann, 2004). As Miewald and McCann argue, “some places,
rather than others, are defined as the appropriate and legitimate locations for particular
activities while being connected with and set in relation to other scales” (Miewald &
McCann, 2004, p. 1046). The wilderness is a place for grizzlies (and people); the
surrounding national forests are a place for people (and grizzlies); the surrounding private
lands are for people only, a “grizzly bear exclusion area” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 2-5). Such
scales and appropriated places are produced, and often contested. What scale(s), what
place(s), are necessary for grizzly recovery in the Lower 48? Well, clearly we don’t really
know. The CB and CMC alternatives both produce the BE as necessary, but in very
different ways, diverging radically on the question of which “particular activities” are
“appropriate and legitimate” on Federal lands.
“Bear Wars” also asserts the inevitability of Bitterroot grizzly recovery, but it is
snuck into the narrative in a clever way. Early in the film, the narrator compares the
grizzly reintroduction debates to the earlier controversies over wolf reintroduction. The
story begins by citing the differences between the two plans, highlighting the CMC
advantages of the grizzly plan. The story is told along these lines: Wolves were
reintroduced to central Idaho and Yellowstone as a nonessential experimental population,
but without citizen management, and the whole issue was still perceived as a very federal
affair. Local papers jumped on the chance to ridicule (Democrat) Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt flying in for the photo-op of carrying a wolf (in a kennel) to the reintroduction
site and personally releasing the wolf from its kennel back into Yellowstone. Wolves
81

Though this statement is not really accurate at all. There may be no “fancy homes” along the ridgetops of
the mountains themselves, but Hamilton County, Montana, in the Bitterroot Valley just east of the
wilderness (and containing some of the “finest views” of the east flank of the Bitterroots you will find) is
home to some of the most expensive and outlandish trophy homes anywhere in Montana.
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have long been a hated and literally demonized species by many Americans, but they are
charismatic animals and their conservation is widely supported throughout the
environmental community. Wolf reintroduction succeeded despite fierce local opposition
to the plan, but the lack of citizen control made the issue very polarizing within local
communities. Stressing the polarized outcome is a plug for the CMC – an appeal to locals
and moderate opponents. This audience now more at ease – this hole opened – the
inevitability rhetoric is quickly inserted. Grizzly reintroduction in the Bitterroots, we are
told, will succeed as well. Pam Houston, the narrator of “Bear Wars,” paints wolves and
grizzlies as
symbols of conflict between national conservation policy and local
concerns. But bringing back a threatened or endangered species, isn’t a
faint hope or a nice idea, it’s the law. The American people have made it
clear that we’re going to recover species, like the wolf, the grizzly bear,
and the spotted owl (Anderson, 2000).
Notice what species bookend the grizzly bear. The wolf: recovered via the ESA
over the protestations of ranchers. The spotted owl: recovered via the ESA over the
protestations of loggers. The discourse of inevitability is a subtle strongarming technique
designed to make outright opposition appear to be a futile standpoint. Later in the film,
while whittling away at the bear/human conflict issues, the inevitability is reasserted:
It’s really not a problem between people and bears. It’s a problem between
people. Maybe once we realize that Bitterroot grizzlies aren’t going to ruin
our economy or eat our children, maybe then we can start to get along.
Bears are coming back. It’s going to happen (Anderson, 2000).
As in the EIS, the CMC emerges as a hallmark of NWF’s advocacy campaign. In
the EIS, the CMC was foreground both by its location in the document (being the first
component of the alternative explained) and through the considerable allocation of space
it was given. The flyer and the film each foreground the place of the Bitterroot
Ecosystem first, but that is an understandable strategy, as was argued. The reader/viewer
must be made to care about the place before they’ll ever care about the issue. That
headline status noted, the CMC still commands the majority of the space in the NWF
flyer, with fully three columns devoted to its explanation – compared to one column total
discussing the place, the bear’s conservation status, and the ESA mandate for recovery. In
the flyer’s description of the CMC, there is no mention of the CB alternative or of
outright opponents of BE grizzly recovery. The CMC coalition is represented as a
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collaborative effort between conservation and timber industry groups. The two are
represented as historical adversaries who have come together to develop “a commonsense solution to grizzly recovery [that would] bring local communities together, rather
than polarizing them around yet another endangered species debate” (NWF, 1997a, p. 3).
Common sense itself is rather difficult to demonstrate – common sense merely is what is
reasonable. What can be demonstrated, however, is a lack of common sense. Appeals to
common sense work best when it can be demonstrated that existing alternatives are
unreasonable. The flyer merely tries to assert the case for the CMC proposal on its own
terms. The television special “Bear Wars,” however, provides vivid imagery of those who
lack the common sense to support the proposal.

5.8. Conclusion: Marking the ‘Radical Center’
In the “Bear Wars” television special, FWS Grizzly Bear Recovery Coordinator
Chris Servheen refers to the CMC proposal as the “radical center” (Anderson, 2000).
This “radical center” moniker was clearly deliberately deployed. On National Wildlife
Federation’s promotional websites advocating the CMC proposal that were online until
some time after Norton shelved the proposal, NWF attorney Tom France marks the NWF
position as “the radical center – the place where long-term solutions get constructed by
finding common ground instead of nurturing old differences” (NWF, 2001, paragraph
19). Radical, I assume, connoting that the CMC is cutting edge, experimental, threatening
to the uninformed. Not surprisingly, after Servheen places the FWS and CMC alternative
in the “center,” the groups on either side of the center are immediately represented, as
would be expected, as rather unreasonable. Here we have a perfect demonstration of the
exhibition of an expert program where the supporters (the CMC-supporting interviewees
in the film, the self-identified “center”) are “knowledgeable and rational experts” while
their counterparts are represented as “the uniformed and emotional public” (Hays, 1987,
p. 9). First we are shown a video clip from a public meeting organized by the FWS where
timber representatives were making their case for supporting the CMC and being
committed to grizzly recovery. “Left” of center is then represented by a young, bearded
hippie-looking man pounding his fist into his palm while shouting at the timber industry
representatives:
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How are we to trust you as a player in this grizzly bear recovery game,
when you as an industry can’t even commit to sustainability on the land
that’s already been logged? The industry has cut and run in the East. It has
done the same in the Midwest. It intends to do the same here. And then go
to Siberia if necessary (Anderson, 2000).
Immediately following this clip, Servheen calmly states that “extreme
environmentalists think we’re not doing enough. Many people who are against grizzly
bears and concerned about Federal Government activities think we’re doing way too
much.”
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“extreme

82

environmentalist.” This is an economical way of dismissing a critique of the plan that –
when fairly assessed – is not historically inaccurate, uninformed, or really unreasonable
sounding whatsoever. This shot was likely chosen less for its content (which is not selfevidently dismissible) and more due to the “emotion” displayed and perhaps also that the
person looked the part of an Earth First!er. After the “extreme environmentalist” and
Servheen’s response, we are treated to a video shot of an outright opponent of grizzly
recovery in the BE. A grizzled (pardon the pun) “Old West”-looking type (rough,
windblown and sun-scorched skin, blue collar cap with an Idaho agricultural group logo,
western-style shirt, beard, gruff voice) makes his case against grizzly reintroduction:
I am against grizzly bears. [long pause] And a bunch of people I know are
against grizzly bears, and if you introduce them – which you will, we know
that – they won’t last very long. I can assure you of that. They’ll be
wherever their collar is. You’ll be able to track them real easy. And that’s
not a personal threat against them, I’m just saying I’ve heard a lot of
comments and I believe that’s true (Anderson, 2000).
Servheen does not comment on this threat. We are left to decide for ourselves the
validity of being “against grizzly bears.” And I would say that this sentiment in itself
does come across as, well, unreasonable. And when followed by the “frontier justice”83
threat of vigilante-style shooting of the reintroduced grizzlies, the perspective flies right
off the radar of reasonableness. When you hear considerable applause from the sizable
crowd assembled as the speaker left the podium, the impression is quite effective: There
82

It is interesting how “radical,” when part of the label “radical center,” takes on a positive connotation, but
“extreme” when part of “extreme environmentalist” takes on a negative connotation. No one, of course,
self-identifies as an “extreme environmentalist.”
83
That clip was followed by the narrator describing the “frontier justice” attitude of some opponents of
recovery: “Among those who’ve got a grudge against grizzlies, you’ll hear talk about the ‘3 S’s’, shoot,
shovel, and shut up. That kind of frontier justice – killing a Federally protected species – is pretty rare, very
illegal, and incredibly stupid.”
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are opponents; they are not necessarily only few and far between; they are angry; they are
unreasonable.
In the assessment of the EIS, I argued that foregrounding the experimental
nonessential population status and the CMC – perhaps even at the expense of making a
clear case for grizzly recovery itself – showed that the CMC supporters were
unapologetic in courting the timber industry. “Bear Wars” mirrors this forthrightness
regarding the concessions and compromises, but in addition provides two subtle images
that further mark their allegiance to the timber industry (and against anti-timber
“extreme” environmentalism). The first of these is during the interview with Kamiah,
Idaho timberman Bill Mulligan. When he mentions the perceived threat of the grizzly
becoming “the spotted owl of the region,” a clip of a spotted owl perched in a tree is
shown for a few seconds – long enough for many viewers to recognize that the stand of
trees where the owl is perching is not old growth but second growth, with the largest trees
being maybe ten-to-twelve inches in diameter. I see this as something of a nudge-and-awink to timber interests, and I am quite sure that few environmental groups in the region
would use this image in an advocacy documentary. During the spotted owl debates in the
1980s and 90s, a large amount of the controversy surrounded the question of the
ecological relationship between spotted owls and old growth forests. Environmentalists
argued that spotted owls required old growth trees to reproduce and hence spotted owl
protection necessitated old growth protection. Timber groups, on the other hand, had their
own sets of studies (many developed too late to influence the outcome) that presumed to
show that spotted owls were beginning to utilize second growth forests as well (Proctor,
1998b). A spotted owl perched in what is clearly a relatively young second-growth forest
– and this was the only spotted owl image in the film – employs a powerful symbol but
does so in a way unthreatening to timber interests. It is possible of course that the choice
of this particular spotted owl imagery was accidental, but I doubt any astute
environmental filmmaker would have casually and/or accidentally done so.
A second image in the film just as directly favors timber over environmentalism
(at least “extreme” environmentalism) and must have been chosen intentionally as so by
the Bear Wars filmmakers. Pam Houston’s final narration in the film:
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Next time I ride through this wilderness, all my senses will be working
overtime. It’s a feeling we all deserve. Of begin alive and attuned to the
world around us. A feeling you always get [long pause] in bear country
(Anderson, 2000).
How is “bear country” represented in the finale of the film? After the final narration we
are taken to another aerial pan of a landscape, presumably somewhere in the Bitterroot
Ecosystem, but the shot is dominated by an older clearcut covered with young regrowth.
We then pan out to see this second-growth as just a small part of a huge forest with
spectacular mountain peaks in the background. If this is bear country, then the CMC
alternative will work – wilderness areas and ‘multiple use’ forests taken together
comprise bear country. The image and attendant claims also work to directly counter the
main thesis of the Conservation Biology alternative – that grizzlies require “true”
wilderness and all compromise plans are insincere efforts at recovering the species.
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Chapter 6. Reconsidering the Conservation Biology Alternative: Ethics,
Science, and the Paradox of Saving Wild Nature
6.1. An Introduction to a Problematic Situation
This chapter raises the difficult question of how to begin judging the rival
conservation alternatives for grizzly recovery. We can view them as moral-ethical
projects. We can assess which effort would represent the ‘best available science’. We can
assess their practicality – would effort ‘x’ have a chance at ever being implemented? Was
the Conservation Biology alternative too ‘extreme’? Did the Citizen Management
Committee alternative represent (yet another) unacceptable compromise? The myriad –
seemingly infinite – angles from which to assess environmental debate point to the sheer
complexity of environmental issues, but also open up avenues for empirical analysis. This
is, after all, the pockmarked ground from which ‘environmental problems’ arise – the
same ground upon which solutions are crafted and our environmental opinions formed.
Even with over seventy percent of grizzly recovery supporters endorsing the
Conservation Biology alternative, this critical mass of support could not escape the
tensions and contradictions that the complexity of the situation produced. Through an
analysis of ethical considerations and political models within the debates, I seek to
explain both the presence of the near-consensus in favor of the Conservation Biology
alternative and the persistence of ambivalence among its most vocal opponents.

6.2. The Best of Both Worlds?: Grizzly Recovery, Rewilding, and
Environmental Ethics
Environmental ethics involves thinking about what nonhuman nature(s) we care
about and why (and to what degree) we care about them (Proctor, 2001).84 Whether their
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Here Proctor is referring to what he calls “popular environmental ethics” and not the more arcane
academic environmental ethics, which might be better thought of anyway in the broader sense of
“environmental philosophy.” These are not, of course, exclusive realms. Much popular environmental
ethics is informed and influenced by environmental philosophy. Venn diagrams of the two would, I
suppose, overlap. Deep ecology, even, to draw on an easy example that’s already been discussed in this
dissertation, represents this well. It has a (more or less) scholarly form (Katz, 1997; Katz et al., 2000b;
Mathews, 2001; Naess, 1973) as well as (again, more or less) popular writings tying its ‘philosophy’
directly to personal and occasionally political action/choice (Naess, 1989; Turner, 1996) – the two ‘forms’
of which inform each other and are not exclusive of one another. Due to the degree to which deep ecology,
biocentrism, moral monism, et cetera influence and persist as the dominant readings/applications of
environmental ethics for environmentalism in the Rocky Mountain Northwest (a point I hope to have
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bases be utilitarian, economic, aesthetic, scientific, religious, or whatever, it is undeniable
that ‘our’ (if I may, people with definitive feelings toward one or more environmental
‘issue’) environmental ethics – these selective concerns for nature – go a long way to
determining which environmental causes we rally around, and what stances we take in
these causes. This is, of course, no secret to those who solicit public support for
environmental causes. As such, every “conventional [environmental] account cries out
for our moral attention” (Proctor, 2001, p. 236).
What are the moral aspects of the arguments for recovering grizzly bears in the
Bitterroots? Indirectly, most of these have been established in previous chapters, but it is
worth initiating this specific discussion of the environmental ethics of Bitterroot grizzly
recovery by reexamining how, exactly, different groups demanded our ‘moral attention’,
plead for us to care. For CMC proponents,
Grizzlies were shot, poisoned, and trapped out of the Selway-Bitterroot
country, and by the 1940s [they] had been eliminated… [T]he forests and
mountains of this immense land remain empty of one of North America’s
most impressive creatures (NWF, 1997a, p. 2).
As the sun rises over the snow-capped peaks of the Bitterroot Mountains
… a grizzly bear lumbers up to the bank of the Selway River. She is
followed by a pair of cubs…This is the goal, now close within reach, of the
Citizen Management Committee Alternative … to return the magnificent
grizzly bear to its native habitat in the Bitterroot Mountains (NWF, 2001,
paragraph 1, italics in original).
Humans eliminated grizzlies from this vast wild area. This is a moral wrong that can be
righted by returning ‘the grizzly bear’ (in the abstract, as a ‘species’85) to this part of its
home. Until this wrong is righted, the Bitterroot Ecosystem is incomplete. Alliance for
the Wild Rockies’ “Citizen Guide to Grizzly Bear Recovery” similarly cries out for our
moral attention:
established within this dissertation) I will not employ a popular/scholarly environmental ethics split, but
rather work under the assumption that the two determine each other dialectically.
85
Here acknowledging the slipperiness itself, the questionability, of thinking of the grizzly bear in the
lower 48 States as a “species.” Do people care about species? Many if not most probably do. A species is,
by definition, something objectively unique. Uniqueness is the source of diversity, a concept widely
accepted as positive and good (Takacs, 1996). Do people care about subspecies? Maybe, but the case is not
as clearcut. It would, I think, depend on the context and the way it was presented. Stated another way,
fewer people would espouse a concern for the protection of subspecies than species in the abstract. Do
people care about populations? Considering that every tree contains distinct populations of this or that
species of insect, for example, the answer would almost have to be ‘no’. Individual populations can be
endangered, and popular concern for particular populations can arise, but it takes considerable work on the
part of environmentalists to make it happen.
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Through unrelenting manipulation and destruction of grizzly bear habitat
and a vigorous shooting, poisoning and trapping campaign, the bears were
eventually extirpated from most of their historical range… The grizzly
bear is known as a keystone or umbrella species, serving as a natural
barometer of ecosystem health. If grizzlies are present, it means that the
land itself is healthy and productive (AWR, 1997).
Emphases vary, but both narratives tug at the same heartstrings. This common ground of
concern was shared by supporters of the Conservation Biology Alternative and many
(one would hope most) of the supporters of the CMC Alternative as well.86 While the
supporters of the two alternatives diverged beyond this common ground on many points
of contention, one point of divergence that is relevant and interesting in the context of
environmental ethics centers on the question of how, exactly, the different alternatives
proposed getting bears back into the Bitterroot, and additionally, how to manage them
once they were there. The major point of contention centered on whether reintroduction
or recolonization should be the preferable and primary means of promoting recovery in
the Bitterroots. For CMC proponents, it was (on paper) a straightforward matter: at least
five bears per year would be taken from existing populations in the lower 48 states and
southern Canada to form a seed population from which the nonessential experimental
population would grow (USFWS, 2000a). For supporters of the CB alternative, the
primary means of reestablishing a Bitterroot population would be through natural
recolonization, enabled by reopening of the corridor to the northern Idaho grizzly
populations (though reintroduction was included as a potential supplement if deemed
necessary). Supporters of the CB alternative voiced two main gripes with the forced
reintroduction and management presented in the CMC alternative.
The first revolved around the following claim put forth in the CMC alternative as
published in the Draft EIS:
Subadult grizzly bears of both sexes would be trapped, each year for 5
years, from areas in Canada (in cooperation with Canadian authorities)
86

In this “many if not most CMC supporters” I would include Hank Fischer and Chris Servheen and their
cohorts at Defenders of Wildlife/National Wildlife Federation/USFWS. I would also include the tens of
thousands of supporters that were drawn from the ranks of these powerful organizations. Additionally, I
would include those with interests in the regional timber economy who also held sincere interests in seeing
Bitterroot grizzlies recovered, as well as the non-timber-related groups who endorsed the CMC Alternative,
most prominently “sportsmen’s” organizations such as the Montana Wildlife Association. Excluded would
be those timber-allies who signed on merely to ward off the potential of a fully protected ESA grizzly
population in the region, either through reintroduction, recolonization, or rediscovery.
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and the United States that presently have healthy populations of grizzly
bears living in habitats that are similar to those found in the Bitterroot
Ecosystem. Three sources of grizzly bears for the BE have been
identified: southeast British Columbia, the Northern Continental Divide
Ecosystem (NCDE) population in northwest Montana, and the
Yellowstone Ecosystem (YE) population. Specific numbers of bears that
could be obtained yearly from potential source populations is [sic]
unknown at this time. Some undetermined level of mortality is expected
among transplanted bears (USFWS, 1997a, p. xvi).87
This claim is riddled with logistical and logical problems, both of which were exploited
by opponents. For one, “Canadian authorities” had never acquiesced to the idea of being
able or willing to hand over any young bears for the project, much less the five per year
that would have been needed if they were not to resort to taking bears from ESA-listed
populations in the lower 48 states.88 If the transfer had been approved, Canadian
environmentalists were considering mounting a campaign against it (Dee, 1997). Without
the assurance that Canadian bears would be available, the FWS had to find additional
source populations. So the NCDE and Yellowstone populations were recast as “healthy
populations of grizzly bears.” This move puts the FWS, and any environmentalists who
would choose to endorse it, in something of a quandary. It is difficult to claim that the
NCDE and Yellowstone grizzly bears populations are ‘threatened’ – needing and
deserving their fully protected status under the ESA – and at the same time claim that
these populations are “healthy” and include expendable, surplus bears.
There is no absolute contradiction, here, of course. It could undoubtedly be
argued, and probably even scientifically demonstrated, that these populations are
‘threatened’ (“not yet in danger of extinction, but … likely to become endangered within
the foreseeable future”) yet still able to withstand the loss of one or two subadult grizzlies
per year over a period of only five years. But as any grizzly ecology study will tell you,
human-induced mortality is one of the greatest, if not the greatest threat to the grizzly
bear’s long-term viability (Craighead, 1979; Craighead et al., 1995; Maguire & Servheen,
1992; Mattson et al., 1996; Mattson & Reid, 1991; Pease & Mattson, 1999; Primm,
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This entire passage is repeated in three places of the Draft EIS, on pages xxii, 2-82, and 2-106. The
wording was nearly unchanged in the Final EIS.
88
This was made clear in a number of memos and written correspondences between USFWS and Canadian
wildlife managers, many of whom were members of the binational (US and Canada) Interagency Grizzly
Bear Committee.
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1996). As an animal with a very low reproductive rate (females reproducing on average
every 3-5 years with an average litter of only two cubs (Craighead et al., 1995)), small
losses of young bears and reproductive-age females can have dramatic effects on the
population as a whole.89 Therefore, it is quite easy to contend that if the NCDE and
Yellowstone grizzlies are threatened, then they can ill afford to be losing the very bears
(especially young females) that are the key to their survival.
Moreover, the Yellowstone/NCDE “healthy populations” claim can only be taken
so far and still work logically for Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction. For if these
populations are indeed ‘healthy’ enough to be considered recovered, the FWS should be
moving toward delisting these populations – removing them from the ESA altogether.90 If
the lower 48 grizzly bear is not indeed in danger of becoming extinct, the justification for
reintroducing grizzly bears to the Bitterroot is weak at best. These inconsistencies were
not lost on opponents of the FWS’s preferred alternative. This is one of the six bulleted
“problems with the government’s preferred alternative” listed in AWR’s “Citizen Guide”
pamphlet.91 Nearly every CB alternative supporter who testified at the Draft EIS public
hearings made explicit their objections to the possibility of taking bears from existing
endangered populations. This line of argumentation was not, however, the exclusive
domain of CB supporters. Several outright opponents of reintroduction used this as
evidence that the premise of the entire project was unsound.
Some testimonials objected to the concept of translocating bears on more
explicitly ethical grounds. There has long been noted an “animal rights versus species
preservation” (Wenz, 2001, p. 132) dilemma in environmental ethics. The relocated
grizzly bears were being subjected to management practices that can be questioned on
animal rights grounds. Being drugged, captured, radiocollared and released far from
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Indeed, 2004 was a rough year for grizzly bears in southern Alberta as well as the NCDE population.
Each of these populations suffered unsustainable losses, particularly of reproductive-age females, due to
human-caused mortality. 31 bears, including 19 females, were lost from the NCDE population, the most
since 1974, the year prior to the bear’s ESA listing (Mann, 2004). It is difficult to imagine that, had the
reintroduction efforts proceeded, NCDE grizzlies would have been available for transplant in 2005.
90
The Greater Yellowstone population may be delisted as early as this year (2005) (Black, 2005; Gearino,
2004).
91
This problem was headlined “Source Bears May Not Be Available” in the pamphlet, and referred to the
possibility of taking bears from lower 48 populations as “an alarming move” (AWR, 1997,p .8).
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home must, it seem, be traumatic to some degree to these highly intelligent animals.92
And this does not even consider those bears whose death would result from
complications associated with the translocation process (as acknowledged will happen to
an unspecified number of bears in the above passage). Individual bears, in other words,
are being asked at best to suffer and at worst to die for the cause of reintroducing bears to
the Bitterroots. Perhaps this is an unnecessary dilemma as, according to CB supporters,
an alternative exists that does not subject bears to these cruelties and dangers. The
objection to intensive and intrusive management was most colorfully argued in one
testimonial at the Lewiston hearings:
The grizzly is a beautiful animal … but one of the grossest acts of animal
cruelty that I have seen in Montana [has been fitting] grizzlies with radio
collars. Imagine yourself going out here in the parking lot, somebody
shoots you in the rump with a hypodermic needle, puts you in a cage
behind a pickup, two hundred miles across bumpy roads, into a helicopter,
flies you some place, you are penned up for six weeks and they dump you
in Little Rock, Arkansas. Are you going to be happy? Are you going to be
stressed out? (USFWS, 1997d, p. 79)
Here, it seems, is one area where the CB alternative makes a more (eco)logically
sound and less ethically questionable case. Consistent with the rewilding goal of
(re)granting nature autonomy (Noss et al., 1999), this critique of intensive and intrusive
wildlife management represents a laudable ideal for possible future human/nonhumannature relations. From where do these objections arise? Is traditional wildlife
management an ethically defensible practice? The grizzly bear management literature is
replete with techniques that might well appear objectionable to many.
I will draw my examples from the work of Frank and John Craighead, inarguably
the most innovative and influential early grizzly bear researchers. The Craighead brothers
studied grizzly bears in Yellowstone National Park between 1959 and 1971 and
continued to research grizzlies in the Yellowstone Ecosystem (but outside of the national
park) for more than two decades thereafter.93 The Craigheads’ “pioneering grizzly bear
92

And I understand the metaphor of trauma here is anthropomorphic, but it seems like the only logical
descriptor.
93
They left Yellowstone National Park after a heated dispute with park bear managers over artificial
feeding of grizzlies at the park’s garbage dumps. Grizzly bears had been encouraged to feed at these dumps
for generations (going back at least to 1916) (Craighead et al., 1995, p. 328). In 1971, a new park
management staff responded to pressure from scientists and interest groups who argued that grizzlies’
feeding on garbage was unnatural and should be stopped. The Craigheads vociferously disagreed with this
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research … [was] the first to relate bears’ use of habitat … to a greater ecosystem model”
(Clark et al., 1999, p. 3). In 1961 the Craigheads invented the radiocollar, a signalemitting device that fits around the neck of an animal. Radiocollars allow researchers and
managers to locate and track grizzly bears. For an animal as elusive to human presence as
the grizzly, radiocollaring and tracking enabled the Craigheads to amass in a few years
more data on grizzly bears than all that previously existed. Frank Craighead’s 1977
popular natural history Track of the Grizzly describes their experiences in the field.
Chapter 1 of the book, “The Bear Marian,” details the process of radiocollaring their first
Yellowstone grizzly. The following image (Figure 6.1) is from the chapter’s first page.

Figure 6.1. “The Bear Marian,” cover page from Chapter 1 of Frank Craighead’s
1979 popular natural history book Track of the Grizzly (Craighead, 1979, p. 13)
In this drawing, the bear is represented (rather gratuitously, it seems) as gentle and
feminine. The radiocollar, in tandem with the ear tags, augments the feminized aesthetic
by appearing almost as jewelry. This imagery is hardly played down in the text, where
Marian is described in as “fickle,” a “timid young female,” and displaying “coyness”
before a potential suitor (Craighead, 1979, pp. 50, 54, 53).94 The radiocollar, however,

proposal, pleading with the Park Service to at least phase out the dump closures over several years. The
Park Service ignored the Craigheads’ advice, and the resulting hostility led to the end of their research in
Yellowstone. The grizzly population in Yellowstone declined significantly after the dump closures, as the
Craigheads predicted would happen (Craighead et al., 1995).
94
Lest I be accused of mocking this rhetoric with my use of the term “suitor” for her mate, let the record
show that the author was equally anthropomorphic, as Marian’s “flirting” with the male bear Inge was
followed by twenty minutes of “lovemaking” (p. 54). For a considerably more detailed examination of the
Craigheads’ fascinating yet curious anthropomorphic gendering of the Yellowstone grizzly bears, see my
“Grizzly Conservation and the Nature of Essentialist Politics” (Hintz, 2003).
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does not play second fiddle to natural history (or the “love” story for that matter). Marian
was not just a coy and timid female grizzly bear. As of September 22, 1961 she became
“a free-roaming electronic instrument of science” (p. 14). Track of the Grizzly and
brother John’s The Grizzly Bears of Yellowstone (a much larger book published almost
twenty years later, and one geared more toward a scientific than popular audience)
provide plenty of photos graphically depicting the often-intrusive nature of grizzly bear
fieldwork.

Figure 6.2. Grizzly bear fieldwork practice 1: “Taking a milk sample from a
lactating female grizzly” (Craighead, 1979, p. 86+).
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Figure 6.3. Grizzly bear fieldwork practice 2: “John and Frank Craighead remove a
young drugged grizzly from a culvert trap” (Craighead, 1979, p. 86+).

Figure 6.4. Grizzly bear fieldwork practice 3: “Each marked animal was given
permanent lip (right) and underarm (left) tattoos” (Craighead et al., 1995, p. 61).
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Figure 6.5. Grizzly bear fieldwork practice 4: “To establish the age of adult bears,
one of the fourth premolars was removed, thin-sectioned, and stained to reveal
annuli…” (Craighead et al., 1995, p. 59).
My point in providing these images from the Craigheads’ popular and technical
natural history monographs is not to establish grounds for ethical judgments regarding the
rightness or wrongness of these (or any other) wildlife management fieldwork practices
(that would be the subject of a different, but potentially very interesting, research project
altogether). Rather, my intention is to illustrate through these images that wildlife
management does consist of practices that could be perceived as ethically questionable at
the very least. If one was to make this contention, however, it is important to note that the
object of ethical concern is not Ursus arctos horribilis, ‘the grizzly bear’, the ‘species’
listed under the ESA for which recovery plans are being debated. The object of concern,
rather, is individual grizzly bears, those particular animals who would ‘suffer’ for the
greater good of species recovery. But is there an incompatibility between arguing for the
good of species and the rights of individual animals?
Mark Sagoff, a well-respected theorist of environmental policy and law, answers
this question in the affirmative. He justifies his claim of absolute incommensurability
between animal rights advocacy and environmental ethics by pitting his model for
(apparently all) environmentalism, Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic,” against Peter Singer’s
“animal

liberation”

thesis.

Effectively
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conflating

conservation

biology

and

environmentalism, Sagoff argues that “environmentalists” are concerned with preserving
evolutionary processes and are not, cannot, be concerned with the welfare of individual
animals (Sagoff, 2001, p. 94):
An environmentalist’s “obligation to preserve the ‘integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community’95 … implies no duties whatsoever to
individual animals in the community, except in the rare instance in which
an individual is important to the functioning of that community. For the
most part, individual animals are completely expendable (p. 94, emphasis
added).96
Sagoff concludes that “a humanitarian ethic” (from which arguments for animal rights
arise) “will [neither] help us to understand or justify an environmental ethic [nor will it]
provide necessary or valid foundations for environmental law” (Sagoff, 2001, p. 94).97
Reconsidering Killingsworth and Palmer’s horseshoe diagram (Figure 5.4),
Sagoff seems to be endorsing the “new” deep-ecology/science/government alliance
(Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p. 14). But, as I mentioned in the previous chapter (and
as I would argue is exemplified by Sagoff’s reasoning) perceiving ecopolitical identities
as preexisting and mutually exclusive can result in an unnecessary and unproductive
circumscription of possible paths of action. Luckily, whether or not and to what degree
this problem exists in the ‘real world’ of environmental politics can be empirically
examined, even as the results and the implications may or may not be crystal clear. For
example, when a deep ecologist, in assessing the AIDS crisis in Africa, suggests (as
many have) that “nature” should be allowed to take its course (i.e., that we shouldn’t try
to medicate and prolong the lives of African AIDS patients) the connection between
95

The internal quote is the most oft-quoted single passage from Aldo Leopold’s seminal essay “The Land
Ethic” from A Sand County Almanac (Leopold, 1949).
96
And from this passage it is certainly easy to imagine how this concern with wholes over parts would be,
to put it mildly, problematic in the context of human society. Taken literally, as such, not only would the
rights of human individuals be sacrificed for the ecological functioning of the whole society, but the
concerns of humans as a species would have no grounds for preferential treatment over any other species. I
have addressed and will address further the political problems that arise from such “holistic” thinking. I
will not, however, consider to any real degree the potential “problem of ecofascism” (Callicott, 2001b), the
fundamentalist literal reading of ecological holism taken to its logical extreme (Ferry, 1995; Fischer, 2000,
see pp. 111-112 for an excellent and concise summary).
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It should be noted that Sagoff is no outlier here as well. The animal rights versus environmental ethics
‘problem’ is a well-trodden path within environmental ethics (e.g., Callicott, 2001a; Varner, 2003; Wenz,
2001). Even so, I am not attempting any degree of a systematic review of the environmental ethics
literature here. Rather, my point, as it has been all along, is for environmental and social theory to inform
my assessment of the Bitterroot grizzly debates and, secondarily, for my empirical observations of the
debates to inform, as they can, environmental and social theory.
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ideology and action is as straightforward as it is objectionable. In this case, holistic
thinking leads to an ethically objectionable conclusion – the welfare of individual AIDS
victims (and their dependants), sad as the situation may be, must be sacrificed for the
greater good of solving the larger problems of overpopulation, famine, and ecological
degradation.98
In the case of the Bitterroot grizzly debates, however, it appears that an inverse
correlation is at work. The ethically preferable course of action appears to come down in
favor of the Conservation Biology alternative, the recovery alternative most fully (some
might say self-righteously) informed by holistic ecology. In other words, the
holism/concern-for-individuals divide does not empirically hold up in this case. There
was plenty of evidence of deep felt care for grizzly bears (that is, not just ‘the grizzly
bear’) from within the ranks of the Conservation Biology alternative supporters:
I’d like to see grizzly bears in the Bitterroot Ecosystem during my
lifetime, but it’s far more important that we allow bears to return to a place
that provides them with the habitat security and a prospect for long,
undisturbed, lives. We need to grant the bears the respect they deserve and
recover the ecosystem properly even it takes decades or centuries instead
of months (USFWS, 1997e, p. 104).
Our goal should be to restore these magnificent creatures as God intended
them to be; wild, and not as collared and tracked shadows of their natural
selves (USFWS, 1997e, p. 91).
Out of holism, or at least in tandem with holism, has arisen an environmental
ideal (rewilding; the CB alternative) that exhibits what Suzanne Michel calls a “politics
of care” (Michel, 1998) – a way of interacting with, all the while learning about, animals
(individuals and species); a politics that might well be judged ethically preferable to
mainstream, intrusive wildlife management. Michel is part of a small group of “animal
geographers” attempting to envision and enact more preferable modes of human-animal
relations in the “nature-culture borderlands” (Wolch & Emel, 1998). Following this spirit,
it could be argued, for example, that the Craigheads’ field routine of drugging, milking,
tattooing and tooth-pulling is a paradigmatic example of modernist science. The disabled
grizzly bears depicted in the images are, it seems, treated as little more than bits of
98

And for good measure let me note again that political ecologists have done a fine job of debunking the
popular “tragedy of the commons” causal chains of explanation, for example, overpopulation → famine →
ecological degradation.
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“nature – an external, material reality to be classified and quantified” (Michel, 1998, p.
164). The CMC alternative could be critiqued as reinforcing the “modernist … denial of
nature’s agency” through its command-and-control surveillance techniques (Michel,
1998, p. 169). Or, as Michel’s fellow animal geographer William Lynn challenges us to
ponder, somewhere along the line do scientifically managed grizzly bears become mere
objects, “animals [that] lay beyond the boundary of the moral community” (Lynn, 1998,
p. 280)? Who, after all, could argue that drugging/tattooing/tooth-pulling/radiocollaring is
preferable to the rewilding ideals of “[forging] a more comprehensive approach to
protecting whole ecosystems” (Wilcox, 1998, p. 18) or envisioning an Earth “where
nature reigns” (Noss et al., 1999, p. 99)?
This question is only partially rhetorical. Rhetorical, yes, in that rewilders have
presented us with laudable ideals that are, in principal, preferable to establishment
wildlife management. This is one line of inquiry that, however it might be drawn out
further, would seem to invariably fall in favor of the CB alternative. Employing a
methodological environmental pragmatism, however, can lead to a reworking of this very
line of questioning. I will introduce this reworked, pragmatist line of inquiry by tying a
small but representative selection of the environmental pragmatist literature directly to
the issue, the problem, of the grizzly reintroduction debates.

6.3. The Bitterroot Ecosystem: Imperfect Wilderness or Problematic
Situation?
As Andrew Light has noted on multiple occasions, any environmental pragmatism
worthy of the name – whether it be the methodological (Light, 2004; Light & Katz,
1996a), political (Minteer, 2002; Reid & Taylor, 2003), or philosophical (Hickman, 1996;
Robert, 2000) – “accept[s] the public task” of translating what may appear on the surface
as arcane scholarly debate “into terms more likely to morally motivate policy makers and
the general public” (Light, 2004, p. 124). The dominant stance within (at least) the
regional environmental community on the Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction debates was,
as I have demonstrated, supporting the CB alternative and admonishing the CMC
alternative. All signs seemed to point to the CB alternative as being the more
scientifically validated, expertly managed, ethically desirable, even economically
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beneficial99 recovery alternative of the two. I will use environmental pragmatism to
productively challenge this received wisdom on the issue of Bitterroot grizzly recovery. I
find an essay by the environmental pragmatist Ben Minteer particularly helpful as a
springboard from which to reformulate the environmental-ethical and -moral components
of the grizzly reintroduction debates.
In the essay “Beyond Considerability,” Minteer “suggest[s] … that we should
recognize the virtues of an environmental ethical approach that moves beyond
attributions of considerability, one that focuses more of its attention on the experimental
method of moral inquiry and dispute resolution that figures prominently in Dewey’s
work” (Minteer, 2004, p. 98). “Attributions of considerability” refers to the
aforementioned debates within environmental ethics over what bits of nature (e.g.,
individual animals, ecosystems, evolutionary processes) are to be attributed moral
standing. This focus on “general normative principles and broad conceptual issues of
moral standing and moral significance” (p. 104) has led to the articulation of competing
and exclusionary environmental-ethical metatheories, the most prominent of which have
been outlined in this chapter (animal rights versus ecological ethics) and Chapter 4
(anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism). These metatheories are then perceived to map
directly onto (again, competing and exclusionary) environmentalist identities, for
example, the seemingly intractable divide between deep ecologists and social ecologists
(see Figure 5.4).
Instead of assisting our ability to make informed decisions on specific
environmental debates, the rise of these ‘ideal type’ theories and corresponding identities
produces a number of litmus tests (e.g., ‘Is this proposal biocentric?’) that few natural
resource management proposals could ever hope to pass. Imagine if you will what a
biocentric timber sale would look like! (I couldn’t think of one either.) How about a
biocentric proposal for recovering grizzly bears in the Bitterroot Ecosystem? That’s a
little easier to imagine, since that’s exactly what the CB alternative presented. The CB
alternative is untainted by compromise from its biocentric perspective (a point vocally
celebrated by its proponents). The CMC alternative, however, is a literal product of
compromise. The CMC proposal was written first and foremost to succeed, while the CB
99

See Chapter 7, section 2 for a comparative discussion of the economic components of the alternatives.
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alternative was written to live up to an ideal in uncompromising fashion. Comparatively
judging these proposals vis-à-vis “general normative principles and broad conceptual
issues of moral standing and moral significance” (Minteer, 2004, p. 104), as I have
shown, falls in the favor of the CB alternative. It is difficult, for example, to make the
case that the CMC alternative is more ecocentric, or more holistic, or more scientific than
the CB proposal. Similarly, the CMC alternative fails the ecocentric, holistic, and
scientific litmus tests produced by ideal type models.
An “environmentalist” (and who, really, would want to be excluded from this
company?), one who advocates exclusively for ecological processes as per Sagoff
(Sagoff, 2001, see above, this chapter), can only choose the CB alternative. Recalling the
discussion in chapter four, this is Dave Foreman’s (Foreman, 1997) with-us-or-against-us
rhetoric materialized. To drag the George W. Bush metaphor along for one more
sentence, the CMC coalition became the CB supporters’ axis of evil. Debate was
effectively closed.
Minteer’s Deweyan model of environmental pragmatism, by contrast, brings
informed decision making back into the realm of environmental activism. Minteer begins
with Dewey’s “view of moral reasoning as an experimental activity carried out in the
context of specific ‘problematic situations’” (Minteer, 2004, p. 106). Writing in the first
half of the twentieth century, Dewey was offering a corrective to dominant trends in
moral philosophy that are strikingly similar to the obsession with debates over the locus
of moral standing within environmental ethics. Totalizing perspectives – for Dewey,
“[theories] outside of the contingencies of existence and untouched by its vicissitudes”
(Dewey, 1998a, p. 100) – steamroll over context when applied to specific situations. This
critique is by no means specific to Dewey or even to pragmatism – any application of
‘critical theory’ (for example, I hope, this study) would carefully consider the
social/historical/ecological/etc. context of the issue at hand. Neither biocentric ethics nor
ecology challenges their own or each other’s assumptions (Proctor, 2001; Taylor, 2000);
the result being a rather uncritical100 theory (the rewilding model) and practice (the CB
alternative).

100

Paraphrasing Friedrich Sixel, critical perspectives examine the implicit and explicit assumptions of their
objects of analysis (Sixel, 1995). Good science can do an excellent job of scrutinizing its methodological
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The Deweyan model is, by contrast, self-critical and sensitive to context.
Pragmatism embraces value pluralism, recognizing it as an empirically verifiable
condition within and across human societies (Minteer, 2002; Parker, 1996). This latter
point deserves a little elaboration. If, as pragmatism (empirically) finds to be the case,
value pluralism exists everywhere in the world, then pluralism becomes the grounds upon
all which methods of inquiry must begin. Pluralism becomes a necessary methodological
assumption; not, as some might have it, an obstacle to progress.101 Dewey recognized
further that “problematic situations” can only be resolved democratically if they are
solved experimentally. Advocating a “reflective morality”, Dewey argued against “fixed
adherence to a priori principles.” Rather, he insisted that
free inquiry and freedom of publication and discussion must be
encouraged and not merely grudgingly tolerated… It is, in short, a method
of democracy, of a positive toleration which amounts to sympathetic
regard for the intelligence and personality of others, even if they hold
views opposed to ours, and of scientific inquiry into facts and testing of
ideas (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 329, in Minteer, 2004, p. 107).
Pragmatism opposes, then, “addressing only a like-minded audience” (McKenna & Light,
2004, p. 11) or addressing others solely for the purposes of expanding your like-minded
community. Moral and/or102 scientific absolutes cannot, in this model, provide an a priori
unquestioned and unquestionable basis from which to devise programmatic, normative

assumptions (with Pease & Mattson (1999) being an exemplar from the grizzly ecology literature). But as
studies in the philosophy of science (and more recently “science studies”) have demonstrated, natural
science does not tend to include a robust internal critique of its philosophical assumptions or the social
context that at least partially determines scientific practice.
101
Recall George Wuerthner’s (1999) “Selfish Genes, Local Control, and Conservation” essay describe in
Chapter 4, footnote 38.
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“Or” more often than “and,” to be certain, but conservation biologists do sometimes make the case that
theirs is a simultaneously (infallible) moral-scientific enterprise. Paquet and Hackman, for example, in a
‘gray literature’ pamphlet promoting large carnivore conservation in the Northern Rockies, state that the
“philosophical context within which we are promoting this agenda is that natural systems and biological
diversity are good and should be preserved” (Paquet & Hackman, 1995, p. 3). Conservation biology is the
integration of this philosophical context and scientific ecology and “define[s] the ethical foundations for
the[ir] proposed strategy” (p. 3). Their proposal is not insensitive to social context, as the document
includes a separate “sociological context” wherein rural communities should not unfairly shoulder the costs
of conservation programs. I would argue, however, that placing the “ethical foundation” in a unified
philosophical-ethical context wholly separate from the sociological context still fails to completely remove
the “authoritarian edge [from] ecological politics” (Harvey, 1993, p. 21). That is, conservation biology
retains sole possession of ethical right and scientific authority. The social situation is certainly more
complex than the “white hats valiantly fighting black hats” (Luke, 2002, p. 302) narrative, such as when
Paquet and Hackman witness “a growing tension between forces promoting exploitation of natural
resources and those acting to preserve them” (Paquet & Hackman, 1995, p. 21).
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solutions. The Deweyan model of inquiry forces each party to investigate and articulate
the particular points fundamental to their support or opposition to a proposal.
I want to close out this section by thinking about some ways in which Deweyan
pragmatism – as both a model of investigation into problems and a ‘spirit’ of humility
and experimentalism – could have productively informed and guided a follower of the
debates, particularly one leaning toward supporting the CB alternative on environmentalethical grounds. One thing a pragmatist approach could not provide, of course, is an outof-the-box answer to whether specific management practices (e.g., translocation,
radiocollaring) are ethically right or wrong. Rather, it would force us, as concerned
individuals (environmentalists), to think about the specific objections we hold, question
the grounds of these objections, and weigh these considerations in light of the
‘problematic situation’ at hand.103 Stated another way, it provides a method of forging an
intelligent inquiry into our beliefs, which may or may not stand up as truths in particular
situations.
I will take as my example the case of the radiocollar, the most commonly voiced
explicitly ethical objection to the CMC alternative. In the self-critical pragmatist spirit
outlined above, one would first want to scrutinize why one felt offense at the idea of
radiocollared grizzlies. Is the objection to radiocollaring and monitoring an ethical
concern for the welfare of the individual grizzly bears wearing the collars? If so, an
examination of the grizzly bear management literature could reveal that the Craighead
brothers – inventors of the radiocollar and (as was demonstrated earlier in this chapter)
unapologetic promoters of its use and usefulness – shared the concern that wearing a
radiocollar might bother individual bears or inhibit their natural proclivities. Indeed, the
Craigheads comparatively analyzed the behavior of collared and uncollared bears (as well
as the behavior of individual bears before and after collaring) and found no generalizable
differences in behavior. Moreover, none of the 23 bears collared every attempted to
remove their radiocollar (Craighead et al., 1995). This ‘data’ on radiocollared bears,
103

If all this talk of values and individuals has raised the red flag of “Idealism!,” please note that issues of
material social conditions and their relations to environmental perspectives, problems of power differentials
within the communicative model espoused, and the like will be central in the discussions that comprise the
following sections. I do think, however, that it is fair to give due weight to the importance of environmental
values and environmental ethics in individuals environmentalists’ perspectives on particular issues. And, as
I hope to have argued effectively, an uncritical environmental ethics can at the very least buttress a
politically problematic environmental ideology.
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discovered through an open inquiry into the foundations of our objections, might then
either lead us to drop our objection or to rethink why we cannot not feel offended by the
collar. To be clear, my intention is not to signal closure on the issue of the ethics of
radiocollaring bears. What I have presented is one hypothetical investigation and
conclusion.
Reading different literature or entering into a different discussion on the matter
could lead to critiques of radiocollaring rather than defenses of the practice. One might
object, for example, on the grounds of adding one more mortality variable (intensive
management) to an already ‘threatened species’. This objection could be countered by
historicizing the utility of the radiocollar, for example, by noting that without the massive
amounts of data (much of it acquired through the aid of radiocollars) gathered by the
Craigheads on Yellowstone grizzlies, we may have gone unaware of the sharp population
decline of the population in the early 1970s that prompted the grizzly’s ESA listing.
Again, any similar hypothetical example could go on ad infinitum, and hoping the point is
taken, I will terminate this thread here.
The purpose of the preceding section is to serve up hypothetical examples of
pragmatist-spirited inquiry. In the broadest sense, an environmentalist-pragmatist would
(ideally) hold herself to a spirit of openness and inquiry which would include a
willingness, even a commitment, to undertaking dialogical scrutiny of the foundations of
her beliefs and activism, recognizing their inherent dynamism and fallibilism. Those
beliefs that smack of a purist sensibility perhaps would be the ones in need of the deepest
scrutiny. For this example, the beliefs “I am opposed to radiocollaring grizzly bears” or
“radiocollaring grizzly bears is unethical” would (at least) border on such purist
sensibilities – they determine a right course of action without considering the context of
the specific ‘problematic situation’ or (possibly) without scrutinizing the basis for the
beliefs.
Michael Soulé – the conservation biologists whose biocentrism I critiqued at
length in Chapter 4 – provides the closest thing to a pragmatist account of wildlife and
wilderness management I have found. This essay is also significant for my purposes
because Soulé’s inquiry into this problem points to what I will argue is one of the most
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fundamental conceptual-practical obstacles to the productive development of
environmentalism in the Rocky Mountain Northwest.
Tackling the question “Should Wilderness Areas be Managed?”, Soulé sounds
very much the pragmatist in the opening section — admonishing perfectionist ideals for
practical reasons, embracing value pluralism, and calling for a more communal,
dialogical and empathetic environmentalism:
Perhaps it is the quest for perfect freedom that leads many people to wish
for perfect wildness in Nature. But even as we are inspired by this ideal,
the “real work” – as Gary Snyder calls it – is our communal struggle to
protect the beauty and integrity of nature, a project that is necessarily
sullied by the expediencies and compromises of politics. The ideologically
diverse participants in this work are often tempted to circle the wagons
and shoot inward – a habit of conservationists. Instead, we might consider
riding a mile in each other’s wagons (Soulé, 2001, p. 136-7).
Soulé offers a heuristic typology (admitting the “archetypes are arbitrary; most of us
probably fit at least two”) of environmental activism – “ways of perceiving and saving
the wild”: (a) managerial/political; (b) ecological/process; and (c) heroic/experiential (p.
141). Not surprisingly, Soulé places himself in the second category, ecological/process,
not accidentally represented as a middle ground between the poles of resourcism and
radically restrictive but wholly ‘unmanaged’ wilderness preservation. I find Soulé’s
typology and its extended elaboration helpful, not because I draw all of the same
conclusions from it that he does,104 but because it provides specific and general lenses
through which to assess the grizzly reintroduction debates and the regional environmental
movement in the Rocky Mountain Northwest.
Each archetype has a different nature-management ideology based on differing
preferred ends. “Managers” are Benthamite utilitarians always seeking to maximize
resource output to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. “Ecologists”
manage solely to enhance or restore ecological processes. “Heroics” are opposed to all
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From this typology, for example, he winds up back at the core area/buffer/corridor rewilding model, still
seeming to hold onto a fairly purist idea of ‘management’ for natural areas, that is, all management would
be for the purposes of enhancing ecological processes. The litmus test for cutting trees, then, I think it is
fair to deduce, is that the cut would be done for the purposes of restoring or enhancing ecological processes
(and so it seems that sylvan ecologists would be put in charge of planning tree cutting). Timber harvest, on
the other hand, is an ‘anthropocentric’ management action and therefore unacceptable within reserves.
What is missing here, I would argue, is recognition of the overlap between these two ‘forms’ of cutting
trees – problematically represented in the rewilding literature as incommensurable activities.
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management as it offends their aesthetic ideal of free nature. The heroics are implicated
as at times blockading effective ecological restoration through passionate, articulate
admonitions against, for example, radiocollars. Soulé adds a temporal twist to this
particular objection:
How long should we tolerate an invasive intervention for the sake of longterm benefits? For example, are the visual or ethical effects of seeing a
bear with a radio collar or tattoos in its ears … so egregious that they
should not be tolerated for ten or twenty years, even if these interventions
are essential to restore a high degree of naturalness to a wilderness? (p.
146)
There is quite a lot to chew on here, even if this is still a pretty loaded question. Loaded
in one sense in that it denotes that these considerations apply primarily (or perhaps
solely?) when managing “wilderness.” Even as Soulé shelves the managed/unmanaged
dichotomy, the wilderness/non-wilderness divide is left intact – wilderness persists as the
ideal. But I have covered this territory at length in Chapter 4 and will return to it later, so
I will leave my ‘deconstruction’ of this paragraph at that. There are pragmatic and
positive things to take away from this passage as well. For one, it raises the idea that
some people’s primary objection to a radiocollar on a bear is aesthetic.
The radiocollar, or presumably any visible management artifact, violates what
some people feel that wild nature, literally, should look like. As one testifier at the
Salmon, Idaho Draft EIS hearings put it, “I really don’t want to see a grizzly bear, which
is a symbol of wilderness … with a radio collar” (USFWS, 1997f, p. 109). Certainly,
using Soulé’s terminology, it is easy to imagine how a backcountry experience viewing
an artifactual collared grizzly would be much less “heroic” than viewing a grizzly that (at
least) appears totally wild.105 But, even as this position makes an easy target for derision,
to end the discussion by assuming that all radiocollar opponents are macho hikers seeking
a wild and dangerous backcountry experience would be to unfairly diminish the aesthetic
component in human-nonhuman relations. While I am not qualified to write on the issue,
105

And the popularity of backcountry “heroism” (i.e., its influence on environmentalism in a region where
“extreme sports” are quite popular) probably shouldn’t be discounted. A recent documentary film about the
exploits of grizzly writer and photographer Timothy Treadwell, who with his girlfriend was killed and
eaten by an Alaskan brown bear last year, has prompted a spate of copycat hobbyists who push well past
the level of safety to get up-close experiences with wild bears, endangering both themselves and the bears
(Mann, 2005). Similarly, backcountry rangers in Glacier National Park have noted numerous hikers
wanting to visit “the grizzly Hilton” (an area of the park with an unusually high density of grizzlies) made
famous in Doug Peacock’s novel The Grizzly Years (Mann, 2005).
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there is certainly a world of interesting (existing and potential) discussion centering on
the aesthetic, dialogical and dialectical relationship between humans and nonhuman
nature (and this wouldn’t be lost on all pragmatists, as Dewey, for one, wrote extensively
on the foundational nature of the aesthetic in organizing and determining human
experience).106 One thing I find positive about Soulé’s line of inquiry here is not so much
the specific conclusions he draws as much as the openness produced through his
willingness to take on and tease apart given dichotomies and deeply-held beliefs. He
draws conclusions, yes, but he also opens up rather than closes down avenues for dialog
with his spirit of empathy and pragmatic methodology.
Another component Soulé’s typology worth examining, but this time a point
where pragmatists would diverge from his model, is the inclusion of the relations
between means and ends engendered by different environmental ideologies. Soulé sees
each of his archetypes as employing specific methods of dealing with means-ends
dilemmas. For managers, “the means are the ends,” meaning I suppose that actions
proposed are so immediate and utilitarian that there is no place for long-term thinking.
For heroics, “ends never justify imperfect means” (Soulé, 2001, p. 141). This is another
not-so-subtle jab at wilderness purists, accusing them of having zero tolerance toward
anything that might rail against their impossible-to-uphold-in-the-real-world sensibilities.
For ecologists, “ends justify less-than-perfect means.” This is consistent with his
treatment of the radiocollar – the less-than-perfect means in the service of the (perfect?)
ends. Stated another way, this line of reasoning still harbors the notion that an ideal endstate (e.g., a restored ecosystem, or wilderness) can be reached. The result in this case is,
in my opinion, preferable to blanket opposition to radiocollaring grizzlies. An even
“more” pragmatist methodology, however, would move toward the dissolution of the
mean/ends dichotomy altogether.
As Josh Whitford argues, the dualism between means and ends is untenable. It is
not that the two cannot be empirically established in specific situations, but “it is clear
that the categories of means and ends are not a dualism; there is no end that is always and
only and end, but never a mean” (Whitford, 2002). The dissolution of the dualism imparts
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Significantly, the aesthetic was a fundamentally relational rather than contemplative construct for
Dewey, and as such was integrated into and not separate from his work on politics and social change
(Alexander, 1987; Dewey, 1934; Hoy, 1998; Reid & Taylor, 2003).
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two key conceptual interventions for my immediate purposes. First, “there are no final
ends, there can be no end-in-itself, only ends-in-view” (p. 338). We work toward goals
(ends) but we never ‘arrive’; the “ends-in-view” are just that, always temporally ahead,
always plural, always determining new ends-in-view. Secondly, the ‘work’ itself is
dynamic – altering the course of events: “an end-in-view is a means in present action;
present action is not a means to a remote end” (Dewey, 1922, in Whitford, 2002, p. 338).
The “means” is what effects “some change in the present state of affairs” (Whitford,
2002, p. 338).
The difference between Soulé’s means/ends and pragmatist means-ends is
significant in the context of assessing the CB and CMC alternative for Bitterroot grizzly
recovery. Under what I think would be the dominant application of Soulé’s model to the
Bitterroot debates, the CMC alternative would be rejected because its stated end – the
establishment of a nonessential experimental population of grizzly bears – falls well short
of the rewilding ideal. The CB alternative, of course, did not suffer from this
shortcoming. Being all about ends, it could be sheltered from the vagaries of means (that
is, since the ends were presently unattainable, it could articulate equally unattainable
means). Turning the dichotomy on its head (“an end-in-view is a means in present
action”), the rewilding-ideal/CB-alternative was the means to an end – aiding the
blockading of the CMC alternative.107 As Michael Soulé urged against, the CB advocates
circled the wagons, and quite effectively shot inward. Soulé is (in this case) advocating,
as I am throughout, a strategy of intra-environmental “convergence”108 (Norton, 2003, p.
11) when possible. This is not to say that divergence is never a defensible tactic, but I
would (and will further) argue that the militancy with which the CB supporters diverged
may well have done more harm than good. To wrap up this section with a brief return to
the issue of radiocollaring, thinking of radiocollaring grizzlies as a “less-than-perfect
means” does nothing to answer its ethical questionability. This logic would have as little
107

And as I have indicated, there are always plural ends. Another end would be what I termed rather
harshly in Chapter 4 as “the maintenance of an ideological and pragmatically stifling purity of purpose.”
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That is, the ability to recognize common ground where it exists between different environmental
ideologies as well as between different ‘camps’ within the environmental movement; then capitalizing on
this common ground by collaborating for effective and progressive policy advances and issue resolution.
This, in contrast to the all too common tendency within academic and advocacy environmentalism of
eschewing common ground in favor of perpetuating, even exacerbating, (more or less) intramural
differences.
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to say about the ethics of radiocollaring as it would about the ethics of bombing Baghdad
to spread democracy. Only as an end in itself, a change in the present state of affairs, can
any action be judged. Perhaps a recognition of the “irony” (Keulartz, 1999, p. 87, see
below) of the entire situation – a recognition of the fallibility and imperfectability of all
attempts at mitigating the problem (all the problematic situations) of humans-in-nature –
would drive an environmentalism that is less hostile to programs and reforms that fail to
live up to perfectionist ideals.
Jozef Keulartz, writing about a large-scale effort at rewilding109 a landscape in a
radically different social/political/ecological context (the Netherlands), articulates the
irony of that situation in a strikingly resonant passage: “This attempt to drive the devil of
technology out of nature with the help of Beelzebub reveals the profoundly ambivalent
character of nature development” (Keulartz, 1999, p. 84). In ‘reality’ – Soulé and
Snyder’s “real work” of conservation – this irony is not lost on wildlife biologists and no
doubt the majority of rewilding activists. As the nature-writer Charles Bergman noted in
Wild Echoes, his fabulous book on contemporary North American endangered species
conservation:
The wilder and more spectacular a creature is, the greater the likelihood in
America that it is tagged or radio-collared, even surviving on dosages of
medicine. Few wild animals are seen anymore except by those biologists
who make it their living to chart—and save—these creatures’ lives with
all the paraphernalia of high technology. The reality is that much of our
wildlife has been lost and most of what is left wears collars (Bergman,
1990, p. 104).
That this observation is undeniable does not mean that it is not justifiably lamentable. But
this reality cannot be undone with any single action, despite the best and purist intentions
of so many CB alternative advocates. Rewilding (the already pretty darn wild) Northern
Rockies to any degree will be a complex and difficult social experiment. If, as Soulé
warned early in his career, that “the risks of non-action may be greater than the risks of
inappropriate action” (Soulé, 1986, p. 6), the purity of purpose of the conservation
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The term “rewilding” was not used in his essay to refer to the restoration efforts that were underway in
the Netherlands, but it is appropriate. The program aimed to return portions of the Dutch landscape to
conditions of ecological functioning that mirrored the landscape “as it is assumed to have existed in the last
interglacial era,” before humans “possess[ed] long range weapons,” domesticated and sanitized the
landscape and became the primary regulators of ecological functioning (Keulartz, 1999, p. 87).
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biology movement may have produced an unfavorable course that (ultimately) enabled
non-action.

6.4. Science versus Everything Else: The Scientific Committee and
the Persistence of Hierarchy
The preceding section introduced the issue of environmental ethics for three
primary purposes. First, it brings to light the inherent ambivalence of an
environmentalism that simultaneously eschews the technocratic management of nature all
the while advocating its own profoundly technologically- and instrumentally-founded
program. Secondly, it provides one example of how the CB alternative, when judged
solely in comparison to the CMC alternative, seems to rise naturally to the position of the
obviously preferable course of action. Finally, my environmental pragmatist intervention
raised the objection (following much of what was discussed in chapter four) that the
rather purist ideology employed and idealized end-state envisioned by many CB
supporters might in fact be hindering a broader understanding of the context of the
reintroduction debates. The rest of the dissertation will follow all three of these lines of
analysis. In this section, I undertake a critical assessment of what may have been the
single most profound objection to the CMC alternative by CB alternative advocates – the
idea of the Citizen Management Committee itself. My primary objects of analysis come
from the two components of the Draft EIS public comment component: statements made
at the public meetings as well as formal letters written to the FWS. I will also draw again
on promotional materials put forth in support of the CB alternative (particularly the AWR
handbook that was the target of scrutiny in Chapter 4).
The ubiquitous disdain on the part of CB supporters toward the Citizen
Management Committee is rather easy to empirically establish. In the Draft EIS public
hearing testimonies, many CB supporters voiced opposition to the Citizen Management
Committee, often couched in a rhetoric of an objection to the infiltration of politics into
science. Representative examples include:
Alternative 4 [the Conservation Biology Alternative] is good science. It’s
not politically motivated. It’s motivated by the best interests of the animal,
you know, the grizzly bear… Alternative 1 … is a politically-driven
management committee. Again, this is a decision that has been made
based on politics, not on science (USFWS, 1997b, p. 117, emphasis
added);
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[The citizen management] alternative allows politically-nominated,
extractive-industry staff to decide the management and the fate of the
bruins. Those decisions need to be made by independent scientists and
good, objective science, not for bottom-line profit, and not for political
interests (USFWS, 1997b, p. 38);
Concerning Alternative number one [the CMC alternative], a proposal
submitted by a biased extractive industry and supposedly environmental
organizations that once worked with the best interest of wildlife at their
roots… (USFWS, 1997d, p. 29, emphasis added);
Alternative Number one is not only inadequate in effectively protecting
and restoring the grizzly bear and its habitat, it is a bureaucratic and
political operation where those who lose are the citizens and their
expectations of thoughtful government, the environment, the grizzly bear
and other species of animals and plants that are already threatened by the
destruction of their natural habitat (USFWS, 1997e, p. 41);
I am not idealistic enough unfortunately yet to believe that we can allow a
group of citizens with strong political and financial interests to agree on
what’s best for the future of the grizzly bear (USFWS, 1997e, p. 82);
The so-called Citizens’ Committee will not be made up of citizens like
you or your neighbor, but rather appointees of the governors of Montana
and Idaho … Management decisions about grizzly bears should be based
in the best available science with input from all interested citizens, not just
a small politically-driven management committee (USFWS, 1997e, p. 97);
My … concern is with this so-called Citizen Management Committee.
What may sound like a great bottoms up strategy on paper would actually
be a quasi-political committee appointed by public officials who are
heavily influenced by the timber industry. Wouldn’t it make more sense to
put the management of bears in the hands of scientists and bear biologists
who are sensitive to the needs of grizzlies rather than citizens who know
little about grizzlies and are appointed by politicians more sensitive to
bureaucracy than bears? We should put our bears in the hands of experts
(USFWS, 1997e, p. 109, emphasis added).
These statements, at least for my immediate purposes, pretty much speak for
themselves. CB supporters were not “idealistic” or optimistic enough to entrust the
management of the reintroduced (or recolonized) bear population to the Citizen
Management Committee. Although some proponents of each recovery alternative voiced
critiques of or apprehension toward certain specific aspects of the alternative they were
supporting, in the Draft EIS public testimonies only one supporter of the CB alternative
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even remotely challenged the management structure presented in the CB alternative.110
What management did the CB alternative propose?
In the AWR pamphlet (and mirrored in the EISs) The CB alternative intentionally
countered the Citizen Management Committee model by establishing a ten member
Scientific Committee … to carry out additional research, implement
translocations of grizzly bears, and monitor the results of the project. This
interdisciplinary team shall have participants employed by state and
federal governments and members from the non-governmental,
independent scientific community (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 12).
The “interdisciplinary”-expert character of the committee was to be fulfilled through the
following mandate:
Each [member will be] an acknowledged expert in one or more of the
following disciplines—
A) the design and implementation of grizzly bear recovery plans (private
sector appointment);
B) economic analysis of forest ecosystems (private sector appointment);
C) landscape ecology;
D) grizzly bear habitat requirements and habitat use patterns;
E) plant ecology and the remote sensing/GIS based analysis of vegetation
on a regional scale;
F) population viability analysis;
G) fire ecology;
H) conservation genetics;
I) restoration of fire ecosystems; (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, pp. 11-12)
Three other components of the Scientific Committee proposal are worth noting.
First, the appointment would be made by the Secretary of the Interior in consultation with
the National Academy of Sciences. Secondly, the membership of the committee was to
consist of “not more than 5 … employees of any Federal or State agency or from any
agency involved in resource extraction [and] not less than 5 … persons from the nongovernmental, independent scientific community and academia” (p. 12). Lastly, “sole
authority and responsibility for implementing recovery efforts pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act” shall reside with the Secretary of the Interior, who will act “in
good faith” on the recommendations of the Scientific Committee (p. 12). This committee
very clearly countered every skepticism, fear, and admonition that CB supporters voiced
toward the FWS-proposed Citizen Management Committee. The exclusively expert110

One testimonial at the Missoula meeting endorsed the Conservation Biology Alternative but said he
liked the idea of citizen management and thought that it should somehow be integrated in Alternative 4.
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scientific membership; the National Academy of Sciences appointment consultation
mandate; the inclusion of “independent” scientists (and the resultant guarantee that
bureaucrats could never hold a majority) – all of these components ensured the scientific
purity of the management committee.
Frank Fischer’s111 Citizens, Experts, and the Environment (Fischer, 2000) serves
as the primary text that will abet my explanation and catalyze my critique in this section.
To preview my argument (and following on much of what has been argued already), it is
my contention that the CMC alternative was perceived by many CB supporters as a
deplorable manifestation of bureaucratic-“technocratic” (Fischer, 2000, p. 92)
environmental management, a model perceived by many to be more complicit in causing
and continuing environmental problems than in ameliorating or solving them. The CB
alternative/movement, however, exhibited ambivalence and even contradiction because it
failed to offer a viable alternative to many of the perceived deficiencies in the dominant
model.
Neither of these features of the Bitterroot debates (the tension or the resulting
ambivalence) is new to environmentalism:
Tensions between science and politics have been intrinsic to
environmental struggles from the outset. On the one hand, science and
technology have been identified closely with the major causes of
environmental degradation; on the other, they have served as the primary
methods for both detecting environmental problems and searching for
effective solutions (Fischer, 2000, p. 89).
But there is a history to the development of this tension. In its first-phase (rising to real
prominence in the 1960s), environmentalism was primarily a citizen-based movement,
where the (known) demons and dangers were obvious (e.g., nuclear power, pollution
from increased automobile use) and usually perceived as science- and technology-based.
The second phase, however, is characterized by less visibly and intuitively obvious
environmental problems.112 As such, these new problems (e.g., the ozone hole, global
warming, biodiversity decline) were reliant upon articulation by science to make them
111

For clarity’s sake, Frank Fischer is an environmental-political theorist; not to be confused with Hank
Fischer, Defenders of Wildlife activist and architect of the wolf and grizzly reintroduction campaigns in the
Rocky Mountain Northwest.
112
I employ Fischer’s first-phase/second-phase narrative because it is useful for my purposes of
explanation, not because it is necessarily ‘better’ or more accurate than, for example, Hays’ (1987) or Soulé
and Noss’s (1998) historical accounts that mark different signal phases at different times.
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known to the public, and their attendant solutions were no less science-dependent (but the
current ‘obviousness’ of these problems/attendant-solutions, it seems, is testament to just
how effectively this sophisticated information has been disseminated to the public). “The
result has been an increasingly technocratic environmentalism, in the environmental
movement as well as the corridors of governmental decision making.” What in the 1960s
smacked of a “street politics” saw its discourse increasingly articulated “through the
languages of environmental management” (Fischer, 2000, p. 93).
Once environmental issues became part and parlance of the national political
scene “the struggle over environmental policy shifted from the public arenas of protest to
the institutional [governmental, academic] arenas of expertise” (p. 94). This transition has
resulted in an enormous growth industry of environmental science and activism, but
many problems have accompanied this growth. Most profoundly, the initial euphoria over
the promise of the technoscientific fix for environmental problems quickly abated as
science proved to be quite “underdetermined” (p. 94). An overdetermined science, by
contrast, the evanescent dream, “could [have] answered questions in such a way that
would eliminate or at least significantly reduce potential conflict among affected parties”
(p. 94). The underdetermined nature of science, however, with an increasingly obvious
inability “to answer the environmental questions with enough precision to be decisive …
opened up – unintentionally – the space for the politicization of science” (p. 95).
Beginning in the Reagan years, science – as “counterexpertise” (p. 100) – has been
increasingly effectively used113 to counter the findings of environmental science and
forestall the implementation of aggressive environmental policy.
Another concomitant event was the rise of “professional specialization, [where]
each group of specialists came to know more and more about less and less” (p. 95).
Different specialties studying, for example, biodiversity decline or groundwater
contamination, articulated different but equally challenging (and expensive) remediation
programs. This made it more and more difficult for environmental science and
environmental activism to speak in a unified voice (even if ‘the opponent’ – pro-growth
113

Many critics would no doubt feel this characterization is too generous. Paul and Anne Ehrlich, for
example, see pro-growth industry-friendly science not as a use of science but rather a “betrayal of science”
(Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1996, book title). Whether or not there is a science that can be “betrayed” would, of
course, be an entirely separate issue to tackle.
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industry – did not suffer from this same problematic lack of unity), as different
specialties/disciplines competed for both scarce government funding dollars and public
support (in the form of monetary contributions and activism). Stated another way, as an
increasingly professionalized and specialized environmentalism splintered, a more
unified opposition – armed with the very same tools, and much deeper pockets –
effectively obviated much of the political change environmentalists desired.
This historical narrative of the development of contemporary environmental
science and activism helps explain three important components of the Bitterroot debates,
each of which is given representation in the quotes above as well as the excerpts from the
“Scientific Committee” section of the AWR handbook. The first is the persistence of the
rigid science/politics divide and a resultant reproduction of dominant roles for science
and politics (with politics as everything-else) in the CB model. The second is an
ambivalence toward this very reproduction of the dominant model. Finally, we can see
and understand the sources of the disdain toward the CMC alternative and a general
unwillingness to view “compromise” as an acceptable path.
Initially, Fischer’s historical explanation as summarized above points to a
genealogy of environmentalism that connotes two divergent, but (significantly) not
mutually exclusive, paths which different environmental movements have taken. The first
is a move away from technocratic explanations and programs of action toward (or back
toward) more openly progressive, citizen-activist, grassroots environmentalism. The
classic example of a laudable and at times quite successful contemporary progressive
grassroots environmentalism is the environmental justice movement (e.g., Bullard, 1990,
1994; Di Chiro, 1995; Dowie, 1995; Fischer, 2000; Gottlieb, 1993; Schlosberg, 1997;
Smith, 1998; Williams, 1999). The environmental justice movement is “loosely
organized into local, regional and national coalitions … coalesced around a shared
argument: environmental burdens (e.g. proximity to hazardous sites) tend to be
inequitably borne by poor Americans in general, and by Americans of color in particular”
(Williams, 1999, p. 57, 50). The role of science is central in the environmental justice
movement, but its programmatic application contrasts radically to more technocratic
environmentalism:
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One of the most innovative features of the environmental justice
movement’s efforts to empower citizens and thus revivify democracy has
been to help local citizens understand their own needs and interests. In the
case of toxic wastes, this effort has almost always involved confronting
and coming to terms with scientific information about risk and exposure.
Rather than merely accepting information provided by scientists and
experts … the movement assists communities in a variety of ways to
collect and interpret their own information … It involves a method and
practice of participatory research that goes considerable distance toward
democratizing the otherwise hierarchical relationship between scientists
and the communities they attempt to assist (Fischer, 2000, p. 121).114
The other path is environmentalism that sticks more to the second-phase
technocratic-expert model, digging in its heels beneath the authority of scientific
argumentation. For both models of environmentalism, “the main job of the movement, as
with any movement, is to organize people to get involved” (Fischer, 2000, p. 110). A
sharp contrast between the two, however, is found in the role of the citizen-advocate
within the movement. The environmental justice movement seeks to develop a base of
“lay expertise” (p. 121) from which nonprofessional citizen-advocates can articulate the
complexities of the situation and effectively lead campaigns. Promoting and courting lay
expertise is not exclusive to the environmental justice movement, of course. Andrew
Light sees community-based ecological restoration projects as one vehicle for “restoring
ecological citizenship”:
A direct participatory relationship between local human communities and
the nature they inhabit or are adjacent to is at least a necessary condition
for encouraging people to protect natural systems and landscapes (Light,
2002, p. 157).
The technocratic converse of these participatory models is one where citizenactivists serve as mere mouthpieces for professionalized organizations, giving a public
face to a company line. Now it would be extremely unfair to characterize the entire
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I am not holding up environmental justice per se as the exemplar that all environmentalism need strive
toward, as some authors do explicitly (Pepper, 1993; Smith, 1998). This would be unfair to (for one) the
conservation biology movement, as it would conceal the real differences between the problematics faced by
each movement’s practitioners. There is a world of difference, for example, in helping people fight toxic
waste dumping in their communities (a textbook environmental justice campaign) and convincing people in
a rural timber-dependent community that grizzly bear habitat protection should take precedence over timber
production on neighboring national forests. This is not to say that the conservation biology movement
cannot (or that it has not) learned from the successes and tactics of the environmental justice movement,
but rather to say that holding the former up as a political model for the latter would be, well, to ignore
context.
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conservation biology movement115 so harshly. There is considerable literature promoting
the benefits of local, lay ecological knowledge for conservation (e.g., Fairhead &
Scoones, 2005; Goldman, 2003; Harrison et al., 1998; Myers, 2002; Scholz et al., 2004;
St. Martin, 2001). Even Wild Earth ran a special issue championing “citizen science”
(Wild Earth, 2001), and many if not most lay advocates of conservation biology are no
doubt fairly well versed in ecology. But when assessing the CB alternative, it is difficult
to judge it as anything other than an example of the crudest form of non-participatory,
technocratic expert management. This is most explicitly represented by the makeup of the
Scientific Committee – an exclusive domain of credentialed scientific experts.
Frank Fischer raises another relevant point, noting the problematic assumption
that the rise of ENGOs qua “public interest groups” represents real change in institutional
practice or culture from previous models: “Although interest groups represent citizens …
they are themselves hierarchical organizations frequently quite removed from the citizens
for whom they speak” (Fischer, 2000, p. 113).

Within the conservation biology

movement in the Rocky Mountain Northwest, hierarchy is the norm. There is a wellcrafted intra-movement hierarchy among the internally hierarchical professional interest
groups. Science, not surprisingly, remains atop the hierarchy. The following is one
example from the region that I would argue is representative.
Predator Conservation Alliance, based in Bozeman Montana and dedicated (as the
name would suggest) to the conservation of the region’s predators, does not produce
science itself, but rather serves as a “clearinghouse” for the organization and
dissemination of scientific findings to the regional community. Additionally, they craft
and propose programmatic solutions to the problems of predator conservation.116 The
science comes from a combination of research-oriented nongovernmental organizations
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The term “conservation biology movement” is courtesy of Dave Gaillard, Project Coordinator for
Predator Conservation Alliance in Bozeman. During my interview, he used this term casually on multiple
occasions to reference the broader movement of which his organization was a part.
116
And in the interest of fairness to these very sincere and valuable organizations, every program they
advocate is not a grand-scale utopian regional or continental rewilding. Predator Conservation Alliance and
American Wildlands are working diligently, for example, toward a solution to the problem of wildlife
roadkill along the Bozeman Pass stretch of Interstate 90. They are working with private landowners, State
and Federal agents, transportation planners, and the like to figure out what combination of re-fencing,
speed limit reduction, overpass/underpass construction, et cetera might be achievable and facilitate wildlife
movement less dangerous to wildlife. Bozeman Pass lies along a key northward dispersal corridor for
Yellowstone wolves.
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such as American Wildlands (also headquartered in Bozeman, MT) and the Ecology
Center (headquartered in Missoula)117 and scientific conservation biology (Gaillard
interview). This scientific-activism network structure allows for the science/politics
divide to persist in its fully reified-divided form.118
This division of labor is profoundly represented in the AWR handbook promoting
the CB alternative. Along with the scientific justification for the proposal (justified via
peer-reviewed conservation biology as well as regional gray literature, all formally cited),
the AWR handbook presents an economic case for the CB alternative as well. The
ecological restoration “jobs creating proposal” (Garrity, 1996, p. 19) and its economic
justification were cited in the handbook (emphasis on the citation itself here) as in the
following example: “In terms of net cost, more jobs can be created in wildland restoration
at far less cost to the treasury than below-cost logging operations within roadless areas
(Garrity 1995)” (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 8). What is the “Garrity, 1995” (sic)119 piece
that this economic validation is based upon? It is the Appendix to the very handbook in
which it is cited, authored by “Michael Garrity, Research Fellow, Economics
Department, University of Utah.” Even as the cover of the pamphlet makes it appear as a
single report – titled “The Conservation Biology Alternative for Grizzly Bear Population
Restoration in the Greater Salmon-Selway Region Central Idaho and Western Montana”
– on the inside cover we find that it is actually two reports, and are instructed:
These reports may be cited as follows:
Bader, M. and Bechtold. 1996. The Conservation Biology Alternative for
Grizzly Bear Population Restoration in the Greater Salmon-Selway
Region Central Idaho and Western Montana: Alliance for the Wild
Rockies Special Report No. 8. Missoula, MT. 32 pp.
Garrity, M. Economic Analysis of the Conservation Biology Proposal for
Grizzly Bear Restoration in the Salmon-Selway Region. In: Bader, M. and
Bechtold. 1996. The Conservation Biology Alternative for Grizzly Bear
117

These regional scientific research groups publish most of their findings in the so-called gray literature,
non-peer-reviewed outlets such as ‘scientific working papers’.
118
Lest I be accused of distorting this feature of the regional environmentalist community, I will note that
the division is not strict and that the scientific groups do not hide their advocacy positions. I do believe,
though, that it is a prominent enough component of the movement to warrant it as evidence in support of
my more general argument – that the movement contains and upholds traditional lay/science,
advocacy/objective, and citizen/expert dichotomies, all which work toward the reification and ultimate
authority of the products of the right halves of these dichotomies.
119
I use the “sic” qualifier here because the publication date is 1995 in some places in the handbook and
1996 in others.
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Population Restoration in the Greater Salmon-Selway Region Central
Idaho and Western Montana: Alliance for the Wild Rockies Special
Report No. 8. Missoula, MT. 32 pp.
This is a curious, if not unique, structure for a formal document. Nowhere else
have I ever seen a paper reference its own appendix as if the appendix was a wholly
independent document. As far as I can tell, Garrity’s economic analysis appears only as
Appendix A in this handbook. The only reason I can see for granting the Garrity analysis
an air of quasi-independence is to make it appear as an independent, scientific, objective
piece of research bolstering the separate conservation-advocacy program set forth in the
first half of the handbook.
This is representative of the hierarchy (between as well as within organizations)
within the regional conservation biology movement in the region: science supporting
politics – separate realms, each with its own epistemology (objective/social),
methodology (scientific method/advocacy), and division of labor (professional
scientists/professional activists). This division of labor does work for the movement: It
allows the science to remain unsullied from the taint of politics; this helps maintain
science’s status atop the movement hierarchy. This division of labor also reestablishes
and reinforces the science/politics divide, enabling and making intelligible the rhetorical
admonitions of “politicized science” as represented in the above comments from the
Draft EIS public testimonies.
Judging from the formal letters written by regional ENGOs to the FWS in support
of the CB alternative, both scientific and lay groups were equally enthusiastic in their
endorsement of the Scientific Committee and their condemning of the idea of citizen
management. The Craighead Wildlife-Wildlands Institute (CWWI), headquartered in
Missoula, based their support of the CB alternative “on our opposition on philosophical
and scientific grounds to management by a local citizen committee” (USFWS, 2000a, p.
5-129) (they never, it should be noted, defended the “philosophical” component of their
objection). Apparently, the work of grizzly bear management was completely beyond the
grasp of the non-scientist: “a lay committee cannot identify and keep pace with the best
available science nor is such a committee likely to identify the need to develop the best
‘available’ science” (p. 5-12, emphasis in original). On the former point, critics would
argue that empirical evidence refutes this claim. Fischer, drawing on case studies from
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citizen groups involved in nuclear power and toxins epidemiology campaigns, argues that
“there is no reason to believe that citizens are incapable of mastering the necessary
science, at least if they are willing to devote sufficient time and energy to it” (Fischer,
2000, p. 149). On the latter point, it could be argued even as a citizen management
committee might not develop new “best available science,” its presence would by no
means slow the wheels of conservation science. Consigning the role of non-scientists to
pre-implementation-activists, the letter states that “We have no objection to encouraging
citizen involvement in endangered species recovery programs … Some of the ESA’s
most notable successes (e.g., the peregrine falcon) owe much to the efforts of the civilian
proponents of recovery” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-129, emphasis in original). Noting the
very intentional emphasis in this passage, it is clear that the role for the public is to be a
proponent (or more harshly, ‘mouthpiece’) for the experts. I am quite confident that if
asked “are you an environmentalist or do you work for a living?” (White, 1995), staff
scientists at CWWI would reply “both, of course.” Yet apparently missing the irony of
their own assertions, or feeling immune to the charge of hypocrisy, these professional
bear biologists believed that “citizen participation in recovery (whether advisory or
otherwise) … should not include those with direct economic interest in these lands”
(USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-129, emphasis added).
Friends of the Bitterroot, a local conservation activist organization headquartered
in Hamilton, Montana, no less enthusiastically drew a science/citizen line in the sand:
“Reestablishment of a viable grizzly bear population can occur within this habitat
preservation program subject to scientifically-based information from a committee of
scientists” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-124). On the role for local citizens: “Local input, yes;
local control, no” (p. 5.125). The line is drawn at the devolution of authority. The letter
even admits that this is as much an objection on grounds of precedent as it is specifically
an objection to the Bitterroot CMC. The centralized model itself must be kept in place.
To intervene with one slight digression from my immediate thread, I think that
these letters uphold what may have sounded like a rather harsh accusation of the “doublyuncritical” nature of the CB movement (as above, this chapter). The professional
scientists advocating the CB alternative were undeniably “professional and managerial
elites” who, if employing a reflexive, self-critical attitude toward the elitism inherent in
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their knowledge production, would have acknowledged and accounted for their
“segregation … from the majority of the population” (Bromley, 1999, p. 11, in Reid &
Taylor, 2003, p. 84). Elites operate within “spaces of flows,” wired (in this case) into
institutional methods and networks of knowledge validation while the majority of
regional residents are “confined to the space of places,” arguing (very subjectively), for
example, that they should have a stronger voice in Federal lands management decisions.
Following this line of argumentation, I would argue that it is radically uncritical to
exploit this elite positionality to argue for exclusive (rhetorical and practical) authority on
the subject.
Here Foucault’s (1980) notion of “power/knowledge” is quite helpful. The crux of
the construct is that “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and,
conversely, knowledge induces effects of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 52, in Forsyth,
2003, p. 104).120 Practicing a “critical” politics means (among other things) being aware
of and accounting for privilege arising from the inescapable imbrication of power and
knowledge. The converse – exploiting the power/knowledge nexus – represents
resolutely uncritical practice. But consistent with the general thrust of this chapter, there
is a detectable countercurrent to the uncritical embrace of power/knowledge in these
debates. Science (employing Bromley above121) maintains its power/knowledge privilege
by “segregating” its knowledge from subjective, place-based reasoning; this is the source
of the exclusionary claims of CB supporters. Yet, all the while championing the need for
a solely-scientific management structure, countless CB supporters echoed their opponents
by establishing their credibility to speak on the subject via claims of place-based
knowledge and experience. As one testimonial at the Missoula Draft EIS hearing put it,
120

In light of the more general case made in chapters two and three against the appropriateness of Foucault
for an environmental pragmatist framework, I should probably insert a quick defense of this selective and
fleeting appropriation of Foucault. I find a sharp difference between deployments of Foucault’s constructs
of power/knowledge and governmentality (with Tim Luke’s (1997; 19999a; 1999b; 2001; 2002) works as
exemplars) and deployments of Foucault that argue for a radically anti-naturalistic and “fervent[ly] antiutopian” (West, 1989, p. 236) analytical and practical politics (e.g., Braun & Wainwright, 2001; Darier,
1999a, 1999b; Haraway, 1997; Levy, 1999; Quigley, 1999). While the former could be consistent with an
environmental pragmatist framework (even if I have employed it quite sparingly), I find the latter
analytically disabling and politically “nihilistic” (West, 2004).
121
And Bromley here is drawing on Manuel Castell’s book The Information Age. I thank Herb Reid for
pointing me to this reference, first through personal communication and, later, courtesy of his essay (coauthored with Betsy Taylor) “John Dewey's Aesthetic Ecology of Public Intelligence and the Grounding of
Civic Environmentalism” (Reid & Taylor, 2003).
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“my family has lived in Montana for four generations. Having established that
questionable bit of credibility…” (USFWS, 1997e, p. 64) (and then she went on to argue
for the CB alternative). “Questionable” indeed, because if local experience counts (no
matter how and to what degree), then the argument for exclusive scientific authority is (in
some manner and to some degree) compromised. And so here we find another source of
tension and ambivalence within the conservation biology movement. Tim Luke
economically sums up this tension:
The action of expert elites inside of formal organizations … remakes …
contradictions by presuming the inaction of lay populations outside of
these complex organizations. The elites’ presumptions about mass
acquiescence before their scientific and managerial authority, however,
have never held entirely true (Luke, 2002, p. 304).
I will return to the issue of science “smothering” (Keulartz, 1999, p. 96) place in the
conclusion, but for now I will terminate this digression and return to the discussion of
hierarchy in the conservation biology movement.
The CB alternative was not, then, the replacement of a hierarchical model with a
non-hierarchical model, but rather the replacement of an undesirable hierarchical model
(politics over science, the Citizen Management Committee) with another (science over
politics, the Scientific Committee122). Science and politics are represented (through the
CB alternative and its supporting constituency) in both the Citizen Management and
Scientific Committee models as separate, discrete entities. The sole role of the lay public
in the CB proposal – once implemented – is the opportunity for public comment on the
Interior Secretary’s committee nominations. Apparently, this authoritarian management
structure made few CB proponents uneasy; at least, few felt compelled to vocally critique
it, much less object to it.123 The doctrine of “science knows best” seems to define the
culture of the conservation biology movement. The activists, I do not think it would be
122

Notice as well the absence of the word “management” in the “Scientific Committee.”
As per individuals representing themselves, literally one testimonial supported the CB alternative but
critiqued the management structure, advocating instead a CB-style reintroduction (with full ESA protection
and with the experimental status) but with a CMC in charge of management. Elected officials and
environmental organizations were in a similar near-consensus regarding unqualified support. Only the
Missoula Board of County Commissioners supported the CB alternative but pressed for modifications, and
similar to the commenter referenced prior, they were significant modifications, such as CMC management
and the removal of the roadless are road-building and logging prohibition. Judging from the adamant
opposition to the CMC (as shown in this chapter), and the repeated incantations of roadless area habitat
protection found in the CB promotion literature and recited in the public comments, I strongly believe that
these concessions would have been judged unacceptable by the majority of CB supporters.
123
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unfair to say, toed the company line very effectively. The conservation biology
movement, in this case at least, spoke in a surprisingly singular voice.

6.5. The Uncritical Embrace of Scientific Authority: Three Explanatory
Takes
In this section I will attempt a degree of explanation for both the existence of and
the uncritical stance toward the hierarchical model. There is no doubt some continuation
of the historical lineage of Fischer’s second-phase scientific-technocratic environmental
management to the contemporary conservation biology movement in the Rocky
Mountain Northwest – especially in light of the under-social-theorized nature of many of
the assumptions of conservation biology, as discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 4.
But the conservation biology movement is not, of course, a mere relic of 1970s
technocratic management (and mouthpiece activism). There has been a development of
this movement through time, and more specifically of this movement in this region, that
has somehow enabled the persistence of a culture wherein what is considered by many to
be a rather outmoded method of politics could be so uncritically embraced (e.g., it seems
reasonable to deduce that the Scientific Management stands as the ideal model for
participation/management within this movement). In this section, I will make three ‘cuts’
at explaining the existence and persistence of this institutional culture.
My first avenue of explanation considers the question of how this model could be
so widely and uncritically embraced by so many. Part of the appeal of the CB alternative
– its apparent intelligibility as well as its ‘obvious’ superiority to the CMC alternative –
was that it spoke in only one language, one “genre” – scientific conservation biology. As
I have argued throughout, framing the issue of grizzly bear conservation as primarily a
scientific problem obscures the fact that it is ‘really’ a much more complex social issue.
As Keulartz argues,
In both environmental philosophy and nature policy, a social dispute is
constantly in danger of being smothered by scientific argumentation, with
the result that all considerations not based on ecology are systematically
brushed aside. But argumentation is repressed as well, since
[environmental advocates] base themselves one-sidedly on the image of
nature emanating from … ecology (Keulartz, 1999, p. 95).
Speaking in the (seemingly consistent) language of scientific ecology, the argumentation
can be rather easily judged favorably because it follows one set of (interpretive186

methodological) rules. Trans-generic rhetoric, such as that of the CMC alternative, is not
so easily or fairly judged due to the absence of trans-generic rules or a language that
would make a judgment clear. As long as the problem could be continually reframed in
scientific terms, the result would fall out in favor of the CB alternative.
My other two routes of explanation appeal more directly to the previouslymentioned trends of specialization and professionalization within environmentalism.
Timothy Luke writes about the relatively recent proliferation of university environmental
studies undergraduate and graduate degree programs, and the incredible growth industry
of professional environmental management. While he is careful to qualify his
generalizations with the note that his sample of programs was necessarily arbitrary and
that his generalizations cannot account for the presence of renegade, stealthily subversive
professors and courses, Luke finds environmental studies programs remarkably bereft of
reflexivity and lacking a self-critical culture. Moreover, he finds “the environment” is
consistently theorized in thoroughly reductionist and mechanistic yet highly complex
terms: “[these programs consistently] reframe ‘the environment’ as a highly complex
domain far beyond the full comprehension of ordinary citizens or traditional naturalists”
(Luke, 1999a, p. 105). Luke appears to have located a possible institutional source of the
“interpretive hubris” (Taylor, 2000, p. 275) I discussed in Chapter 4. If Luke is correct
(and I think he is) then the culture of hubris and the “technoscientific discourses” (Luke,
1999a, p. 104) that dominate university environmental studies curricula would certainly
find their way into an increasingly professionalized environmental movement. The result
would not, it is fair to say, clash with the Scientific Committee management model
espoused in the CB alternative.124
My third and final stab at explanation centers on the widely-held environmentalist
disdain toward compromise. The Citizen Committee and the experimental nonessential
status together were perceived by CB supporters as unacceptable compromises for
Bitterroot grizzly reintroduction. Environmentalists have strong and well-founded
reasons to be skeptical of purportedly middle-ground paths that smack of compromise.
124

Where and to what degree this is occurring is, of course, an immediately unanswerable empirical
question (really requiring an in-depth ethnographic analysis of environmental studies programs and their
graduates in environmental NGOs). But after my own small dose of university coursework in
environmental studies, I can personally attest to the existence of a very self-assured, unreflexive student
culture.
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Probably the most famous case comes from the early 1960s, very early in American
establishment environmentalism, when David Brower (the “arch-druid” of American
environmentalism (McPhee, 1971)), then executive director of the Sierra Club, brokered
a deal with the Bureau of Reclamation. Brower agreed to “trade” the damming of Glen
Canyon on the Colorado River for the cancellation of two planned dams in Dinosaur
National Monument (Dowie, 1995). Before the Glen Canyon dam was built, he floated
through it and was awestruck by its magnificence (he had never visited Glen Canyon
prior to the compromise). He later said that he instantly regretted his decision to
compromise away such a natural wonder and – in what has since become a legendary
admonition – urged environmentalists to eschew compromise. With the rise of
professionalized environmentalism in the 1980s, some groups held fast to Brower’s plea
while others found it idealistic and impractical.
For the mainstream national ENGOs, compromise is (literally) the way their
business works. Unapologetic regarding compromise, Jay Dee Hair of the National
Wildlife Federation once stated “We’re not selling out, we’re buying in” (Dowie, 1995,
p. 75). What were they buying into? A place at the Federal table in Washington, DC.
During the 1980s six of the ten largest US environmental organizations had moved their
headquarters to DC and their memberships and budgets swelled, as they hired
professionally trained financial specialists, marketers, and advertisers. The Wilderness
Society, the Sierra Club, and the National Wildlife Federation, for example, all saw their
budgets grow tenfold or more during the decade (Dowie, 1995). Lobbying – for policy
and issue-resolution compromise – became the model. As Jeffrey St. Clair, “the maverick
editor of Wild Forest Review” (Schlosberg, 1997, p. 273), railed:
Somewhere along the line the environmental movement disconnected with
the people. Rejected its political roots, pulled the plug on its vibrant
tradition. It packed its bags, its starched its shirts and jetted to DC where it
became what it once despised: a risk-averse, depersonalized, overly
analytical, humorless, access-driven, intolerant, statistical, centralized,
technocratic, deal-making, passionless, sterilized, direct-mailing, jockstrapped, lawyer-laden monolith to mediocrity (St. Clair, 1995, in
Schlosberg, 1997, p. 275-5).
This institutional transition has opened up a wide rift between a new “corporate
environmentalism” (St. Clair, 1995, paper title) on one ‘side’ and local and regional
groups on the other (with the latter perceiving their power as intentionally and
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increasingly marginalized by the former (Dowie, 1995)). CB supporters didn’t have to
look far, or far back in time, to see evidence they might be wise to greet the CMC
coalition with skepticism. The National Wildlife Federation, with attorney Tom France as
its spokesman, helped broker the “Option 9” compromise plan in the Pacific Northwest
spotted owl controversy – a compromise perceived nearly unanimously as unacceptable
to Northwest forest protection activists (Proctor, 1995; St. Clair, 2004). This was the
same Tom France who would just a few years later be touting the CMC alternative for
Bitterroot grizzly bear recovery as “the radical center.” Like Option 9, the CMC
alternative was a compromise deal brokered between national environmental NGOs and
the timber industry. For many CB supporters, this was evidence enough that the CMC
was yet another deal with the devil. Montanans and Idahoans, to be sure, have good
reason to be wary of compromise plans that have loopholes big enough to drive a logging
truck through.125 For most environmentalists in the region, it seems, there was no real
choice to deliberate. Armed with 20/20 hindsight, however, lamenting the ultimate
derailment of the recovery efforts, I will argue in the following chapter that the CMC
alternative may have deserved a second look.

6.6. Conclusion: the Paradox of Saving Wild Nature
In conclusion, I want to (re)focus on two features of the conservation biology
movement and the CB alternative: paradox and ambivalence. It might be tempting, as
some seem content to do (e.g., Kovel, 2002; Smith, 1998), to write off the efforts of the
conservation biology movement as holding irresolvable contradictions and therefore
representing an indefensible “ideology of nature” (Smith, 1998) in both theory and
practice. But, in a feat of understatement, I would argue that this would, for starters,
ignore the key role this movement plays within the broader environmental movement as
well as ignore its commendable successes. It has been local and regional groups, after all,
125

The oft-voiced mistrust toward the intentions of the timber industry is also understandable. For example,
timber battles in the Northwest supplied much of the proving grounds for the early Wise Use movement
(Brick, 1995). In the cases of the CMC coalition, then, corporate timber’s about-face from unapologetic
‘anti-environmentalism’ to a new spirit of collaborative conservation was understandably viewed with
suspicion. (But it should be noted that although the conflation of corporate timber/Wise Use/antienvironmentalism is probably fair, a similar conflation of anti-environmentalism with timber workers, their
families, their communities, et cetera certainly obscures more than it reveals, including the possibility that
anti-environmentalism is/was a shallow, opportunistic, and alterable political identity (Brick & Weber,
2001). “Anti-environmentalism” is no more consistent and no less riddled with ambivalence than the
environmental ideologies critiqued in this chapter.)
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that have been the most active and (often) successful in holding Federal land
management agencies accountable for unsustainable timber cutting that is in violation of
Federal law; the “mainstream nationals” are conspicuous by their silence in challenging
Federal forest policy and practice (Dowie, 1995; St. Clair, 2004). Noting empirically the
contradictions within the movement (as I did in this chapter and Chapter 4), seeing them
in a broader view as manifestations of “paradox” can help explain them as well as
understand their productive role.
A paradox, quoting James Proctor, “is a contradiction that is none the less true,
i.e., a contradiction whose truth resides in the paradox and is not revealed by resolving it
in some way” (Proctor, 2001, p. 235). Perhaps the fundamental paradox in nature politics
in the West is the ideal (and the ‘reality’, as legislative mandate) for “multiple use” of our
public lands. Just as bears and logging roads may not be compatible,126 environmentalists
and loggers will remain, to some degree, necessarily at odds. Each group espouses
conflicting, but often “irreducibly” legitimate, claims to right and good (Parker, 1996, p.
32). This tension would be impossible to resolve without one group completely doing
away with the other (without, for example, a radical rewriting of Federal lands
management legislation that exclusively favors either conservation or extractive
production over the other127). The CB alternative can be viewed as both manifesting
paradox (a grassroots environmentalism promoting authoritarian management) and as an
outcome of paradox (protecting an idealized wild nature that wears radiocollars).
As Keulartz found in the Dutch eco-restoration movement, I find a striking
ambivalence exhibited throughout the conservation biology literature, as well as its
products in the promotional materials and the public testimonies. Many of the sources of
this ambivalence have already been noted, for example, the wary embrace of technology
as a “less than perfect means” to an idealized ends. There is also an ambivalence that
arises as prominent groups like The Wildlands Project and Alliance for the Wild Rockies
are unable to point to many successes that match the scale of their ambitions.128 Perhaps
126

Though the degree of this incompatibility is widely disputed.
Which each side has, of course, tried unsuccessfully to do.
128
The Wildlands Project, for example, has recently announced that the cancellation of Wild Earth due to
lack of funding (publication of the journal is said to recommence when funding allows). The Spring 2003
issue included a list of accomplishments from the 2002 year. Without wanting to denigrate their
accomplishments, the list is not very impressive. For example, they listed three bulleted “highlights” of
127
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this is partly a result of their model, which (scientifically) mandates grand scale
programmatic goals (e.g., The Wildlands Project’s “continental conservation” (Soulé &
Noss, 1998; Soulé & Terborgh, 1999b)) but also eschews the “beltway” compromises
that might be necessary to effect them. The purist goals and sense of unjust
disempowerment can even help to reinforce each other. TWP and AWR, “partly because
they never exercised [any] real authority, maintained their greatest revolutionary purity”
(Douglas, 1992, p. xiii).129
One additional source of ambivalence and tension is worth noting. CB advocates
were rarely comfortable referring to the Citizen Management alternative by name, often
lobbing at the CMC subtly disparaging monikers such as “the ROOTS proposal”
(highlighting only one of the four main partners in the “coalition,” the forestry industry
group Resource Organization on Timber Supply) or the oft-voiced “so-called Citizen
Management proposal.” By disavowing that “real citizens” would comprise the panel,
they attempted to affix a singularly corporate stamp (moreover, a corporate timber stamp)
onto the CMC. Whether the target was ‘really’ citizens or corporations, it is undeniable
that the CB alternative attempted to “exclude … certain groups from nature policy”
(Keulartz, 1999, p. 91).

Many CB supporters could never, it seems, escape the

ambivalence of their profoundly non-participatory “exclusion position” (Proctor, 2001, p.
234) knowing all the while the complexities of the issue at hand.130
Considering paradox, however, stopping at the accusation of exclusion might
obscure one considerable prospect. If the CB alternative represented an “exclusion
position” – one ‘side’ of the paradox of managing a disappearing nature – then perhaps it
could be given as much credit for producing the CMC alternative as blame for the CMC’s
eventual failure. After all, by “refusing to reduce itself to a weakened version and at
their “Rewild the Rockies” project: (1) “helped convince wildlife agencies in Idaho, Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, and New Mexico to ask the Secretary of the Interior to make significant changes to the current
delisting process for wolves…”; (2) “conducted a two day workshop to review our New Mexico Highlands
conservation plan”; and (3) “collected signature of more than 50 top scientists” to convince the Bush
administration not to delist the gray wolf (Wildlands Project, 2002, p. 6). It is not difficult to imagine why
it is hard to keep money flowing in when those are the types of keystone successes foregrounded in an
annual review.
129
I borrow this quote because it says this so clearly and succinctly, noting though that it was put forward
in an profoundly different context, that of French Fascism in the 1920s!
130
Though not all CB supporters shared in this ambivalence. The folks at the Craighead Wildlife-Wildlands
Institute, for example, exhibited a rather unapologetic stance in defense of unchecked scientific
management.
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worst a mere shadow of [its] core argument” (Proctor, 2001, p. 235), the CB alternative
represented one “extreme” (in a non-disparaging sense) from which a position “nearer the
middle, the compromise position,” is crafted (p. 235). The CMC alternative can be seen,
then, as this ‘real world’ policy reconciliation131 of the grizzly bear/logging paradox.132
Does the CB alternative, then, deserve blame for helping grind the grizzly bear recovery
process to a halt, or credit for helping define the grounds for the program that almost
came to pass? This, I suppose, is an unanswerable empirical question, another paradox
that will fuel future environmental debate.
Regarding the role of ‘critical’ analysis, critiques can help point toward stumbling
blocks within the movement, all the while recognizing that the larger inherent paradox of
environmental protection can never be wholly resolved. If my critiques are construed as
highlighting actual weaknesses in the movement (my intent) – as resolvable
inconsistencies and/or practical impediments – then bringing them to light might
(hopefully) productively assist in the positive development of the movement. On that
note, I turn to my concluding chapter, my last “critical” offering to the conservation
biology movement. In the concluding chapter I offer a critical, if generous, reading of the
CMC alternative, in the belief that we can learn even more from considering what could
have been.

131

To explain the emphasis, “this reconciliation” as opposed to the reconciliation. That would imply a
resolution of the paradox, an oxy-moron that would destroy the theoretical purchase of the concept.
132
Conservation biologists can not, as Neil Smith reminds us, provide us with the goods and services that
make society possible. They simply do not produce that nature. Capitalist logging, on the other hand, as
many equally-Marxist theorists would have it, is not sustainable (e.g., FitzSimmons et al., 1994; O'Connor,
1994; Salleh, 1994). Short of a truly eco-socialism, I suppose the best we can hope for is a productive
bears/logging or (more broadly) conservation/development tension that manages to do “justice” to both
sides. To terminate this footnote, I will add the understatement that environmentalists truly are
marginalized in our contemporary political economy; that is, the bears/logging tension should not be seen
as one played out on the mythical level playing field.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Revisiting the ‘Radical Center’: a Generous
Reading of the Potential of Citizen Management
7.1. Introduction: Lamenting Failure with the Aid of Hindsight
I have say that we (Predator Conservation Alliance) were very
disappointed that the reintroduction did not proceed, because for grizzly
bears to colonize the Bitterroots on their own seems like a real long shot.
Because they’re a slow reproducing species, they don’t have a natural
recolonizing behavior like wolves do… And we’re just concerned that the
trends are going away from connectivity instead of toward it so the more
time we waste in waiting for them to get there the worse the situation
looks in terms of ability for them to do that (Gaillard interview).
Thus lamented Dave Gaillard of Predator Conservation Alliance, former
Conservation Biology alternative stalwart, after being asked how he felt about Gale
Norton’s “reevaluation” of the Record of Decision on Bitterroot grizzly bear recovery –
the action that effectively halted the reintroduction efforts (US EPA, 2001). The bottom
line, for Gaillard, was pretty clear. Reintroduction – even with the CMC alternative –
would be a world more desirable than the current situation. This sentiment was echoed by
all but one of my interview subjects representing seven environmental organizations in
the region. The sentiment was also expressed by the general public, judging from
comments made during the 60 day public comment period following the Secretary’s
action.133 97.9% of all respondents opposed Norton’s reversal. Counting only original
letters written by individuals,134 that is, even disregarding the email and post-card form
letters solicited by Defenders of Wildlife, the National Wildlife Federation, and other
environmental organizations, a full 82% were still opposed to the decision (USFWS,
2001, p. xiv).
Now it cannot be assumed that opponents of the reversal (especially those who
wrote original letters) represented the same 70%-pro-CB/30%-pro-CMC split from the
Draft EIS comment period. It would also be false to read every objection as explicit
support for the CMC alternative.135 But it is quite fair to state that the overwhelming
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Courtesy of NEPA, this was still part of the EIS process.
Identical letters written by as few as 8 people still counted as form letters.
135
Many respondents (i.e., unwavering CB supporters), in fact, seemed to want to have it both ways – they
objected to the reversal of CMC alternative implementation, but on the grounds that the FWS should
134
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majority of environmentalists, including many former CB alternative supporters, felt
personally disappointed and (as environmentalists) betrayed by the administration’s
decision. So this in itself, I believe, warrants a close, but perhaps generous reading, of the
potential of the CMC proposal, acknowledging the fact that it was this proposal that
almost136 resulted in the reintroduction of grizzlies to the Bitterroot – a situation much
preferable to where we find ourselves today. Further, a critical-yet-generous reading
might go some ways toward the environmental pragmatist goal of contributing to the
development of environmental policy and politics. Even Louisa Wilcox – the only CB
supporter I interviewed who did not flatly declare that she would have preferred CMC
implementation to the reversal – acknowledged that things would have to be done
differently next time, that the near-success of the CMC proposal changed the terms on
which future efforts should proceed (Wilcox interview137). After stating that CB
alternative advocates could have benefited from doing a better job in community-scale
organizing and education, specifically going out into the Idaho communities who felt
marginalized by the process, Wilcox added “I really do think you have to unravel this
enough to recreate it in a more grassroots kind of way” (Wilcox interview). Hopefully,
this analysis of the CMC alternative (and the dissertation more broadly) can aid in that
process.

7.2. Reintroduction in Idaho, or, It Isn’t Just the Bitterroot Ecosystem
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CB alternative touted itself as a “jobs
creating proposal” (Garrity, 1996, p. 19). As such, and especially in light of the fact that
the CMC alternative was designed expressly to quell economic concerns, I think it is fair
to comparatively assess the economic components of each proposal. Any essay from the
“new west”/regional-transformation literature, whether a triumphant or critical
assessment, will highlight the problem of job losses within rural counties as extractive
industry employment declines (see any of the “new west” references in section 4 below).

instead switch to the CB alternative. This is the equivalent of objecting to a proposed impeachment of a
president on the grounds that the candidate who originally lost the election should be instated.
136
I think it is fair to assume, for example, that if Al Gore had become President, the Record of Decision
would have been upheld and reintroduction would have proceeded apace.
137
Louisa Wilcox is Wild Bears Project Director for the Natural Resources Defense Council. She works in
NRDC’s Livingston, Montana office. She is a 25 year veteran of conservation in the region and longtime
grizzly bear conservation activist (Rocky Mountain College, 2005).
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And only the most unapologetically boosterist reading will also highlight the wage
discrepancies between the higher paying but increasingly scarce extractive industry jobs
and lower-paying unskilled ‘replacement’ jobs in the service sector – discrepancies as
great as sixty percent in some counties (Snow, 1997).138 As such it is understandable and
commendable that both the CMC and CB alternative included economic components
intended to help mitigate the hardships felt by many locals in the region.
Admirable in intent, the “jobs-creating” component of the CB alternative directly
buffers extractive industry workers’ economic hardship:
Local residents would be hired to carry out restoration work, directly
investing them in grizzly bear restoration. In total, more than 1,501139 new
jobs would be associated with the restoration work … Moreover, these
jobs are largely compensatory for jobs that are foregone as a result of not
building roads and logging roadless areas within the population recovery
zone. The same heavy equipment operators who are used to build roads
can also be hired to take roads out (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 8).
While I will have multiple points to make regarding the CB alternative’s
“compensatory” employment component, the issue I will address now is the question of
where these jobs would be located.

138

Many are quick to point out that statistics like those cited in (Snow, 1997) – where dwindling mining
jobs in Butte average around $50,000 while increasing jobs within the hospitality sector average only
around $20,000 – mask the fact that the average wages in most rural western counties, even within just the
service sector, do not fall below, or at least significantly below, average wages for extractive industry
workers. Fair enough. There has been an incredible regional job growth in, for example, real estate,
engineering, environmental consulting, financial advising, and various professions that are amenable to
telecommuting, and this job growth has offset the job losses in extractive industries – more than offset it in
many places. But few un- or underemployed loggers or miners are qualified (or necessarily desire) to make
the switch to employment as, say, an environmental consultant. So there remain many individuals, subcommunities, and entire towns that have been negatively impacted by the decline in extractive jobs but
have yet to enjoy the benefits of the economic transition.
139
This claim is careless and weakens their argument. The phrase “more than 1,501 new jobs” – like so
many of the projections in the EISs (see chapter 5) – smacks of a transparently false precision that
undermines the intended impression of accuracy.
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Figure 7.1. Jobs-Creating Ecological Restoration Areas in the Conservation Biology
Alternative (map by author)
Two (related) things jump to the forefront when assessing the geographic location
and distribution of the potential jobs created in ecological restoration work as part of the
CB alternative. The first is the dense spatial concentration of the new jobs. Over 92% of
the jobs created lie within the “corridor restoration area” along the Idahopanhandle/Montana border. The second is that all three areas are along the Montana
border (along the east slope of the mountains) and would be much more easily accessible
workplace locations for Montana residents than for Idaho residents. Even more
significantly, only the 9 jobs in the Magruder Restoration Area would be readily
accessible to any of the communities in central Idaho’s “Isolated Timber Dependent
Area” (hereafter ITDA) as defined by the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem
Management Project140 (ICBEMP, 2001a). The jobs component of the CB alternative
vastly favors workers from western Montana’s ITDA.

140

Initiated in 1993 under a directive from President Clinton, the ICBEMP’s purpose was to “develop a
scientifically sound and ecosystem-based strategy for management of [interior Columbia River Basin]
forests” (ICBEMP). The project lasted for eight years, and its products include two Draft EISs, a Final EIS,
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Figure 7.2. The Conservation Biology Alternative with Montana and Idaho’s
Neighboring “Isolated Timber Dependent Areas” Added (map by author)
The spatial segregation of the new jobs becomes apparent when the two ITDAs
are added to the previous map. ITDAs are defined in the ICBEMP as “areas … where
timber related management issues have the potential for the largest influence on isolated
communities” (ICBEMP, 2001a, abstract).141 One conclusion is easy to deduce: This jobs
program would be rather unimpressive to any of the approximately ten thousand residents
of the “mill towns” within the central Idaho ITDA (ICBEMP, 2001b).142 A resident of
Peirce, Idaho, for example, would probably not feel like this jobs program was at all
“compensatory” (Bader & Bechtold, 1996, p. 8) toward his or her personal situation when
7% of the jobs (the Lolo Pass jobs) were going to be at least 3 ½-4 hours away, while
92% of the jobs (the Corridor Restoration jobs) would be 5-8 hours away (in both cases,
dozens of technical reports, and a wealth of regional GIS data that is available free to the public via
download from the ICBEMP website.
141
And it is probably worth reemphasizing that the ICBEMP and the Bitterroot grizzly debates were
concurrent. So the Bitterroot recovery alternative architects were working with the same demographic and
economic data as were the ICBEMP staff.
142
“Mill towns” are defined by ICBEMP as towns “with mills or jobs related to the timber industry”
(ICBEMP, 2001b, abstract). The seven mill towns in the central Idaho ITDA are Grangeville (pop. 3,226),
Orofino (2,868), Kamiah (1,157), Pierce (746), Kooskia (692), Craigmont (542), and Weippe (532)
(ICBEMP, 2001b)
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the figures represent approximate one-way driving times). Now I realize that this is only
one (rather crude) ‘spatial analysis’ of the CB jobs program. I would argue, however, that
(a) the analysis is fair in that it represents what would likely be the most severely and
quickly impacted communities within the region; and (b) this analysis sufficiently
grounds the larger point I want to draw out of this. I will take each of these in turn.
Point ‘a’: the central Idaho ITDA includes the communities that would likely be
the earliest and most severely impacted by implementation of the CB alternative. All
habitat analyses of the region were in consensus that the national forests north of the
wilderness recovery/reintroduction area contained some of the best grizzly habitat in the
region. Logging within roadless areas of these national forests was prohibited by fiat in
the CB alternative. As they lay within the CB “grizzly bear recovery area,” all national
forest timber harvests in roaded portions of the forests (i.e., outside of roadless areas)
would have been subject to full Section 7 consultation to ensure that they did not
adversely affect grizzly habitat. It can further be assumed that environmentalists in the
region would have challenged all approved timber harvests in the recovery area. Judging
by the experience of timber harvesting on the Targhee National Forest (another Forest in
grizzly country, but home to the Yellowstone subpopulation of bears), the combination of
Section 7 requirements and litigation in grizzly habitat is a potent tool for stopping or
drastically reducing national forest timber harvests. This is not to argue that Idaho
residents (especially grizzlies) have not ultimately benefited from reduced harvests on the
Targhee or that curtailing timber harvest on the central Idaho forests would not impart
benefits of its own.143 It does, however, support my argument that these communities
would have been the most severely impacted by the implementation of the CB proposal
(at least in its initial stages).
And this brings me to point ‘b’: the CB proposal represents an insensitivity to the
communities that will bear the most immediate burdens of its implementation. Adding
insult to injury, it seems, a “compensatory” job program was established that failed to
offer anything, really, to the residents of these communities (and more broadly, all of
Idaho west and south of the ITDA). I can only conclude, then, that the CMC alternative

143

The idea that increased Federal lands protection is ultimately beneficial to local communities and
regional development is central to the “new west” narrative (e.g., Power, 1996b; Power & Barrett, 2001)
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was a much more socially sensitive – perhaps even just – conservation proposal.144
Despite rampant misinterpretation by so many of its critics, the CMC alternative did not
guarantee the residents of the central Idaho ITDA continued timber employment or
unchecked harvests on national forests. It did, however, extend something of a ‘deal’
along the lines of “we will not use grizzly recovery as an avenue to blockade timber
harvest in the national forests surrounding the recovery area (though we do ask that it be
taken into account when planning timber harvests).” The CB alternative, for residents of
central Idaho, extended no similar offer.
So how was it that the CB jobs component – the ‘good faith’ offer toward
economically squeezed timber workers – fell so blatantly in favor of Montana residents? I
think it is primarily an artifact of the naturalistic framing of the region as merely
comprised of multi-scalar, nested, “ecosystems.” Now while there is plenty to be
commended in the “bioregionalism” literature that foregrounds the ecological and social
advantages of “dwelling” within ‘naturally’ bounded areas (e.g., watersheds, ecosystems)
(Fox, 2003, p. 253) over being political subjects within arbitrary and ‘artificially’
bounded spaces, a wholly naturalized conception of space that omits “place” (McGinnis,
1999)145 from the bioregional narrative can produce problematic results. Case in point:
the CB alternative – framing the space in question as Bitterroot-Ecosystem-withinNorthern-Rockies-Ecosystem – “smothered” (Keulartz, 1999, p. 95) the real social,
political, and economic differences between (and within) central Idaho and western
Montana, or Idaho and Montana more broadly. The result? Yet another centrally-planned
and -administered conservation program that fails to integrate into the conservation
equation the concerns and considerations of the majority of local residents; ultimately
failing also to consider (or even recognize) the effects of its actions on these same people.
That the epicenter of the centralized planning is now western Montana and not
Washington DC is an insignificant point for a resident of central Idaho. Social and
political difference – or, geographically, the spaces and places of the ecologically
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Though, as rewilding advocates have warned (see Chapter 4 section 5 above), “conservation plan[s]
cannot give equal weight to biocentric and socioeconomic goals, or the former will never be realized”
(Soulé & Noss, 1998, p. 25).
145
This reference is to the edited book Bioregionalism (McGinnis, 1999), all of the contribution of which
emphasize the central place of “place” within bioregionalism.
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unenlightened – become mere obstacles between our present, defiled state and an
idealized end.
As I hope to have made clear, I believe that driving more wedges between
environmentalists and everyone-else will not save wild nature, much less lead us toward
more sustainable modes of living. On that litmus test, the CMC proposal clearly falls out
as preferable to the CB proposal. That noted, my preference for the CMC, as it stands so
far, is based (primarily) in critiques of and (secondarily) in comparative assessments
against the CB proposal. My most elaborated discussion of the CMC proposal, Chapter 5,
is less a judgment and more an explanation of the rhetorical and strategic components of
the proposal. In other words, I have yet to articulate a critique or defense of the CMC
proposal itself. That will be the task of the following sections, the first of which makes a
general case for the collaborative conservation model, after which I asses hypothetical
future scenarios of a CMC-managed Bitterroot population of grizzly bears.

7.3. A Case for Collaborative Conservation
In this section, I argue a general case for the positive potential of collaborative,
community-based conservation initiatives on public lands. I will draw primarily on an
essay by collaborative conservation champion Donald Snow (1997) that succinctly and
forcefully defends collaborative conservation in an historical and contemporary analysis
of Western public lands management and politics. My intent in this section is not to
review the various aspects of the Citizen Management Committee (as I hope to have
already accomplished that task) but rather to provide the initial grounds for the case that
the CMC represents a worthwhile “experiment” in public lands management authority
devolution.
Snow recounts the West’s “legacy of dependence” on the Federal Government:
“Virtually every state and every rural county … remains profoundly dependent on the
flow of revenues from public lands” (Snow, 1997, p. 189, emphasis in original). As I
showed in chapter five, in the Bitterroot region of Idaho this has been the case for nearly
all of the post-Euro-American-settlement history of the region.146 The pattern that has

146

To restate (following chapter five) the historical depth of this problem, this history of disempowered
citizens predates the growth of corporate timber in the State. By 1870, only a decade after Elias Pierce’s
discovery of goal at Orofino Creek in 1960, gold prospectors in Idaho found themselves mostly poor and
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developed out of the “historical accident” of the Federal Government owning half or
more of the land has been one of often-massive, and always massively-subsidized,
development of the natural resources of the Federal lands. Every oil- or gas-development
project, hardrock mine, timber sale, water project and even grazing allotment in the West
is heavily subsidized by the Federal Government. That these projects were usually
Washington/state/corporate backroom deals (though their transparency has certainly
improved in the past quarter-century), and just as often proceeded in highly unsustainable
fashion, has given rise to the well-known boom/bust economic cycles that typified the
rural West for most of the twentieth century.
This cycle of dependence and despair has given rise to an opportunistic political
leadership where “plans for resource development – indeed, for any development – are
never denied” (p. 189). The result is a region containing both an angry, disempowered
citizenry and an elected leadership content to “avoid tough decisions [and continue]
reaching deep into the pork barrel to keep the benefits flowing and the true costs of
resource development hidden from public view” (p. 190). The political “impotence” (p.
190) of Western residents Snow describes has been articulated by a number of writers
sympathetic to conservation. Former Missoula Mayor and CMC advocate Daniel
Kemmis, for example, describes the West as a region where “democratic human
sovereignty ha[s] been atrophied by decades of bureaucracy” under a system of
governance that by any accounts seems bent on “threaten[ing] self-determination”
(Kemmis, 1998, p. 4,5). (Although I would add that singling out “bureaucracy” as the
villain lays the blame too singularly on the Federal Government and plays into the Wise
Use creed of State-(corporate) control over Federal lands, even as that is far from
Kemmis’

intent.

Snow’s

Federal-Government/corporate/State-political-leadership

collusion better captures the complexity of the history and the difficulty of overcoming
it). As shown in the regional historical overview in Chapter 5, the Northern Rockies and
central Idaho are dominated by Federal lands and play the rule to Snow’s model sociopolitical West.

powerless. “By, then, the individual miner had become just another tiny gear in a gigantic industrial
machine” (Peterson, 1976, p. 61).

201

Over the past three decades or so, environmentalists and academics have done an
exhaustive job of exposing the grand sham of subsidizing the unsustainable exploitation
of the region’s Federal lands. Now fully exposed, “what the region faces … is essentially
the end of the great federal experiment” (Snow, 1997, p. 186). Three alternative ‘models’
of management are rising out of the ashes.147
One is a rush to privatization, where “instead of relying on distant (or not-sodistant) bureaucrats to act as environmental stewards, we could trust the marketplace, for
private resource owners will always tend to act to protect their property, whereas
bureaucrats will tend to act to protect their own rear ends” (p. 193). Environmentalists
have been selective and opportunistic endorsers of the privatization movement. For
example, they love to lay bare the “lie” of subsidized timber harvests on national
forests148 but have been vocal opponents of fees on backcountry camping and hiking on
Federal lands which would go toward covering the costs of trail maintenance and
recreation management. And there is nothing inherently disingenuous about selectively
appropriating privatization schemes on Federal lands. As multiple authors have argued, in
some cases free-market approaches are appropriate and benefit environmentalist
objectives while in others cases they run counter to the goals of the movement (diZerega,
1996; Power, 1997). But enthusiastically toeing the privatization line marks dangerous
ground for environmentalists, as blanket admonishments against “subsidies” can easily
appear disingenuous. National parks and wilderness areas, after all, are just as heavily
subsidized as Federal lands logging. One of the true challenges for western
147

I suppose a fourth model could be mentioned, but its hypocrisy is so transparent and its goals so
unapologetically and singularly geared toward profit for a few, that at best it deserves to be a footnote (even
if some of its mouthpieces, such as New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici, hold Federally-elected office).
This would be the most extreme and radical side of what remains of the Wise Use movement – the program
of which is basically to do away with all environmental regulations all the while legislatively mandating the
development of all timber, oil and gas, hardrock, and range resources on all Federal lands, including
wilderness areas and even national parks.
148
I will take one last poke at Alliance for the Wild Rockies’ promotion of the CB alternative. In their
economic analysis of timber versus restoration jobs in the Bitterroot (itself a strategic move in casting them
as mutually exclusive), an interesting rhetorical maneuver is worth noting. They cast “short-term timber
jobs” (which are “unsustainable” and being lost due to “technological improvements” anyway) against their
proposed “good jobs”/“high-paying jobs”/“quality jobs” in ecological restoration. In doing so, they produce
an inevitability to the transition away from (any and all) Federal lands logging, making obsolete all
conversations of the possibility of sustainable forestry on the Federal lands in the region (and, as Rocky
Barker (1997) urges Rocky Mountain Northwest environmentalists to consider, there is plenty reason to
believe that this is possible). The “good jobs [in ecological restoration] which could spread out well into the
21st century” (Garrity, 1996, p. 20), it should be noted, were projected to last ten years.
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environmentalists, to be sure, is to articulate their goals and programs in ways which can
silence the many critics who see the movement as harboring an elitism that borders on
hypocrisy (Pendley, 1994; White, 1995).149 Hostile admonitions against decentralized
management (see footnote 153, below) do little to temper this image.
The second model of Federal lands management basically stays the course of
federally centralized techno-scientific planning and rational management, but does so
now under the mantra “this time we are going to get it right.” Of course, the Federal
Government and the land management agencies are leading this trend, and its place as
well as its promise should not be discounted. Now that the sham has been exposed, we
should be thankful (or at least hopeful) that where centralized management structures
persist (including where they are necessary, for better or for worse, such as managing the
network of dams along the Columbia River or the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory150), the agencies will act in a more accountable and sustainable fashion.
The third model may have been foreordained eighty years ago by John Dewey151
and a couple of decades later by Aldo Leopold,152 but only in the past decade or so has it
really begun to make waves in Federal lands management. This model does not eschew
Federal management per se,153 but rather “attempts … to make [it] more responsive,
more attuned to public needs (especially) local needs, more democratic” (Snow, 1997, p.
149

And this selection of two references (from the many that could have been chosen) was made to highlight
that this common and valid criticism can and does come from both the political right (Pendley) and left
(White).
150
And this is not to make a case for or against either of these environmentally destructive behemoths, or to
deny that some degree of increased community involvement in their management might be envisioned. My
more specific point is that the new model won’t work everywhere, and where it will, it won’t be
accomplished overnight – megadam networks and nuclear research facilities are probably not the most
logical places to begin the experiment of decentralized management.
151
“Eighty years ago John Dewey asked how citizens could participate in political decision making
dependent on knowledge experts. Since then the question has only grown in importance” (Fischer, 2000, p.
28).
152
“Aldo Leopold … frequently reminded people that conservation’s central goal should be to enhance not
only how people relate to the land, but also how people relate to one another” (Fischer, 1998, p. 121).
153
Snow argues that collaborative management models “are attempts not to erase or abdicate existing
structures of government – as some have erroneously argued…” (p. 186). This “some” would have to
include Friends of the Bitterroot, who, in their letter to the FWS protested that “[T]he CMC has essentially
been given control of national public lands. This is an unprecedented disaster. Will our national parks be
next? What about foreign policy?” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-125, emphasis in original). This statement can be
contested on a number of levels. First, it overstates its case: the CMC (with Federal, State, Tribal, and
citizen members) has been given management authority over the reintroduced bears, not “control of lands.”
Second, it smacks of hypocrisy, as the Scientific Committee was designed to give outside members a
guaranteed minimum 50% representation. Third, the foreign policy comment makes laughable the “slippery
slope” line of argumentation.
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186, emphasis in original). This is the growing movement toward decentralized,
collaborative management authority (when and where appropriate) over public lands.
Snow admits to the experimental nature of “collaborative management” (the most
common catchphrase for this new trend in management), but none the less endorses “the
risk of the local, [meaning] entrusting local people with a major share of decision making
about the lands proximate to their communities – both private and public lands” (p. 195).
It is a risk indeed – history underscores the pervasiveness of short-term thinking in the
region and the volatility and despair that mark the Western “boomtown mentality” (p.
195). Gus diZerega underscores how the pros and cons of community conservation are
nowhere more amplified than in the rural West. On the positive side,
community-based approaches [can facilitate] preserving and enhancing
environmental values [and] can bring unparalleled sensitivity to local
circumstances and opportunities, allowing a fine-tuned approach
unavailable to centralized management… A community-oriented strategy
maximizes points for innovation … Successes can be copied, failure
avoided (diZerega, 1996, p. 109).
But on the negative side,
Local communities, particularly in ecologically critical areas, are often not
wealthy, and therefore are subject to strong economic pressure for hasty
development. This situation afflicts the rural West … [where
communities] are often dominated by local elites tied emotionally as well
as economically to extractive industries… They can be extraordinarily
myopic to the wider impact of local decisions (p. 109-110).
Echoing diZerega, Snow prefers the term “community conservation” to the more
popular “collaborative conservation” because an emphasis on community more clearly
accentuates the new model’s potential strengths as well as why it is a true alternative to
the dominant model. For Snow, community conservation imparts three distinct reasons to
believe its idealism is not unfounded. First, local communities care deeply about and will
work to protect their “nearby natural resources” (Snow, 1997, p. 197). For
environmentalists who point to case after case of local opposition to conservation
agendas, it can be argued that this is more a result of rural Westerners’ sense of perpetual
disempowerment (a disempowerment that many feel has been exacerbated by
environmentalists) and less a sign of inalterable anti-conservation sentiments. It could be
further countered that empirical evidence points just as strongly in a positive direction.
After all, it was residents of the Bitterroot Valley in 1962, who – through a coalition of
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timber workers, farmers, developers, and mountain recreationists – formed the first
organized opposition to the radically increased levels of timber harvests in their
surrounding national forests (Bolle, 1997). More recent evidence abounds as well. Take,
for example, the Applegate Partnership in southwest Oregon, where environmentalists,
loggers, and various other local citizens have worked for over a decade to establish
common ground from which to develop sustainable watershed-scale development and
conservation plans. After a few years of stiff resistance to the local coalition, even the
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management are now active partners in the group
(Little, 1999). So despite the scarred, clearcut hillsides, dammed rivers and overgrazed
rangelands so ubiquitous throughout the West, empirical evidence exists to back up the
intuitive notion that people care about and will protect their surrounding landscapes when
given the chance.
Snow’s second advantage of community conservation echoes many of the
sentiments of the bioregional movement, that is, when communities are active in
conservation, the communities are conserved as well. Collaborative community
conservation forces people into finding and fostering common ground. A significant, if
secondary, result is stronger communities, which in turn can be more effective in
achieving collaborative objectives. As such, a positive feedback loop of sorts is set in
motion once well-organized, committed efforts at community conservation are underway.
Finally, especially in the West, where nearly every community is so directly invested (on
multiple levels) in the surrounding public lands, the sense of community extends beyond
the local to encompass the public lands. A defensive, provincial sense of community,
then, would be counterproductive and would belie the multi-scalar mandate of Federal
lands management. Evidence suggests that this is not an abstract utopian projection. Herb
Reid and Betsy Taylor have empirically found in Appalachia “that a place-based politics
does not have to be and must not be a place-bound politics” (Reid & Taylor, 2003, p. 89).
Snow admits and acknowledges that representing national interests (which in the
rural West often means getting environmentalists a seat at the table) in the “most rural
reaches of the West” presents a great challenge, and some will no doubt exploit the
“new” model as a means to “help governmental agencies and/or corporate interests
proceed even more efficiently with predetermined agendas to develop public lands”
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(Snow, 1997, p. 199). Noting that possibility, it could be countered that the existing
structure is no less vulnerable – the dominant paradigm has certainly been exploited
countless times to the same effect. Snow admits that the new model is largely untested,
that it is a call for an experiment (though preliminary results, such as the Applegate
Partnership, are encouraging). But he is also resolutely optimistic. In the following
section, I argue that grizzly reintroduction in the Bitterroot did provide an appropriate
opportunity to test the collaborative model, and that a little more optimism regarding the
potential of the CMC proposal was probably due.

7.4. What If? Thinking about the CMC Alternative as if it were in place
And in the caverns of tomorrow
With just our flashlights and our love
We must plunge, we must plunge, we must plunge154
Supporters of the CB alternative, as shown in the previous chapter, adamantly
opposed the idea of non-experts being granted management authority over the
reintroduced grizzly bear population. Even more disconcerting, they argued, was the
likelihood that the ‘citizens’ serving on the committee would not have a sincere
commitment to grizzly recovery. This perceived potential defect in the committee could
adversely affect the reintroduced grizzlies in two ways. First, the committee might too
readily lean toward killing ‘problem bears’. Additionally (and not unrelated to the first
concern155) was the idea that CMC management decisions, most specifically those related
to timber plans on national forests surrounding the wilderness areas, would consistently
fall against the bear and in favor of ‘industry’. The cumulative effects of “anti-bear”156
management decisions, it was feared, could doom the recovery effort to failure.
Several lines of reasoning can be followed in response to these concerns. The first
response, that checks against sabotage were built into the CMC proposal, is worth
restating (it was mentioned in Chapter 4) as its significance should not be understated. It
is also straightforward and was articulated directly by the FWS in the Final EIS. The
clearest way to do this, then, is to quote a concern as stated by one of the CMC proposal’s
154

Lyrics to “At The Bottom Of Everything.” Lyrics by Conor Oberst. Music by Bright Eyes (Oberst,
2005).
155
The concern over management kills raises both (a) the ethical (i.e., animal rights) objection to
unnecessary killings of individual bears and (b) the broader ecological concern that every dead bear
compromises the chances for the recovery of the population (i.e., it not going extinct).
156
That the CMC would be “anti-bear” was nearly a mantra at the Draft EIS hearings.
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fiercest opponents and follow this with the FWS’s response, documented in the Final
EIS.157
Here is the general misgiving as voiced by Friends of the Bitterroot:
By placing management in the hands of local citizens who may or may not
have any interest in recovering the bear, the agency fails to act in a way
that is in concert with recovery … This is nothing but a legal shell-game
(USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-125, emphasis in original).
To this omnipresent objection, FWS replied:
The CMC decisions, management plans and their implementation must
lead to grizzly bear recovery. If there is concern over CMC actions leading
to recovery, a Scientific Review Panel could be invoked to review CMC
actions and decisions and make recommendations as to whether CMC
actions … are leading to recovery (USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-124).
CMC decisions must lead to recovery. “Fine,” a cynic might reply, “and the EPA is
making sure my air and water remain clean as well. Why should I believe that ‘the
system’ will work, all of a sudden, in this case?” I think there are a few reasons to believe
that the CMC would not have resulted in a worst-case-scenario (i.e., anti-bear committee
makes decisions that harm bear; bears die; recovery fails). For one, despite the posturing
and rhetorical protestations by Idaho’s elected officials, Idahoans had plenty to gain from
making this recovery successful, and would likely have acted accordingly. Perhaps even
more significantly, the State’s interests would suffer from deliberately (or carelessly)
letting the program fail due to lack of commitment or effort.
Proposals like the CMC alternative require either a certain degree of faith or
favorable evidence to be convincing. The CMC proposal solicited faith from regional
residents and environmentalists – faith in the promise that citizens could and would work
together to promote and ensure grizzly recovery in the Bitterroot. If successful, there
157

Although, for obvious reasons, the FWS did not respond directly to every letter and comment sent as
part of the Draft EIS public comment component, it did directly respond to 18 letters from “the most
prominent or most vocal large private organizations representing the diverse points of view and concerns
about the proposal” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 5-120) as well as all 37 Federal, state, and local elected officials or
governmental bodies who wrote letters on the proposal. These 55 letters were reproduced in full
photocopied form in the Final EIS, along with a point-by-point response from the FWS. Considering the
strident opposition from both sides represented in these letters (from, for example on the pro-recovery side,
Friends of the Bitterroot and Alliance for the Wild Rockies, and from the anti-grizzly-recovery side,
Concerned About Grizzlies and the Idaho Farm Bureau), this point-by-point response really does seem to
be a fine example of agency accountability. The FWS response was also not just Federally-mandated lip
service. Despite sticking with their ‘preferred alternative’ from start to finish, the FWS did make many
changes to the Final EIS based on comments made in response to the Draft EIS. One significant change
was the addition of two “scientific advisors” to the Citizen Management Committee.
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would be evidence in support of future participatory efforts. If the effort failed, however,
and much worse if the failure could be tied to a lack of commitment or sincerity of effort,
then no one – whether it be groups like NWF searching for new collaborative models, or
state and local governments (historically disempowered scales in endangered species
management) – would have a leg to stand on if advocating anything other than traditional
top-down federal management of lands and species in the future. This is not a trend that
many residents of Idaho, and certainly not their elected officials, would want to
propagate.
So I have established two ‘checks’ against the feared political sabotage of the
recovery efforts. The first is the built-in mandate that ‘[a]ll decisions of the CMC must
lead to recovery of the grizzly bear in the BE” (USFWS, 2000a, p. 2-11). Secondly, it is
not difficult to argue that working sincerely toward recovery (and hence success of the
CMC program) represented the best interests of Idaho residents – even those who vocally
opposed the program. Beyond these, there are additional ‘checks’ built into the system
that would work in favor of its success. For one, the remaining two constituencies on the
committee (not counting the Idaho representatives) were from the Nez Perce Tribe and
the State of Montana. The Nez Perce Tribe was on the record as supporting the CMC
alternative, and there is little reason to believe that they would sit quietly if they felt the
recovery goals were being sabotaged.158 The Governor of the State of Montana during the
EIS process, Mark Racicot, also endorsed the CMC coalition. Granted, Governors
change,159 and this does represent a good degree of potential political malleability
regarding CMC appointees. But in the case of Montana, due to the State’s increasingly
prominent environmentalist constituency, I believe it would be difficult for a Montana
Governor to appoint anti-bear committee members. The addition of scientific advisors to
the committee would also, one would hope, serve as a check against sabotage.
Even considering the possibility that the committee would not sincerely work
toward bear recovery (a possibility I consider remote based on the previous evidence),
158

I base this claim in my four years of professional experience as an employee of the Nez Perce Tribe
Natural Resources Department. The Nez Perce Tribe has a longstanding and impressively successful record
of wildlife management and recovery, including their subcontracted work as the day-to-day managers of
the reintroduced gray wolf population in central Idaho.
159
The governor that followed Racicot was no shining example guaranteeing grizzly-friendly CMC
Montana appointees. In a now famous declaration, soon to be Governor Judy Martz once promised to be “a
lapdog of industry” at a campaign rally (Ring, 2002).
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actually working against grizzly recovery would be extremely difficult for the committee
to get away with. The reintroduction process would have been a highly visible and easily
trackable project (especially in its early years as all the reintroduced bears would be
collared and the growth and movement of the population would be monitored). CMC
committee meetings would also have been open to the public. As such, it would have
been very difficult for the committee to hide intentionally counter-productive decisions,
and there would have been a lot of groups (e.g., NWF, Defenders of Wildlife, the Nez
Perce Tribe, one would hope the State of Montana and eventually the State of Idaho) with
vested interests in seeing the program succeed, not to mention any groups that would be
watching closely, waiting for it to fail (as we could assume would be the case for some,
even if we might wish otherwise).
“Fine,” responds my hypothetical CMC-cynic, “but what you haven’t mentioned
is that your best case scenario is the establishment of one other small, isolated
subpopulation of grizzly bears within (already protected) Federally designated wilderness
areas. This recovery plan still does nothing to reestablish links with existing grizzly
populations by protecting and restoring habitat.” One response would be that these goals
go well beyond the scope of the ESA, since it is a stretch to claim that a fully connected
metapopulation is necessary to ensure the grizzly bear’s viability in the lower 48 States.
This is not to argue that a grizzly bear metapopulation isn’t a laudable goal, much less
that we should cease working toward. It can and has successfully been argued, however,
that the metapopulation recovery program is not the only way to achieve recovery. To
guard against genetic depression in the various populations, for example, translocations
could serve as proxies for corridors,160 and switching one or two bears every twenty to
thirty years (hardly offensively intensive management) would suffice (Hedrick, 1995;
Allendorf, 1997). But beyond making a case for the CB alternative as beyond the scope
of the ESA (a response that would fail to satisfy my CMC-cynic), adding a temporal
dimension to the potential of the CMC recovery program reopens the (currently closed)
possibility of protected habitat, corridors, all of the goals of the CB alternative.

160

And remember, this is all said in lieu of the fact that we don’t even know how effectively or even if
grizzly bears would utilize corridors between the subpopulations (Simberloff et al., 1992). They are not a
rapidly dispersing species (Gaillard interview; Fischer interview).
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In reexamining the predicted growth rate of the reintroduced population, we see
that after 20 years the population (if successfully growing) is projected to consist of
approximately somewhere between 40 and 60 grizzly bears. After 40 years, between 60
and 125 bears. It is 50 years down the road, and this using the most optimistic growth
projections (it “could likely take more than 100 years”), before the tentative target
population for recovery of 280 bears would be reached (USFWS, 2000a, pp. 2-19 and 220). So if CMC sabotage is feared, it seems like this fear is being projected very far into
the future. If in twenty years the population was growing healthily and consisted of
around 50 bears, the population could still be easily ‘contained’ by the large existing
wilderness areas. 40 years out, with up to 125 bears, this is still the case. Problem bears,
for example, those that wandered into the Bitterroot valley east of the recovery area (as
Louisa Wilcox (interview) predicted they would begin doing early in the effort), would
still have plenty of space available for relocation within the wilderness recovery area. In
cases such as these, the ESA Section 9 prohibition against killing grizzlies would still
hold (i.e., people could not kill these “experimental nonessential” bears any more than if
they were granted fully protected ESA “threatened” status; the exception is acting in selfdefense, which is allowable for “threatened” bears as well161). As Servheen pointed out in
the interviews in “Bear Wars,” the protocol for problem bears is little different than it is
in the other grizzly bear populations enjoying the full protection of Section 9. It seems
fair, then, to judge the objections to the Section 9 compromises as hyperbole.
Before I move ahead with an assessment of the CMC in light of the other primary
ESA concession (the lack of Section 7 consultation), bringing in the issue of time
provides an opportunity for a productive pragmatist intervention. Pragmatism (as noted in
161

There are some slight differences in the application of Section 9 to the experimental Bitterroot
population. One is that a “livestock owner may be issued a permit to kill a grizzly bear killing or pursuing
livestock on private lands if it has not been possible to capture such a bear or deter depredations through
agency efforts” (USFWS, 1997a, p. 2-77). I suppose in a political climate particularly hostile to grizzly
recovery, this is one place where the experimental status could be exploited by anti-bear forces. None the
less, the situation itself would be rare, rarer even when considering the climate necessary for it to be
exploited. The second exception is “[f]ollowing issuance of a permit by the USFWS, the public would be
allowed to harass, through non-injurious means, a grizzly bear attacking livestock (cattle, sheep, horses,
and mules) or bees” (p. 2-77). I would hardly rate this as highly objectionable. I also cannot help myself
from commenting a little further on this passage: It is a rare treat to be amused by an EIS, but the thought of
a beekeeper having his bees attacked by a grizzly, calling the FWS, being issued a permit, then finally
being allowed to non-injuriously harass the bear should bring a grin to even the most bleary-eyed social
scientist.
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the previous chapter) emphasizes the “open ended nature of moral experience” and just as
fundamentally “suggests a more processual view of ethics, one in which values,
principles, and moral standards emerge through the method of experimentation and
situational analysis rather than just being taken off the shelf and imposed on specific …
conflicts” (Minteer, 2004, p. 107, second emphasis added). We cannot assume, in other
words, that our own standards or anyone else’s will remain static as the processes of
“experimentation and situational analysis” develop and change with time (we can, as a
matter of fact, assume the converse). The CB alternative assumed that its “off the shelf”
solution (“permanent” protection of maximum habitat) was the only way to produce the
(one) socio-spatial structure that could guarantee the viability of the grizzly bear. By
projecting a fixed state of affairs indefinitely out in time (implicit in its social assumption
and explicit in its population viability analysis extinction projections), the CB alternative
failed to recognize (at least) two things: first, there is no imaginable means, outside of
coercion (and this itself is, thankfully, not an available option), to arrive instantly at this
fixed end, much less remain there indefinitely; second, implementation of the CMC
proposal would not have precluded, and may have even fostered, desirable change.
As Charlene Haddock Seigfried argues, “pragmatism’s experimental method
undermines the conservatism that seeks to preserve … standards despite changing
conditions” (Seigfried, 1998, p. 191). To paraphrase Kelly Parker, the pragmatic method
aims for an attunement to the right and the good and an ability to foster change so that
what is good is what grows (Parker, 1996). If this pragmatic mandate is rather abstract,
placing it in the context of the ‘problematic situation’ of grizzly recovery in the BE
brings to light a fundamental difference in the two recovery alternatives. The CB
alternative aimed for a fixed, unchanging socio-spatial end (ironically, in the name of
fostering

evolutionary

change).

Following

Seigfried,

the

CB

alternative

is

(philosophically and politically) conservative in assuming it is Right and would forever
remain Right. The CMC alternative, by contrast, read generously162 could be seen as
pragmatist – experimental and unapologetically open-ended, and even progressive –
162

That is, not interpreted as merely fostering a “new” three-headed monster to (literally) rule the West – a
collusion of national-NGO/corporate-timber/Federal-government to the exclusion of the more ambitious
“new conservation movement.” If this was indeed the motive, or would have been the result (both of which
I highly doubt), it shallowness (and my interpretive naiveté) would have been exposed soon enough.
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fostering changes necessary to move in the direction of broader, abstract goals of
community, sustainability, and grizzly bear conservation163 (all three of which can only
be viewed as emergent and ever-changing “values, principles, and moral standards”).
Stated in a different way, just because one proposal (the CMC alternative) is less
determinant that the other (the CB alternative) does not mean that the more determinant
of the two better establishes the (socioeconomic, regulatory, protective, etc.) grounds
from which long-term grizzly conservation goals can proceed. As diZerega argues, “[w]e
need to become pragmatic when considering strategies and policies. No single strategy is
suitable for every problem. Society is as complex as an ecosystem, and ideological or
political rigidity on public policy is hardly a wise approach” (diZerega, 1996, p. 110).
Judged in this manner, the CMC alternative is certainly still preferable to the current state
of affairs but also, I would argue, begins to demonstrate its own merits as well as its
potential preferability over the CB alternative. I will now return to the specific analyses
of the controversial components of the CMC proposal, focusing on the concessions to
ESA Section 7 that accompany the experimental nonessential population status.
For CB supporters, the lack of required Section 7 consultation for national forest
management activities represented an even more worrisome compromise than did the
Section 9 concessions. As bears wandered north out of the recovery area into the (nonwilderness) national forests, they would be entering the “Bitterroot experimental
population area.” As grizzly bears (re)colonize these “multiple-use” forests, the CMC
would make non-binding recommendations to the Forest Service regarding the effects of
planned forests uses (e.g., timber, off-road vehicle usage) on the grizzly population.
Under the CB alternative, with the bears enjoying full Section 7 habitat protection (as
these areas would have been within the primary recovery area), the burden of proof
would have been on the national forests – every timber harvest would have to be shown
to not adversely affect grizzly bear habitat. Moreover, all logging and roadbuilding in
roadless areas would have been prohibited. Here, clearly, is a component of the CMC
163

And, for a rewilder, within the goal of grizzly conservation lay the goals of core reserves (with grizzlies,
after CMC implementation), corridors (which, as Servheen has repeatedly stressed, are neither off the FWS
and IGBC agendas nor excluded from future restoration and conservation by the CMC alternative), and
buffers (like corridors, the development of which is not excluded by the CMC proposal; the “experimental
population area” surrounding the wilderness core “recovery area” could even ideally be a place to test the
buffer concept out on the ground).
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alternative that really could fall in favor of timber production at the expense of grizzly
bears. Roads could be built, quality forested habitat could be cleared; thus opening up the
forests (potentially including roadless areas) to human access, resulting in increased
human-bear conflict and some combination of illegally killed grizzlies and humanconditioned grizzlies (the latter condition which more often than not ultimately results in
dead bears). If this possibility provides grounds enough to oppose the CMC alternative,
fair enough. Even so, I would argue against that line of reasoning based on current and
projected socioeconomic trends.
Countless studies have announced the arrival of a “new west” – citing economic
trends in the region moving away from resource extraction and toward an amenity-based
economy that favors land conservation over mining, logging, and livestock grazing
(Garrity, 1996; Power, 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Power & Barrett, 2001; Rasker, 1994, 1995;
Rasker & Hackman, 1996; Riebsame et al., 1997; Rudzitis, 1996). If this is indeed the
case,164 then the region would have to undergo a major retransformation for large-scale
timber harvests (especially in roadless areas) to regain prominence in national forest
management. If the amenity-based, pro-conservation transition continues, then at best
(from a grizzly bear conservation perspective) large-scale clearcutting of the national
forests would never be proposed. At worst, the general pro-conservation climate would
be powerful enough to moderate (through the CMC or otherwise) timber plans so as not
to jeopardize grizzly recovery. In either case, aren’t “we” (grizzly recovery advocates)
better off with a grizzly population in the Bitterroots and a Citizen Management
Committee in place that could, at least, influence national forest management in the favor
of grizzlies? After all, without the experimental population of grizzlies, environmentalists
have no leverage courtesy of the grizzly bear165 on which to challenge timber harvest

164

And it is fair in this instance to take the “new west” narrative as an assumption of (more or less) truth
because the CB supporters employed the narrative to validate their case. Stated another way, I am only
applying their own assumptions to their own conclusions. I do not mean to simply and uncritically accept
and run with the various problematic assumptions of a wholesale regional transformation, but a more
elaborated examination that directly challenges the “new west” narrative – a worthwhile project in its own
right – is beyond the scope of this dissertation (though see footnote 148, this chapter, for one “new west”
assumption ‘unpacked’ in the context of these debates).
165
Other, non-bear related, potential future avenues for challenging forest plans still exist, but these
avenues exist with or without an experimental population of grizzlies inhabiting the Bitterroot. For
example, endangered species litigation on behalf of any number of species of anadromous (salmon and
steelhead) and non-anadromous (e.g., bull trout and cutthroat trout) fish. The latter are especially
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plans. That is, barring either reintroduction of fully protected grizzlies or natural
recolonization of the Bitterroot by grizzlies (both of which are remote possibilities), the
grizzly bear provides no additional habitat protection for the national forests surrounding
the wilderness areas. If the trends do reverse and go against conservation and toward
extractive production, then this would mark a future political climate in which even a
CMC-type proposal would have little chance of passing.
Thus a third case, a truly worst case scenario from a conservation standpoint, and
we are still better off, I would argue, with an experimental population of grizzly bears in
the Bitterroot. I could go on from here to make specific cases projecting positive
collaborative successes for the CMC, but that would be highly speculative and downright
boosterist – hardly a sincere perspective for a critical social science analysis (though I
cannot not mention the positive potential I see in a timber/environmentalist alliance, tense
as it would necessarily be). The positive potential is better off left in the abstract (as
covered by Snow (1997) and reviewed in the previous section). Hopefully the future will
provide opportunities to test similar proposals, or perhaps even give the Bitterroot CMC
new life. Only after extended experiments in these endeavors will my optimism toward
the potential of the CMC and collaborative efforts in general prove justified or be
relegated to the dustbin of environmental history.
In closing, I argue that (an environmentalist) opposition to the CMC alternative
would have to be based in one or both of the following beliefs: first, that the CB
alternative provided a viable and preferable alternative to the CMC proposal; second, that
the CMC proposal would have worked to the ultimate detriment of grizzly bear
conservation and against broader environmentalist objectives. Based upon my analysis, I
conclude on the first question that the CB alternative was neither viable nor preferable to
the CMC proposal, and on the second that the CMC proposal – judged with even the
slightest degree of optimism – would have benefited the cause of grizzly bear
conservation in the Rocky Mountain Northwest.
significant in watersheds like the North Fork of the Clearwater, which has been cut off from anadromous
fish runs by the Dworshak Dam. Habitat restoration and species conservation for these fish presents one of
the greatest challenges to the region (Barker, 1997), but its possibility represents inestimable
(cultural/ecological/economic) rewards (Cone, 1995; Landeen & Pinkham, 1999; Reading, 1996; Scarce,
1999). Arguing that since much of the blame for the degradation of fisheries is due to historic and current
forestry practices, timber harvesting on public lands should be eliminated is an overly-simplistic and
erroneous leap of logic (Barker, 1997).
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